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ABSTRACT 
 
Limiting anthropogenic climate change over the next century will require controlling 
multiple substances.  The Kyoto Protocol structure constrains the major greenhouse gases 
and allows trading among them, but there exist other possible regime architectures which 
may be more efficient.  Tradeoffs between the market efficiency of all-inclusive policies 
and the benefits of policies targeted to the unique characteristics of each substance are 
investigated using an integrated assessment approach, using the MIT Emissions Prediction 
and Policy Analysis model, the Integrated Global Systems Model, and political analysis 
methods. 
The thesis explores three cases.  The first case addresses stabilization, the ultimate 
objective of Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  We highlight 
the implications of imprecision in the definition of stabilization, the importance of non-CO2 
substances, and the problems of excessive focus on long-term targets.  The results of the 
stabilization analysis suggest that methane reduction will be especially valuable because of 
its importance in low-cost mitigation policies that are effective on timescales up to three 
centuries.  Therefore in the second case we examine methane, demonstrating that methane 
constraints alone can account for a 15% reduction in temperature rise over the 21st century.  
In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that Global Warming Potential based trading 
between methane reductions and fossil CO2 reductions is flawed because of the differences 
in their atmospheric characteristics, the uncertainty in methane inventories, the negative 
interactions of CO2 constraints with underlying taxes, and higher political barriers to 
constraining CO2.  The third case examines the benefits of increased policy coordination 
between air pollution constraints and climate policies. We calculate the direct effects of air 
pollution constraints to be less than 8% of temperature rise over the century, but ancillary 
reductions of GHGs lead to an additional 17% decrease. Furthermore, current policies have 
not had success coordinating air pollution constraints and CO2 constraints, potentially 
leading to a 20% welfare cost penalty resulting from separate implementation.   
Our results lead us to recommend enacting near term multinational CH4 constraints 
independently from CO2 policies as well as supporting air pollution policies in developing 
nations that include an emphasis on climate friendly projects.   
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1 Stabilization in a Multi-Gas World 
 
1.1 Introduction:  An unresolved need for action 
 
Anthropogenic climate change is likely to be one of the most important issues that 
humanity will need to address in the 21st century.  While attribution is sometimes difficult, 
we are likely already seeing impacts of climate change in everything from the die off of 
Alaskan forests to increases in hurricane intensity to unprecedented European heat waves.  
As the planet continues to warm due to the radiative effects of greenhouse gases, more 
changes will be seen both on the short term (less than a century) and long term (multiple 
century) timescales.  Addressing this issue will require both adaptation (as the Earth is 
already committed to some minimum amount of warming) and mitigation, and possibly 
even geo-engineering.  This thesis concerns itself only with mitigation:  adaptation is a 
worthy topic of study but outside the scope of this work, and geo-engineering should be 
considered a solution of last resort1.  In terms of mitigation, we would ideally enact policies 
that will reduce both the short-term rate of change and the long-term temperature achieved.  
We especially would like to avoid any “tipping points” should they exist as such.  
However, we would like to achieve this mitigation for as little expense as possible.   
Despite the growing recognition of the issue, there has been significant policy inertia 
in enacting mitigation strategies.  The global nature of the climate change problem 
dissuades action, as the atmosphere is a global commons and therefore free rider, collective 
action, and similar issues inhibit enacting stringent policies.  The long time scale of the 
problem similarly retards movement:  politicians think on a the timescale of the electoral 
cycle, the general populace rarely accept sacrifices today for improvements tomorrow, and 
unborn generations have no ability to influence current events.  The uncertainty in impacts 
adds confusion to the determination of optimal measures, and furthermore serves as a lever 
useful to those who wish to delay the passage of any significant measures.  The cost of 
                                                 
1 As in the tale of the old woman who swallowed the fly, to solve one crisis precipitated by what is in effect a 
global scale experiment by enacting another global scale experiment is a very risky notion, to be undertaken 
only in the most dire circumstances.   
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reductions is similarly uncertain, and likely to be spread across most of the economy, and 
this uncertainty also adds to policy paralysis.   
CO2 is individually the most significant of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases.  
However, it is also perhaps the most difficult to abate due to its relationship with energy 
production.  Governments are leery of accepting constraints that they perceive will put 
them at a competitive disadvantage with other nations, which may slow down their 
economic growth, which will impede politically powerful industrial lobbies in the energy, 
transport, and energy intensive production sectors, or which will be unpopular with the 
electorate who would see increased prices at the pump and in monthly energy bills.   
Due to these economic and political implications of non-voluntary constraints on 
CO2, emissions controls have been slow to be enacted, have not included some major 
players (such as the United States and China), and, according to some analyses, are not 
much more stringent than business as usual.  The two most prominent such non-voluntary 
policies are the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Emissions Trading System.  
Standard environmental economic wisdom dictates that efficient policies should be as 
comprehensive as possible in order to capture all low cost abatement opportunities, which 
in the case of greenhouse gases means as many nations as possible.  In addition, given the 
existence of a metric such as Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) that allows direct 
comparison of greenhouse gases (GHGs) on a single axis, such efficient policies should 
also be comprehensive in terms of gas coverage.  And indeed, the Kyoto Protocol was 
designed to cover the major gases and as many industrialized nations as possible. This 
theoretically enables the invisible hand of market forces to find the most efficient solutions 
to a given constraint.  There are three major trading structures:  trading between regions 
allows “where” flexibility, banking and borrowing (e.g., trading between time periods) 
allow “when” flexibility, and trading between gases allows “what” flexibility.  Ceteris 
paribus, where, when, and what flexibility are all desirable features, and this fact has 
indeed been highlighted by research to which this author has contributed (Reilly et al., 
2003a).   
However, there are reasons to believe that some aspects of this flexibility may have 
negative consequences.  First, gases with different lifetimes and source characteristics have 
properties that are sufficiently different that allowing reductions of one gas to compensate 
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for increases in another may be ill-advised.  Second, the inclusion of CO2 in the 
comprehensive approach may be the primary issue that has slowed effective policy 
creation, and therefore a separate approach for individual gases might be politically more 
effective.  We are not the first to note that there are issues with “what flexibility” (Goulder 
and Pizer, 2006), but we state it more firmly than we have previously seen.  There are also 
substances that are not included in the Kyoto basket, and it is possible that these pollutants 
(namely ozone precursors and aerosols) deserve a more prominent role.  We note that even 
inter-regional trading is not always optimal, both due to interaction effects between local 
taxes and reduction policies, and also because of differences between market equivalent 
prices and actual local purchasing power.  In any case, there are tradeoffs between the 
benefits of coordination between abatement of multiple substances, and the benefits of 
crafting policy to optimally address the unique characteristics of each substance.   
Therefore, this thesis uses multiple approaches to address the potential role of non-
CO2 gas policies in a global context.  We first examine the standard approaches to climate 
policy in this chapter.  The role of Article 2 of the UNFCCC and the emphasis on 
stabilization of greenhouse gases are important because of the lack of definition of 
stabilization itself, and because this emphasis on stabilization leads to a focus on CO2 and 
long term targets.  We then delve in more depth into methane policies in chapter two and 
air pollution policies in chapter three.  Computational modeling plays a significant role in 
this thesis in order to determine the potential carried in reduction of these substances and 
the interaction between different policies.  The capability of the MIT IGSM to handle the 
chemistry of the atmosphere is of vital importance for understanding the lifecycles of 
methane and ozone.  The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model (EPPA, 
detailed in Appendix A) provides emissions scenarios for the 21st century, as well as the 
capability of determining economic costs of emission constraint policies in various 
configurations.  We introduced new functionality into the EPPA model so that it could be 
used to analyze air pollution policies in a similar fashion to various GHG policies.  These 
computations are then embedded in a deeper policy context in order to fully understand 
their implications.   
This chapter demonstrates the importance of not being limited to addressing 
stabilization as a concept, and the necessity of looking beyond CO2 for low cost and 
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effective temperature change reduction on the century timescale.  The conclusion of our 
work is that methane reduction in particular, and perhaps also black carbon reduction, 
should play important roles in future climate actions.  However, in contrast to much other 
research in this area, this thesis suggests that greenhouse gas policies should not allow 
methane reductions to be traded for CO2 reductions for reasons political, economic, and 
chemical.  This separate approach will enable policies to be designed in such a way as to be 
best suited to the characteristics of each substance, taking into account the appropriate 
uncertainties, source partitioning between OECD and developing nations, and other 
aspects.  We believe that the advantages in this separation outweigh the loss of “what 
flexibility”.   
However, there do exist advantages of coordination, even in the absence of actual 
trading.  This coordination potential is especially prevalent in air pollution reductions, 
because fossil fuel combustion is a major source of both CO2 and air pollutants and 
therefore reductions or modifications of the fossil fuel combustion process can lead to 
improvements in climate and air quality.  So while we show that NOx, CO, and VOC 
reductions will play little role in direct climate impacts (though inclusion of ozone impact 
on agriculture may change this conclusion slightly), we can also show the magnitude of the 
the interaction of climate and air pollution policy.  Therefore we see that the same analysis 
methodology leads to a suggestion of policy fragmentation in the case of methane, but 
policy coordination in the case of air pollution.   
 
1.2 Article 2 philosophy and limitations:  The stabilization question 
 
1.2.1 The Role of Article 2 of the UNFCCC 
 
Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
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climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.   
 
Any discussion of climate change policy needs to address the centerpiece of 
international cooperation for addressing global climate change:  the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.  Signed by heads of state in 1992 at the UN Conference 
for the Environment and Development summit in Rio de Janeiro the Convention entered 
into force in 1994.  The UNFCCC coordinates various international climate change actions 
such as national inventories, and partners with other organizations such as the Global 
Environmental Facility and the IPCC to further research and create policy.  While the 
Convention itself has no binding reduction commitments it is meant to serve as a 
framework for further climate treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol.  As such, the text of the 
UNFCCC has significant influence on the framing of worldwide goals, studies, and actions 
in the climate change realm. Article 2, as the Ultimate Objective of the Convention, is 
therefore extremely important in considerations of global climate policy.   
The language of Article 2 (perhaps deliberately) leaves significant room for 
interpretation.  Specifically, the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gases does not specify a 
partitioning between gases or a timetable of reductions.  Rhetoric and academic studies 
have concentrated in large part on carbon dioxide, and on long term solutions.  Actual 
policies have mostly followed the suggestions of environmental economists in including all 
GHGs and as many nations as possible in a single comprehensive policy with trading both 
between gases and between regions in order to allow the market to take advantage of the 
lowest marginal cost solutions.  However implementation of these policies has moved 
slowly, and fourteen years after the Framework Convention was negotiated only two such 
policies (the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol) have taken effect, and neither policy 
includes the US, China, nor India, nor, by many estimates, does either policy impose 
significant constraints2.  
 
                                                 
2 Acknowledging, of course, that both policies are meant to be first steps and may therefore be worthwhile 
despite not being tight constraints in their early periods.   
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1.2.2 The Definition of Stabilization 
 
There is disagreement about what stabilization actually entails, but despite attempts to 
put other gases on the agenda the discussion of stabilization tends to trend towards carbon 
dioxide.  The 1997 Technical Paper III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) attempted to clarify the Convention’s stabilization goal (Schimel et al., 1997).  
Sensitivity to small deviations in other GHG emissions was evaluated and the study 
revealed that in the short term these deviations could have significant impact.  The 
Technical Paper also noted that since pre-industrial times, the contribution of these ‘other’ 
substances to radiative forcing is comparable to that of CO2.  But in academic papers, 
control of other gases is at best usually relegated to footnotes or asides (Arnell et al., 2002; 
Dai et al., 2001a; Hoffert et al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2001; O'Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002).  
Question 6 of the Synthesis Report to the IPCC Third Assessment  Report (TAR) asks what 
the consequences are of stabilizing concentrations in carbon dioxide equivalents, but the 
text then only addresses CO2, and the stabilization scenarios are analyzed with only one 
projection of other greenhouse gases, namely the unconstrained SRES A1B scenario 
(Watson and Core Writing Team, 2001). The U.S. National Assessment Report on Climate 
Change Impacts relies heavily on the CGCM1 and HADCM2 models, both of which use 
CO2 as a surrogate for other greenhouse gases (National Assessment Synthesis Team, 
2001).  The fact that forcing changes are often measured in CO2 equivalents rather than a 
more precise term such as W/m2 is yet another piece of evidence that points towards the 
importance of CO2 in academic studies and in political rhetoric.3   
Other studies, such as a Hadley Centre analysis (Mitchell et al., 2000), equate a CO2 
stabilization level with a forcing value.  These studies model varying CO2 concentrations 
and assume the concentrations of all other gases stay constant, but acknowledge that, in 
reality, society might choose a different allocation between other GHGs and CO2 that add 
up to the same total forcing level.  For a given CO2 equivalent stabilization target, the 
actual level at which CO2 will need to be stabilized is therefore likely to be significantly 
lower than the target concentration and, moreover, such studies provide no direct guidance 
                                                 
3 W/m2, or watts per meter squared, are used as a measure of the average global radiative forcing change at 
the tropopause resulting from an increase in the concentration of a given greenhouse gas from some baseline 
(usually present concentrations, or preindustrial concentrations).  
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on the emissions paths that would be consistent with stabilization of radiative forcing.  The 
question of stabilization of multiple greenhouse gases is inevitably linked to how to 
compare greenhouse gases, and thus the inadequacy of GWPs (Reilly et al., 1999).  GWPs 
are defined and discussed at more length in Appendix D.  One approach is to set a specific 
climate or radiative forcing target and endogenously estimate the optimal control path of 
different gases (Manne and Richels, 2001a) .  Work in this vein has relied on unrealistically 
simplified climate and atmospheric chemistry relationships, so it does not provide 
assurance that a single optimal path exists and that it is numerically feasible to solve for it.  
Absent in these efforts are important relationships among methane, the hydroxyl radical, 
tropospheric ozone and its precursors, nonlinearities and thresholds in climate dynamics, 
and issues involving aerosols and other climatically important substances.  In addition, if 
the constraint is limited to stabilization rather than including additional tolerable rates of 
radiative forcing change constraints, the model will yield solutions that have little methane 
control until the decade prior to the constraint taking effect.  In early periods, only the long 
lived gases – and mainly carbon dioxide – are expected to be controlled.  Recently, more 
academic work has begun to have more emphasis on these other gases:  they are especially 
prominent in the EMF-21 special issue of the Energy Journal (Weyant et al., 2006).   
On the political side, we note that Kyoto’s ratification was dependent on the 
signatures of 55 Annex I Parties accounting for 55% of total carbon dioxide emissions – 
not GHG emissions – from those parties.  Similarly, though the European Union has set a 
target of 2° C above preindustrial, in several documents they have gone on to state that the 
target can be met by achieving a 550 ppm CO2 target (European Parliament and the 
Council, 2002).  The Ministerial Declaration of the UNFCCC COP in 1996 stated a goal of 
“stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at twice pre-industrial levels”.  It is likely that 
they set that goal with a doubling of CO2 in mind.  And of course, emissions of gases are 
often measured in carbon equivalent by multiplying by their GWPs.  Finally, the European 
ETS is indeed a CO2 only policy.   
Despite the big picture emphasis on stabilization and CO2, shorter term climate 
policies do often include the possibility of trading among greenhouse gases by using the 
global warming potentials (GWPs) established by the IPCC in order to reach more 
economically efficient solutions than relying on CO2 reduction alone.  Indeed, the Kyoto 
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Protocol allows for precisely this sort of trading across greenhouse gases, using a 100-year 
GWP as the ‘exchange rate’.   However, there is an inconsistency between the concept of 
stabilization and the use of these trading schemes.  We note that trading schemes that rely 
on constant GWPs will not generate stabilization of concentrations or radiative forcing, 
because trading a reduction of a gas with a short lifetime for an increase of a long-lived gas 
will inherently lead to reductions in radiative forcing in the near term and increases in 
radiative forcing in the long term (and vice versa).  Stabilizing radiative forcing would 
require trading concentration levels of one GHG for another, which would imply that in 
terms of emissions, emissions paths for each GHG be specified over at least the lifetime of 
the longest lived of the two.  This can be seen logically if we consider the case where we 
allow a trade between a one time increase in CO2 emissions and a corresponding decrease 
in CH4 emissions.  A one time trade based on GWP weighting would lead to an initial 
decrease in forcing, as the radiative forcing effects of a given mass of methane is larger 
than that of the GWP equivalent mass of CO2.  However, within a few decades, methane 
concentrations would have returned to their equilibrium concentrations while CO2 
concentrations would still exhibit an increase, leading to a net increase in forcing.   
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Alternatively, we demonstrate the effects of a sustained change in emissions levels in 
Figure 1-1, using a highly simplified system where methane and CO2 are assumed to decay 
in the atmosphere with a constant lifetime.  The simulation starts in 2100 with CO2 and 
CH4 concentrations both stable at 550 ppm and 1.8 ppm respectively.  In 2110 methane 
emissions are decreased and CO2 emissions are increased.  Again, the decrease in methane 
leads to a short term decrease in forcing.  In this case, methane concentrations quickly 
stabilize at a lower level.  CO2 concentrations, however, take hundreds of years to reach a 
higher concentration, and this increase in CO2 concentration will eventually lead to a net 
increase in forcing in the system, despite the GWP weighted sum of emissions remaining 
constant during the entire simulation.  In the simulated case shown in the figure, the point 
at which the total forcing in the trading case exceeds the original forcing is reached within 
70 years, and by the time CO2 concentrations finally stabilize, there has been an increase in 
total radiative forcing of more than 0.7 W/m2 (the diamond represents the total forcing 
reached in the year 3000). 
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Figure 1-1:  The impact on radiative forcing (left panel) and emissions (right panel) of trading CH4 and 
CO2 by constant GWP values in a simplified analysis 
An interesting question can be raised as to what interests led the negotiators to adopt 
the precise language of the Article.  Oppenheimer and Petsonk (2005) cite Reinstein, one of 
the US negotiators, as saying that some negotiators lobbied for language that would have 
defined danger in economic terms, which would have naturally led to a consideration of 
economic costs of policies being considered simultaneously with damages.  We can 
hypothesize that it might have been in the interests of some negotiators to word a policy 
such that it would not encourage the adoption of early, near term constraints, and ironically, 
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that these hypothetical negotiators might have found natural allies with ecologists who 
often think naturally about long time scales.  In addition to the issue that Article 2 does not 
encourage short term action, it also limits some approaches to long-term solutions.  In 
Oppenheimer and Petsonk’s analysis of the historical origin of Article 2 they note that there 
exist alternative frameworks for long-term objectives “that are not consistent with the 
language of Article 2” such as technology-based approaches (Metz et al., 2002; 
Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005). 
 
1.2.3 Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference:  The Ultimate 
Objective 
 
Stabilization of greenhouse gases may be the means enshrined in Article 2, but the 
ultimate objective is prevention of dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate 
system.  Article 2 raises the question of temporal issues by noting that stabilization levels 
should be achieved within a time frame that allows adaptation by ecosystems.  In a way, 
this is an implicit acknowledgment that stabilization by itself is not sufficient:  that the path 
taken to achieve stabilization matters.  One question is whether in fact this concept of a 
“path” which avoids dangerous anthropogenic interference might have been a more 
appropriate goal than stabilization.   
Article 2 also makes a nod to economic realities by stating that the stabilization levels 
should be achieved in a manner consistent with sustainable economic development.  It does 
not give any guidelines for resolving a potential conflict where stabilization cannot be 
achieved without impeding economic development, or considering possible tradeoffs 
between interference and development.  It might be the case that the authors of Article 2 
felt that economic costs would be taken into account regardless of inclusion in this 
statement – certainly economic interests have trumped environmental interests in the 
climate debate until now.     
In any case, avoidance of dangerous anthropogenic interference in general refers to 
avoiding negative impacts on both human activities and ecosystems.  These impacts 
presumably scale with the magnitude of climate changes, and these climate changes should 
be related in some way to global mean temperature rise.  Temperature rise itself is a 
 23
nonlinear function of radiative forcing in the atmosphere, and radiative forcing is a function 
of greenhouse gas concentrations.  Therefore the idea that it is possible to limit 
anthropogenic interference by controlling greenhouse gas concentrations does have 
validity.  Figure 1-2 demonstrates one way to think about the stabilization cause-effect 
chain4.  It is possible to design polices and/or goals attempting to control any one of the 
points on this chain:  emissions, concentrations, forcings, temperature, or impacts, and 
there have been suggestions addressing all these possibilities.  Economists tend to 
concentrate on emissions, where there exists the most immediate link between policy and 
effect.  Scientists usually use radiative forcing as a measure of choice, as a natural metric 
that is easily adapted for use in climate modeling.   
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Figure 1-2:  The Stabilization Cause-Effect Chain 
The concept of stabilization clearly targets concentrations as a goal.  There are some 
advantages to addressing concentration for the purposes of making policy rather than 
impacts or temperature.  First is that there is significantly less uncertainty in what 
                                                 
4 .  Note that a similar figure exists in Corfee-Morlot & Hohne (2003) but this figure was developed 
completely independently.   
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concentration will be achieved with a given emissions pathway than in what temperature 
will be achieved with the same pathway – most of the uncertainty in the climate system 
comes in terms of what temperature change results from a given forcing change, with this 
uncertainty mainly being a result of uncertainty in the magnitudes (or sometimes even 
signs) of various feedbacks and the rate of oceanic heat uptake.  Second is that due to the 
inertia of the climate system there is a lag between reaching a given concentration and 
realizing the full impact of that concentration.  Of course, one could use the same argument 
to imply that emissions should be the target rather than concentrations, especially given 
that regulations can more directly effect emissions.  In general, moving up this cause-effect 
chain increases the ability to design policies to reach a given target with certainty, and 
therefore to understand the economic impacts of the policy.   
The argument for moving down the chain is that if the final goal of policy is to 
actually reduce impacts, would impacts be a more relevant target?  This is important not 
only because we care about the impacts specifically, but also to allow greater flexibility in 
how we achieve the goal.  If we take emissions or concentrations as a goal, we need to 
determine an appropriate partitioning between gases (or an appropriate trading measure).  
Well-mixed gases in the atmosphere are effectively interchangeable as far as a climate 
model is concerned, and therefore the use of radiative forcing as a measure allows 
flexibility in determining gas concentrations.  Targeting temperature or actual welfare 
impacts in unfortunately not only difficult for reasons of uncertainty mentioned above, but 
also because the variety in types of impacts and regions where the impacts occur make it 
difficult to even agree on a given target.      
However there are, of course, some substances which have both climate and non-
climate effects.  Ozone, black carbon, NOx, and SOx all have direct health and ecosystem 
impacts as well as radiative forcing effects.  Some substances change climate in complex 
ways that may not result in mean temperature change - black carbon can effect the 
hydrological cycle by warming the air column at high altitudes, and even in cases where 
this does not impact temperature it may change rainfall, cloud cover, and other important 
climatic attributes.  It can be difficult to project concentrations from emissions due to 
uncertainties in atmospheric chemistry, natural emissions, or carbon sinks.  Local 
differences of concentrations for substances such as ozone or black carbon make it hard to 
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compare the global mean temperature impact of a given mean radiative forcing to that of 
well-mixed gases.  There can be impacts on temperature due to albedo changes from land 
use change or urban expansion.  CO2 itself has direct impacts, both positive in terms of 
increased agricultural yields and plant growth, and negative such as increased ocean acidity 
(Ruttimann, 2006) and increased growth of C3 weeds in competition with C4 crops such as 
maize and sugarcane.  There are also feedbacks in the other direction, as climate changes 
impact the carbon cycle, atmospheric chemistry, the hydrologic cycle, and the economy.  
These, and a host of other potential complications, make the link between stabilization and 
dangerous interference less straightforward than might be hoped.    
Examples of the kinds of dangerous interference that are to be avoided can include 
global sea level rise, increases in hurricane intensity or frequency (Emanuel, 2005; Webster 
et al., 2005), changes in precipitation patterns impacting agriculture, melting of permafrost, 
increases in heat wave frequency, loss of especially fragile ecosystems that have limited 
migration capabilities such as coral reefs, alpine ecosystems, and tundra, change of surface 
insolation impacting plant growth, changes of air quality, or a host of other impacts.  It is 
unlikely that there could ever be an agreement as to what combination of these impacts 
might constitute the threshold of “dangerous anthropogenic interference”.  There are some 
possible events, such as the total melting of the Greenland ice sheet leading to 7 meters of 
sea level rise or collapse of the thermohaline circulation leading to likely disruption of 
weather patterns around the North Atlantic and the loss of a major sink for heat and carbon, 
that are outcomes widely considered to be avoided at any cost.   
However, given the ability of ecosystems and economies to adapt, it is an open 
question whether even such drastic events would be a problem given a long enough time 
scale.  The current climate is not inherently superior to a world several degrees warmer or 
cooler.  However, there is significant human and ecological capital invested under the 
current system which might need to shift for any new climate, and it is not obvious what a 
safe rate would be to allow such shifts to occur without excess disruption – indeed, current 
rates of change may already exceed this “safe rate” for the most sensitive ecosystems.  In 
fact, before Article 2 was written, the WMO in 1988 produced a report with a rate of 
warming target (a “tolerable rate”) that was proposed as a long term objective that would 
have led to a very different emphasis in thinking (Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005), in a 
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similar fashion to UNEP and the AGGG in the 1980s (Corfee-Morlot and Hohne, 2003).  
The original proposed rate was 1/10th degree C per decade.  The Dutch and US 
governments apparently were proponents of the long term stabilization approach that 
became the UNFCCC objective, rather than, for example, the Enquete Commission goal of 
a reduction of fossil fuel use by 2050 to avoid 1 to 2 degrees C rise in that time frame 
(Enquete Commission, 1989).   
A potential problem is that even with a fairly slow rate of change, there may be 
tipping points where a rapid change is triggered.  Is there a critical temperature at which the 
interior of the Greenland ice sheet will start melting, leading to total loss of the ice sheet on 
the time scale of decades?  Or a threshold that will cause methane release from tundra or 
clathrates at a scale that will cause further rapid temperature increase?  Is the Amazonian 
rainforest in danger of entering a dangerous cycle where, rather than “rain following the 
plow” as in the hopes of Western settlers in the 19th century, drought will follow the loss of 
vegetation yielding a rapid transformation from rainforest to savannah or desert?  If we 
should pass any of these poorly understood thresholds it will become impossible to turn 
back without resorting to geo-engineering solutions which may prove as dangerous as the 
problem which they were meant to solve.   
Not only is there no agreement on what constitutes dangerous anthropogenic 
interference, but global warming will certainly have very different impacts on different 
regions, and for some temperature changes some sectors in some regions may be positively 
effected by climate change.  Vulnerability comes into play here, with developed nations 
more able to adapt by shifting infrastructure and using technologically (and often energy) 
intensive solutions to weather changes.  Examples include air conditioning for heat waves, 
irrigation for droughts, dikes and levees for sea level rise, and so forth.  However, recent 
events such as hurricane Katrina and the 2006 heatwave in California in the US, and the 
2003 heatwave in Europe, show that even in very rich nations these potential solutions are 
not always well implemented.  Less developed nations have less ability to adapt, and will 
therefore suffer more from climatic change.  This implies that, perversely, those nations 
which are the most vulnerable are often those with the weakest economies, and therefore 
the fewest emissions.  Meanwhile, the nations with the most emissions and therefore 
greatest impact on climate change have less incentive to reduce future warming and would 
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bear more of the cost of reducing emissions, and therefore would be likely to set a 
threshold for dangerous anthropogenic interference at a much higher level than the 
vulnerable, poorer nations.   
But the most important question for any ultimate objective is the impact that the goal 
has on near term policy.  And all the uncertainty and complications involved in defining 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference” may serve to only delay action rather than promote 
actual solutions.   
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Figure 1-3:  Global average radiative forcing (RF) estimates and ranges in 2005 for anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and other important agents and 
mechanisms, together with the typical geographical extent (spatial scale) of the forcing and the assessed 
level of scientific understanding (LOSU). The net anthropogenic radiative forcing and its range are also 
shown. These require summing asymmetric uncertainty estimates from the component terms, and 
cannot be obtained by simple addition. Additional forcing factors not included here are considered to 
have a very low LOSU. Volcanic aerosols contribute an additional natural forcing but are not included 
in this figure due to their episodic nature. The range for linear contrails does not include other possible 
effects of aviation on cloudiness. Figure SPM-2 in the AR4 Summary for Policymakers (Alley et al., 
2007) 
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1.3 Key Gases 
 
1.3.1 The Emphasis on CO2 
 
Carbon dioxide is widely acknowledged to be the largest anthropogenic contributor to 
greenhouse forcing.  CO2 has been recognized as a GHG since the times of Tyndall and 
Arrhenius.  The recognition of the primacy of CO25 is demonstrated by Arrhenius’s 
statement that the absorption of the atmosphere was “not exerted by the chief mass of the 
air, but in a high degree by aqueous vapour and carbonic acid, which are present in the air 
in small quantities.” (Arrhenius, 1896)  He even calculated the temperature change that 
would result from increases in carbon dioxide concentrations, estimating that a doubling of 
CO2 would yield about 5° Celsius warming.  And today climate sensitivity, a common 
metric for the equilibrium temperature response to a forcing change, is in fact defined 
based on forcing resulting from doubled CO2 concentrations – despite the fact that the 
concept “climate sensitivity to forcings” exists (Hansen and Sato, 2004).  The IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report Summary for Policymakers (Alley et al., 2007) shows forcing 
contributions of increases in greenhouse gases beyond their preindustrial levels in their 
standard chart (Figure 1-3), with CO2 contributing 60% of well-mixed gas forcing.  This 
matches estimates from the MIT Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM, discussed in 
more detail in the Appendix B).  Similarly, using 100-year GWP weighted emissions6 
(Figure 1-4) from EPPA in 2000, CO2 accounts for more than 60% of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions.  Fossil carbon dioxide emissions are estimated in the AR4 
Summary for Policmakers to be 6.0 to 6.8 GtC (Alley et al., 2007).  And given a reference 
forecast of emissions, by 2100 CO2 may contribute 75% of GWP weighted emissions and 
almost 75% of forcing increase from preindustrial times (Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5).    
                                                 
5 Along with water vapor, but as the quantity of water in the atmosphere is a function of the climate system 
and not direct emissions, water vapor is always treated as a feedback rather than as a direct GHG.   
6 GWP weighting is still perhaps the best simple way to compare emissions of different gases, for all the 
limitations of the methodology.  It is certainly the most widespread and widely accepted.  Therefore, while we 
will attempt to include more direct measures such as radiative forcing or temperature impacts where possible, 
GWP measures will be used throughout this thesis. 
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Figure 1-4:  EPPA reference scenario emissions weighted by 100 year GWPs 
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Figure 1-5: EPPA reference scenario, forcing from preindustrial 
As has been pointed out by (Hansen et al., 2000), much of the forcing resulting from 
historical CO2 emissions has been partially balanced by the sulfate aerosols that were 
produced concurrently – however, with the advent of pollution control equipment, the ratio 
of CO2 to sulfate emissions has increased greatly, and in any case the century scale lifetime 
of CO2 means that carbon dioxide is a stock problem whereas aerosols have a lifetime 
measured in weeks (Andreae et al., 2005; Novakov et al., 2003).   
Carbon dioxide concentrations have risen from approximately 278 ppm preindustrial 
(Ramaswamy et al., 2001) to 377 ppm in 2004 (Keeling and Whorf, 2005).  Atmospheric 
increases during the 1990s averaged 3.2 PgC/yr (IPCC) or about 1.5 ppm/year.  Because 
increases in CO2 concentrations are responsible for 60% of well-mixed gas forcing 
increases from preindustrial, it can be argued that CO2 has been historically been the most 
important of the greenhouse gases. CO2 is an inherent product of fossil fuel combustion, 
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and emissions are likely to grow significantly because in the absence of strong policy 
action fossil fuels are likely to provide the majority of worldwide energy for the 
foreseeable future, and energy use is projected to continue to grow as economies grow.  
Therefore, CO2 is likely to continue to be the largest contributor to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas forcing in the future.  Unlike other pollutants, CO2 is very difficult to 
eliminate with the use of end-of-pipe technologies.  The closest approximations to end-of-
pipe control involve controversial7, expensive, and energy intensive solutions such as 
capturing CO2 and depositing it into oceanic or geological reservoirs, or novel but largely 
untested approaches such as using flue gases to grow algae (Schwartz, 2004).  This lack of 
accepted end-of-pipe measures means that CO2 may also be the most difficult of the 
greenhouse gases to abate.  86% of energy production in 2004 came from fossil fuel 
sources (U.S. Department of Energy, 2004), and energy use is projected to continue rising 
rapidly.  The US DOE and EPPA both project a 50% increase in global energy use in the 
next 20 years (U.S. Department of Energy, 2006), and EPPA furthermore projects a 
fourfold increase in energy production by the end of the century (Figure 1-6).   
Implementation of international greenhouse gas reduction policies such as the Kyoto 
Protocol has been slow, and was only ratified after last minute concessions and the 
withdrawal of the United States and Australia.  Analysis suggests that the Protocol may 
now be non-binding if full use is made of available “hot air”.  The pace of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s implementation is a contrast to the implementation of chlorofluorocarbon 
controls in the Montreal Protocol.  This difference is likely due in large part to the 
difficulty of reducing CO2 emissions.  Because of the linkage between CO2 intensive 
energy production and economic growth there is a fear that CO2 constraints will lead to an 
economic competitive disadvantage between nations adopting CO2 emissions restraints and 
unconstrained nations.  In addition, the fossil fuel industry is politically powerful.  The 
influence of the fossil industry is especially strong in the US, which accounted for 22% of 
global CO2 emissions in 2004 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2004).  While there are many 
factors involved in why the US was one of two nations to withdraw from the Kyoto 
process, the power of the local fossil fuel lobby is likely one of them.   
                                                 
7 CO2 sequestration is considered controversial mainly because of uncertainty about potential leakage from 
reservoirs and possible environmental side effects. 
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A counterpoint is that the European Trading System (ETS) only covers carbon 
dioxide emissions, and yet was implemented fairly rapidly.  Oddly, initial trading in the 
ETS for the first time period yielded very high carbon dioxide prices up to 30 euros, 
implying that most of the industrial participants expected the constraints to be binding and 
difficult to meet.  On the other hand, academic analyses (Reilly and Paltsev, 2005) 
predicted very low prices more in line with current prices of a euro per ton CO2.  It is not 
clear whether the national negotiators had beliefs more in line with the academics or with 
the industries that held onto their permits until the first inventories demonstrated that the 
initial carbon allocations were in fact quite generous.  However, regardless of the 
perception of the difficulty of meeting the ETS constraints, an initiative entirely within the 
boundaries of the European Union will have very different barriers to implementation than 
a more international policy.   
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Figure 1-6:  EPPA reference projection of Energy Use by Technology and Fuel 
CO2 is also unique among the greenhouse gases in terms of its lifecycle.  N2O 
degrades mainly through photodissociation, CH4 and the hydrofluorocarbons react with the 
hydroxyl radical, CFCs are destroyed in the stratosphere, and perfluorocarbons and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6) degrade through photolysis in the mesosphere, but CO2 has a very 
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different pathway.  Because carbon in the atmosphere eventually oxidizes to CO2, it is 
often more relevant to track overall carbon than CO2 itself.  Elemental carbon is of course 
never destroyed.  Rather, in the short term CO2 in the atmosphere can be transformed into 
carbon compounds in the biosphere through biochemical plant photosynthesis pathways, or 
into carbonates in the ocean by exchange into the surface layer followed by a slow process 
carrying carbon down into the deep ocean until the ocean and atmosphere reach 
equilibrium.  Therefore, burning fossil fuels effectively moves carbon from geological 
storage into the ocean/ecosystem/atmosphere stock permanently, in the absence of 
technologies such as carbon sequestration.  There are geological processes that eventually 
bury carbonates in the deep ocean sediments, bury surface organic matter sufficiently 
deeply to take it out of the available carbon pool, or capture CO2 through chemical 
weathering, but these mechanisms are all slow enough that they can be ignored on human 
timescales.   
One difficulty in predicting future CO2 concentrations is uncertainty about the behavior 
of various components of the carbon cycle.  We cannot even accurately allocate current 
fluxes with significant certainty between these components.  Sabine et al. (2004) provide a 
summary of recent estimates of global fluxes in the carbon cycle, showing a range of 
uncertainty for the different components.  The increase of CO2 in the atmosphere can be 
measured precisely, and anthropogenic CO2 sources from fossil fuels are fairly well 
understood.  There is greater uncertainty in partitioning the remainder of the carbon cycle 
between the ocean sink and the terrestrial sink, and within the net land-atmosphere flux 
there is further uncertainty in partitioning between emissions from land-use change and 
uptake.  Median estimates of the net sink (ocean uptake plus net terrestrial flux) center 
around -2.6 PgC yr-1 from various studies for the 1980s and 90s, but with significant 
uncertainty.  There is less agreement about the land use change component of the total 
terrestrial sink, ranging from a median estimate of a carbon source of +0.9 PgC yr-1 
(DeFries et al., 2002) to +2.2 PgC yr-1 (Houghton, 2003), and the IPCC AR4 estimates a 
source of 1.6 GtC from land use change with a range from 0.5 to 2.7 GtC for the 1990s 
(Alley et al., 2007).  This historical uncertainty leads to even greater uncertainty in future 
projections.  The response of the ocean to saturation of the upper layers, or temperature 
impacts on circulation, is poorly understood, but may lead to a significant decrease in 
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ocean uptake in the future.  The role of land-use change is clearly very important, but the 
accuracy of current models is limited.  Another issue resulting from the complications of 
the carbon cycle is the difficulty of assigning CO2 a single “lifetime”.  The IPCC Technical 
Summary of Working Group I (Albritton et al., 2001) lists a lifetime of “5 to 200 yr”.   
Indeed, given the length of time that a ton of fossil carbon once burned will remain in the 
ocean/atmosphere/ecological system, lifetime may not even be the appropriate concept to 
use (Tans, 1997).  Of course, because CO2 is the gas against which all other greenhouse 
gases are measured, changes in how the carbon cycle is calculated will then lead to changes 
in the GWP weightings of every other gas.   
Distribution issues are also worth noting.  CO2 emissions also form a higher 
percentage of emissions from developed economies.  In 2000 80% of GWP weighted 
Annex B emissions were from CO2, compared to only 57% of non-Annex B emissions 
(EPPA calculations).  By 2100, in the reference EPPA scenario, the share of CO2 in total 
global emissions grows.  In Annex B nations, the share of CO2 emissions reaches 88%, but 
even in the non-Annex B nations it grows to 71%.   These values do not include 
deforestation emissions, which would obviously contribute to the CO2 share in non-Annex 
B nations in early periods, but the inclusion of deforestation emissions (or of agriculture 
and forest sinks) in policies remains a complicated issue.  As the Byrd-Hagel resolution 
(Sen Byrd, 1997) and the recent Methane to Markets Initiative (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2006b) and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate (Office of the Press Secretary, 2005) show, the inclusion of non-Annex B countries 
– especially China and India – is important politically at the federal level for US policy.  
Given that these non-Annex B nations have a large share of non-CO2 emissions with cheap 
abatement potential, inclusion of these nations in global climate policy could perhaps 
concentrate on these substances.   
 
1.3.2 The Potential of Methane 
 
CO2 is the past and present and projected future largest contributor to anthropogenic 
well-mixed greenhouse gas forcing.  However, the 2nd largest contributor is worth 
examining in its own right.  The increased concentration of methane from a preindustrial 
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level of 700 ppb to a current concentration of about 1775 ppb has led to an increase of 0.5 
W/m2, nearly a third of the contribution from CO2.  We project a continued increase in 
methane concentrations over the century, though not to the same extent that CO2 
concentrations increase.  We have a more detailed analysis of methane in the second 
chapter of this thesis, as well as in Appendix E, but there are some attributes of methane 
that are worth mentioning here.   
The first attribute is that methane has a much shorter lifetime than CO2.  We 
discussed one of the implications of this when we showed that two “GWP equivalent” 
scenarios will have different outcomes in terms of radiative forcing over time.  However, 
the lifetime of methane actually depends on the oxidative capacity of the atmosphere, 
whereas the “lifetime” of CO2 as discussed above is a reflection of the carbon cycle.  This 
means that the lifetime of methane will change depending on what other substances are 
being emitted in large quantities, including emissions of methane itself.  Indeed, if 
emissions of methane increase substantially, this will lead to an increase in the lifetime of 
the gas, and therefore in a positive feedback loop even higher concentrations than would 
otherwise be expected.  Additionally, increased methane emissions also lead to increased 
ozone concentrations through the interaction with the ozone cycle, and ozone has both 
health impacts and additional forcing impacts.   
While 75% to 90% of carbon is emitted by fossil fuel combustion (Alley et al., 2007), 
only about 10% of methane comes from the fossil fuel sector, and that mainly in the form 
of leakage during exploration, production, transport, and utilization (Chen and Prinn, 
2006).  Most of the remaining anthropogenic methane emissions are produced as a result of 
anaerobic processes in the agriculture and waste disposal sectors.  There are many 
inexpensive abatement options available in these sectors, some of which carry the 
additional benefit of capturing the methane for use as an energy source thereby potentially 
displacing additional greenhouse gas emissions.  Due to the inexpensive abatement options 
and significant contribution to forcing, we felt that methane was worth individual 
consideration rather than just being included among a host of other gases.  However, it is 
important to note that the nature of methane sources makes them difficult to quantify.  As 
we demonstrate in the next chapter, our results show that methane is not only worthy of 
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separate academic consideration, but that there are compelling reasons to address it 
separately from carbon dioxide in the policy realm as well. 
 
1.3.3 The Question of Air Pollutants 
 
The third chapter of the thesis addresses air pollution.  Some air pollutants such as 
ozone, black carbon, and sulfate aerosols have direct climate impacts, though it is difficult 
to quantify the radiative impact of substances that are not well mixed in the atmosphere.  
Air pollution emissions are also linked to carbon dioxide emissions because they have a 
common source in fossil fuel combustion.  Finally, air pollution emissions also have an 
impact on methane lifetimes.  However, while air pollution has been studied in an 
academic context, emissions constraints have not been directly addressed in any of the 
major climate policies.  Certainly, no stabilization scenarios that this researcher is aware of 
have included explicit air pollution targets.     However, it is not clear to what extent or in 
which manner climate policies should coordinate with air quality standards.  One rationale 
for coordination is that there are local incentives for addressing air pollution, and that 
therefore this local incentives can serve as leverage in order to gain support for 
complementary greenhouse gas reductions.  Or vice versa – international support for GHG 
reduction may provide funding for air pollution reduction in countries that could otherwise 
not afford it.  However, while it is possible at least to measure direct impacts using 
sophisticated modeling tools, the interactions between greenhouse gas policies and air 
pollution policies are difficult to resolve on a global scale.  And if coordination benefits do 
exist, it is still not clear whether policies should directly address both kinds of emissions 
simultaneously, or whether it is sufficient to implement flexible measures that allow the 
market to optimize across multiple simultaneous objectives.   
 
1.3.4 Temporal Issues 
 
One of the key differences that we highlight between CO2, methane, and air pollution 
is the timescale issue.  CO2 has a lifetime on the order of a century, methane has a lifetime 
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on the order of a decade, and air pollutants have lifetimes on the order of hours, days, or 
weeks at most.  These lifetime differences imply consequences for trading between 
substances, as we demonstrated above for methane and CO2 trading.  They also may imply 
differences in policy approach.   
Because of the lifetime of CO2, most stabilization scenarios project actual 
stabilization occurring in the middle of the 22nd century or beyond.  This is far beyond 
policy timelines for most other issues (with the exception of one or two issues such as 
nuclear waste storage).  How does the long term nature of this commitment impact the 
short term policy process that is necessary to actually getting anything done?  On one hand, 
most arguments about the actual long term goal (550 ppm versus 750 ppm, for example) do 
very little to inform today’s policy making and the effort spent in trying to reach some form 
of consensus may actually detract from moving forward.  On the other hand, the most 
ambitious targets, on the order of 450 ppm or less, would almost certainly require 
significant action within the next decade.  So if negotiators decided that keeping the 450 
ppm option open was an important goal, this would have immediate short term relevance.   
An emphasis on stabilization also ignores certain path issues.  For example, overshoot 
scenarios have been proposed, especially in the case of 450 ppm type constraints.  The 
danger of overshoot scenarios is that there are various climatic processes which exhibit 
hysteresis.  For example, permafrost, once melted, releases CH4 and CO2 from stored 
organic material which has a very long restoration timescale.  Another issue where path 
matters might be thermohaline circulation collapse, which may be not only a function of 
final equilibrium temperature change but also of the rate of change to reach that 
temperature (Stouffer and Manabe, 1999).  And of course, there is the question that applies 
to any long term emissions path, but especially to one which delays reductions into the 
future:  will future generations comply with ambitious plans designed in the present?   
Indeed, long term stock problems create a Zeno’s paradox-like problem:  if reductions 
tomorrow are equivalent to reductions today, why start now?  But the same logic can be 
applied tomorrow, and the day after.   
One of the possible benefits of linking air pollution policies to climate policies is that 
the immediate benefits to be gained for air quality improvements will spur near term action.  
This is not only a time scale issue, but also an issue of geographic scale:  local benefits 
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create more incentives than do global benefits.  Methane has similar advantages of time 
scale, but lacks the geographic scale advantages.  The possible problem is that an emphasis 
on these other short term substances will make it even easier to postpone action on CO2 
reduction.  But we believe that it is appropriate to emphasize those achievable reductions 
that can be made today, and continue to work on the technologies that may be useful for 
reductions tomorrow.    
 
1.3.5 A Cross Gas Comparison 
 
We have discussed some of the properties of carbon dioxide, methane, and air 
pollutants.  All three are possible targets of climate policies, but they have very different 
characteristics.  We prepared Table 1-1 to summarize these differences.  Note that for 
carbon dioxide we specify that portion which derives from fossil sources:  the table could 
be easily be expanded to include “CO2 sinks and sources from non-traditional means” such 
as tillage, forest regrowth, or land use change.  These LULUCF (land use, land use change, 
and forestry) carbon measures differ from fossil sources in various key ways, the most 
important perhaps being uncertainty in emissions.  This uncertainty contains not only the 
question of how much carbon is taken up by for example a forest planting, but the 
permanence of that uptake and questions of what the land had been used for before the 
planting.   
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 Fossil CO2 CH4 Air Pollutants 
Time Scale Long Short Short 
Non-climate Plant fertilization, ocean 
acidity 
Ozone production, 
energy production, coal 
mine fires, ancillary 
landfill odor 
Human health, visibility, 
hydrological cycle 
impacts, ozone-
ecosystem link 
Temperature Reduction Half of accessible 21st 
century reductions from 
reference temperature 
increase, even more 
important on long time 
scales 
1/3 of accessible 21st 
century reductions 
(depending on definition 
of “accessible”), less on 
longer time scales 
Policy can lead to 8% 
direct reduction in 2100 
temperature increase  
Uncertainty in impacts Climate sensitivity 
uncertainty plus sink 
uncertainty  
Climate sensitivity 
uncertainty plus natural 
emissions uncertainty 
plus chemistry 
uncertainty plus ozone 
uncertainty 
Large uncertainty in 
aerosol impacts and 
atmospheric chemistry.  
Sign even in dispute for 
some substances.   
Uncertainty in emissions Small Large Medium 
Uncertainty in 
projections 
Large Large Large 
Uncertainty in 
abatement costs 
Large Medium Large 
Availability of low cost 
reductions 
Small (as a percentage 
of total emissions) 
Large Medium (in developing 
world) 
Local benefits of 
reductions 
Zero Small Large  
Ancillary benefits Large (air pollution) Small Medium (CO2 
reduction) 
North-South equity 
issues 
US refuses to act 
without inclusion of 
China, India:  but CO2 
and economic growth 
are linked so LDCs 
resist constraints 
A lot of emissions are in 
the South, but are cheap 
to abate 
A lot of emissions are in 
the South, and have 
large local benefits to 
reduction, but can be 
expensive.   
Regional Differentiation Small Small Large 
Interaction with Existing 
Policies 
Medium Small Large 
Necessity for 
technology development 
Affordable zero carbon 
energy sources may 
require significant R&D 
investment 
Available technology is 
sufficient for significant 
abatement 
Continued incremental 
improvements should 
suffice 
Table 1-1:  A Cross Gas Comparison:  How methane, CO2, and air pollutants differ in many 
characteristics that might have policy relevance. 
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1.3.6 Other Greenhouse Gases 
 
We address fossil CO2, CH4, and the air pollutants in depth in this thesis.  N2O, 
HFCs, and SF6 are all included in the Kyoto Protocol, but we limit our discussion of them 
in this thesis to Appendix C.  Because these gases have smaller contributions to climate 
change in the next century than do CO2 and CH4, we felt it was acceptable to leave them 
out of this analysis.  We note that source characteristics of N2O are similar to those of 
methane, though its lifetime is more similar to that commonly assigned to CO2, so it is not 
clear how much of the methane chapter would be applicable to N2O.  The industrial gases, 
on the other hand, are mostly emitted as leaks, and in physically small quantities, and 
therefore containment and disposal should be significantly easier.  As a follow up study, it 
would be worth analyzing these substances to determine whether there may be value to 
addressing them with individual policies as we suggest for CH4, or if the quantity of GWP 
weighted emissions are small enough that any drawbacks involved in including them in a 
CO2 trading scheme can be ignored. 
1.4 Previous Efforts 
 
1.4.1 Stabilization Calculations 
 
The analysis of stabilization scenarios can illustrate issues pertinent to temporal 
differences between gases, multi-gas scenarios, and trading.  In order to explore the 
ramifications of various definitions of stabilization, we considered several ways that a 
stabilization goal might be achieved.  The following discussion is based on a study by 
Sarofim et al. (2005).  Two primary targets were considered – 550 ppm and 650 ppm – 
using the MIT IGSM, which includes an economic model capable of estimating the cost of 
multiple greenhouse gas control (Babiker et al., 2001; Hyman et al., 2003b; Prinn et al., 
1999).  The CO2ONLY scenarios restrict CO2 but no other gases.  In these scenarios, 
emissions paths were designed to control CO2 starting in 2005 with a given global carbon 
price, and with a price path rising at 5% per year, in order to achieve their target CO2 
stabilization level sometime after 2100 given the median climate parameters described in 
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Appendix B.  Reductions in other GHGs occurred only as side effects of the CO2 quotas.  
The GHGTRADE scenarios used the appropriate CO2ONLY scenario as a baseline, and 
then allowed trading of other GHGs as weighted by their GWPs in order to achieve 
identical GWP emission profiles.  A third case, PROPRED, assumed the same CO2 quotas 
as the CO2ONLY scenarios, but imposed proportional reductions from the baseline path of 
the other GHGs.  Finally, a fourth case, GHGCONST, used the same CO2 emissions 
pathway but holds all other GHG emissions constant at their 2005 levels.   
Each of these scenarios is a plausible interpretation of a stabilization goal but we find 
very different temperatures changes and economic costs on the century timescale (Table 
1-2).  In the reference (no policy) case the temperature increase was 2.8 ºC by the end of 
the century.  For 550 (650) ppm stabilization, the CO2ONLY case reduced the temperature 
by roughly 0.75 (0.5) ºC at a cost of 1.2% (0.4%) of net present consumption (final 
consumption being a measure of societal welfare in the EPPA model, discounted at 5% per 
year over the century).  The GHGTRADE cases were at least 50% more effective in 
temperature reduction on the century timescale than the CO2ONLY scenarios, at less than 
half the cost.  The PROPRED case achieved nearly twice the temperature reduction 
compared to the CO2ONLY case but at a 40% increase in cost.   
In general, these costs are likely to be low because optimal reduction through time 
assumes the most cost effective approach to emissions reduction (Wigley et al., 1996).  Our 
policies also assume participation by all countries from the start, and thus include the most 
cost-effective reductions in all parts of the world.  In contrast, when we simulated the 
economic cost of an extended Kyoto policy where the Kyoto reductions in 2008-2012 are 
gradually increased in the industrialized world and then later extended to developing 
countries to achieve approximate stabilization of CO2 at 550 ppm,, the net present 
consumption loss due to this policy was 2.0%, a greater loss than any of the global 550 
ppm stabilization cases in this study (Reilly et al., 1999). 
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 CO2ONLY GHGTRADE PROPRED GHGCONST 
650 ppm 
ΔT from BAU(a) 
NPC loss(b) 
2005 C-eq Price(c) 
 
0.47  
0.4% 
$23 
 
0.86  
0.2% 
$1 
 
0.86  
0.5% 
$0 to $23 
 
1.02 
0.6% 
$0 to $23 
550 ppm 
ΔT from BAU(a) 
NPC loss(b) 
2005 C-eq Price(c) 
 
0.75  
1.2% 
$50 
 
1.18 
0.5%  
$4 
 
1.46  
1.7% 
$0 to $50 
 
1.34 
1.4% 
$0 to $50 
Table 1-2:  Results of different stabilization policies on temperature and costs 
a)  ΔT :  difference in decadal global mean temperature in 2100 between the policy case and the no 
policy case (with warming of 2.80 °C).   
b)  NPC loss:  percent reduction in net present consumption through 2100 given a 5% discount rate.   
c)  C Price:  The carbon-equivalent price is the price that would clear a permit market in emissions 
given the emissions constraint imposed on the model in 2005.  Note that in the PROPRED and 
GHGCONST cases there is no trading between gases, so there are different prices for each gas, but the 
non-CO2 gases have near zero prices in early periods.   
 
To consider the extent to which year 2100 conditions were consistent with 
stabilization, we ran the earth system components of the MIT IGSM beyond 2100.  We 
considered stabilization at 550 ppm in the CO2ONLY case. To achieve long-term 
stabilization of CO2 required continued emissions reductions at 1% per year after 2100.    
This simple extrapolation of the emissions path was used because the EPPA model was 
designed to run only through 2100. For the remaining cases, we decreased CO2 emissions at 
the same rate as in the CO2ONLY case and maintained all other gases at their 2100 
emissions levels.  We note that the CO2ONLY case does not stabilize radiative forcing, 
which is still rising at 0.01 W/m2 per decade even in 2300 because of the continued 
increase in other greenhouse gases.  Radiative forcing in the GHGTRADE case, which 
continues to have equivalent GWP weighted emissions to the CO2ONLY case, is rising at 
the much faster rate of 0.1 W/m2 per decade in 2300, demonstrating how focusing on short 
lifetime gases such as methane will eventually result in higher forcing in the long term 
 43
because of accumulation of CO2.  This is evident in Table 1-3 where the GHGTRADE case 
has a forcing of 6.3 W/m2 in 2300 compared to 5.0 W/m2 in the CO2ONLY case.  The 
GHGCONST case, on the other hand, has nearly stabilized radiative forcing in 2300 
despite continued emissions of long-lived gases, and radiative forcing in 2300 is actually 
decreasing at 0.01 W/m2 per decade in the PROPRED case. 
For the CO2ONLY 
scenario (Figure 1-7) CO2 
emissions (orange line), which 
were declining at a rate of 0.1 
GtC/yr in 2100, still have not yet 
reached zero in 2300.  Emissions 
of CH4 and CO can be significant 
sources of CO2 and must be 
included in the eventual 
stabilization plan (purple line). In 
order to stabilize concentrations, 
CO2 emissions must continue to 
decrease, eventually approaching 
zero (Hoffert et al., 2002), but 
even out to 2300 there remains  
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(Sarofim et al., 2005) 
some positive ocean uptake (Figure 1-7) mainly due to the ocean’s slow mixing processes. 
Uptake by the ocean in the 550 ppm CO2ONLY stabilization scenario peaks at 4.2 
GtC in 2070 and drops to 1.6 GtC in 2300 and is still declining thereafter.  Terrestrial 
uptake peaks at 1.7 GtC in 2050 and is nearly zero by 2300.  The strength of these sinks at 
any point in time and their overall response depend strongly on the properties controlling 
the climate system response (see Appendix B for details about the choice of parameters) 
and on the features of the terrestrial ecosystems model in the IGSM (Webster et al., 2003).  
For the CO2ONLY case in 2100, the 95% bounds on CO2 concentration due to S and Kv 
uncertainty alone range from 500 to 585 ppm.  With declining anthropogenic emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 begin to stabilize, allowing the terrestrial ecosystem to 
reach equilibrium with the atmosphere.  The ocean mixed layer also approaches 
Figure 1-7:  Components of carbon-cycle budget  
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equilibrium, and further ocean uptake is then limited by diffusion into the deep ocean.  
Furthermore, there are negative temperature effects on both terrestrial ecosystem and 
oceanic uptake rates. 
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Figure 1-8: Decadal global mean average temperature and sea level rise  
Results for the CO2ONLY and GHGTRADE 550 ppm scenarios  (Sarofim et al., 2005). 
In the trading cases, more of the reductions come from CH4 than from CO2 because of 
the relative opportunities for least cost emissions reductions.  Because CO2 is longer-lived 
than CH4, this means that the GHGTRADE cases show greater reductions in temperature 
from the reference case in the short term than the CO2ONLY cases.  But, with more long-
lived CO2 accumulating in the atmosphere, the GHGTRADE cases should eventually 
become warmer.  Analysis of the 550 ppm scenarios (Figure 1-8) shows that the 
temperature rise in the GHGTRADE exceeds the CO2ONLY case after 2240, when the 
CO2 concentration is 780 ppm.  The ‘short term’ benefits of CH4 reduction thus remain for 
a surprisingly long period.  Due to inertial effects, sea level rise in the two cases is 
comparable only after about another 100 years (2330), when the rise is 1.1m above present 
in both cases.   
The comparison between the GHGTRADE and CO2ONLY cases again raises the 
question of whether GWPs are an appropriate ’exchange rate’ in trading GHG reductions 
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(Manne and Richels, 2001a; Reilly et al., 1999; Smith and Wigley, 2000; Sygna et al., 
2002). If the rate of temperature change is an important factor in designing a policy, as 
studies of the possible thermohaline circulation collapse suggest (Schneider, 2004), then 
non-CO2 greenhouse gases are being undervalued by GWP measures, whereas if long-term 
radiative forcing stabilization is the criteria of interest, then gases such as methane are 
being overvalued.  Table 1-3 shows the concentrations of the major gases in 2100 for all 
cases, and in 2300 for the 550 ppm scenarios.  In addition to timescale issues, the 
implications of non-CO2 GHGs and non-GHGs for atmospheric chemistry, such as the 
impact of methane or NOx on ozone levels, might also be important for air quality and for 
changing the lifetimes of other greenhouse gases.  Because the GHGTRADE scenario has 
both superior temperature and cost characteristics, our study shows that adhering to a 
definition of stabilization that emphasizes CO2 is likely to miss win-win opportunities 
(Reilly et al., 2003b).  We note that more than one recent study (Rao and Riahi, 2006; van 
Vuuren, 2006) have found similar results when comparing a CO2ONLY case to a GWP 
equivalent optimal GHG mix case, where the multi-gas scenario was both much less 
expensive and cooler in 2100.   
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 CO2 
(ppm) 
CH4 
(ppm) 
N2O 
(ppb) 
O3 
(ppb) 
Δ Rad. 
Forc.(b) 
(W/m2) 
No Policy, 2100 822  5.42  483  51 7.4 
650 ppm cases, 2100 
CO2ONLY 608  4.09  473  46  5.0 
GHGTRADE 673  2.12  410  45  4.4 
PROPRED 606  2.23  418  45  4.0 
GHGCONST 605 2.12 414 46 3.8 
550 ppm cases, 2100 
CO2ONLY 529  3.80  466  45  4.0 
GHGTRADE 592  1.96  402  44  3.5 
PROPRED 527  1.48  393  41  2.7 
GHGCONST 527 2.14 413 45 3.0 
550 ppm cases, 2300 
CO2ONLY 562 3.58 676 44 5.0 
GHGTRADE 868 1.85 514 43 6.3 
PROPRED 540 1.14 444 44 2.8 
GHGCONST 550 2.12 510 45 3.6 
Table 1-3:  GHG Concentrations in 2100 in Four Policy Scenarios 
(a) HFCs and SF6 are also included in the model though the numbers are not shown here due to 
their comparatively smaller contributions to net forcing 
(b) Change in radiative forcing since 1990 of all GHGs, not including sulfate aerosols. 
These results depend on the specific reference emissions projections which, for CO2, 
at a cumulative level of 1700 GtC, falls into the “medium-high” range for the IPCC’s 
SRES scenarios, but considerable uncertainty exists in future emissions of CO2 and perhaps 
even more so for the other GHGs (Webster et al., 2002).  The projections of non-CO2 
emissions and concentrations in our reference scenario clearly have an impact on the 
results.  By the end of the century, the EPPA model reference scenario projects annual 
methane emissions of 860 Tg (comparable to the IPCC A2 SRES scenario of 889 Tg), and 
N2O emissions of 22 Tg (which is slightly higher than the 20 Tg of the upper range of the 
SRES scenarios).  The resulting methane concentration is, however, significantly higher 
than the SRES projections.  The MIT IGSM includes stratospheric chemistry, natural 
emissions of methane and N2O, and a more complex tropospheric chemistry model than the 
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single box model used by the TAR, which likely contributes to the much higher 
atmospheric concentration results in this study, even though methane emissions are 
comparable.   
The feedbacks and uncertainties involved in the response of natural emissions of CH4 
and N2O to climate change, like the uncertainty in CO2 uptake, add to the complexity of 
designing climate policies.  Yet another emission uncertainty has to do with non-GHG 
climatically important substances that may be controlled by non-climate related policies 
(Dai et al., 2001b).   Our SO2 emission projections also differ from those of the SRES 
scenarios.  Further exploration of these uncertainties and those of climate system 
parameters is warranted, but the first step towards a study of stabilization under uncertainty 
is an examination of what stabilization means for a single set of reference conditions.   
Indeed, this section has demonstrated that significant uncertainty arises resulting from 
definitional issues alone.  Whether and in what manner non-CO2 gases are included within 
stabilization policies makes a large difference in terms of what temperature change results 
from a given target.  The non-CO2 gases, and especially methane, are shown to be 
extremely important for low cost and effective temperature reductions on timescales of up 
to three centuries.  Therefore, we recommend that future studies and proposals involving 
stabilization include these other gases, and make the manner of their inclusion explicit. 
 
1.4.2 CCSP Scenarios 
 
An example of one approach to explicit inclusion of other gases within a stabilization 
analysis is present in the second of the 21 synthesis and assessment products of the US 
Federal Government’s Strategic Plan for the US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) 
(US Climate Change Science Program, 2006).  This product was a call for new scenarios of 
GHG emissions and concentrations.  We present our work on this product in this thesis as a 
further examination of stabilization, demonstrating the importance of the non-CO2 gases 
without detracting from the crucial role of CO2 reduction itself.  In addition, the use of two 
other models within the CCSP product allows some examination of the consequences of 
different modeling assumptions.   
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That these new scenarios consisted solely of “stabilization scenarios” indicates some 
of the power that the idea of stabilization has among climate scientists and policymakers.  
This influence is especially significant given that the Bush administration has usually 
avoided the standard climate policies, rejecting Kyoto, proposing emission intensity targets 
rather than standard caps, and starting programs such as Methane to Markets, the Asia-
Pacific Development Initiative, and FutureGen. 
 
Figure 1-9:  CO2, CH4, and N2O concentrations and total forcing.  Results from MIT IGSM 
calculations using CCSP targets. 
The multigas targets themselves were chosen in order to yield atmospheric CO2 
stabilization at 450, 550, 650, and 750 ppm (Figure 1-9).  This choice of targets was 
designed in order to allow comparisons to previous work that was often focused on CO2 
stabilization at these levels.  A further forcing increment was allowed for non-CO2 GHGs.  
This increment of 0, 0.1, 0.2, or 0.3 W/m2 was determined in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, 
using Sarofim et al. (2005) as a guideline for what non-CO2 GHG constraint might yield a 
price comparable to the price of meeting the CO2 target.  Results from the economic 
analysis of these scenarios show that for the EPPA simulations in the CCSP study, methane 
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prices for the last half of the simulation period were fairly close to the price they would 
have under GWP based trading, but N2O prices were significantly higher due to insufficient 
N2O abatement options to achieve stabilization of that gas.  Two other computer models 
developed and run by other research groups at Stanford and the Pacific Northwest National 
Labs (PNNL) were used in the CCSP study, with differing approaches to the non-CO2 
gases:  mini-CAM had the prices rise at a rate that was consistent with their GWP values 
and the CO2 price, whereas MERGE used a forward looking model to dynamically 
determine the price of each gas separately (Figure 1-10).  Non-GHG substances with 
climatic implications such as black carbon, tropospheric ozone, or sulfate aerosols were not 
considered at all in calculating allowable forcing increases, though secondary impacts of 
GHG constraints on emissions of these substances or their precursors were included in the 
MIT study.   
The policies necessary for stabilization were implemented such that they started post-
2012, with Kyoto Party members pursuing the Kyoto Protocol limits through 2012 and the 
United States pursuing the Bush goal of improving US GHG intensity by 18 percent from 
2002 to 2012.  After 2012, further reductions were allocated such that each country/region 
bore the cost of reductions within the region and marginal costs of reductions were equal 
across regions.  That is, allocations were set such that there was no incentive for emissions 
trading.  This convention was chosen so that regional costs reflected reduction efforts in 
each region and was not intended to represent a fair, feasible, or likely result of a 
negotiated agreement (US Climate Change Science Program, 2006).   
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Figure 1-10:  Relative Prices of CH4 and N2O to Carbon Across Scenarios (CH4 in log 
scale). Differences in the relative prices of CH4 and N2O to carbon reflect different 
treatments of this tradeoff, often referred to as what flexibility. In the MiniCAM scenarios, 
the tradeoff is based on the GWP of the non-CO2 GHGs, which are constants, leading to 
constant ratios of the non-GHG prices to the carbon price. In the MERGE scenarios, 
relative prices are optimized with respect to the long-run stabilization target. In the IGSM 
scenarios, stabilization was forced for each gas independently. Emissions were set so that 
concentrations of CH4 would stabilize and allowed the CH4 price path to be determined by 
changing opportunities for reducing emissions. Given N2O emissions from agriculture, the 
relative price of N2O is very high, in part because reference emissions were high. Lower 
reference scenario emissions of N2O for the MERGE and MiniCAM scenarios allowed 
them to achieve relatively low emissions at lower N2O prices.  (US Climate Change 
Science Program, 2006) 
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For the EPPA simulation, stabilization scenarios were implemented such that the 
carbon price rose at 4 percent per year, to yield a Hoteling approximation to an optimal 
market solution over time.  This is not necessarily a socially optimal solution given the 
existence of other distortions in the economy such as: pre-existing taxes on fuels, labor, and 
capital; unexplained differences in purchasing power parity across countries; unpriced 
externalities related to energy use such as environmental pollution; or public goods 
resulting from research and development.  In the EPPA simulation there were separate 
targets for each of the major gases, due to the inconsistency of stabilization with allowing 
GWP based trading and stabilization as mentioned in Sarofim et al. (2005) and discussed 
earlier in this chapter.  However, 100 year GWPs were used to trade between HFCs, PFCs, 
and SF6.  This is a reasonable approach because even fairly low carbon prices result in near 
zero emissions of these substances, and their total GWP weighted sum is fairly small in 
comparison to the CO2 constraints.   
The CCSP exercise was also designed to terminate in 2100.  This left unspecified 
how to take into account various long-term factors, such as the issue of how to address 
gases with long lifetimes (namely CO2 and N2O) which would not have reached 
equilibrium in that time period, or the changes in natural emissions and uptake to be 
expected post-2100.   
Outside of the CCSP exercise, we have performed analyses extending the EPPA 
based simulations within the CCSP scenarios to 2400 (Figure 1-11).  Because we do not 
extend EPPA itself past 2400, we made the assumption that the emissions of all gases 
except CO2 would remain constant post-2100.  CO2 itself would decrease at a rate 
calculated to approximate stabilization.  While it may have been a poor assumption to 
extend throughout this period the 1.42 GtC/year uptake adjustment factor used to balance 
the land sink (TEM), the ocean sink, and the atmospheric accumulation rate in the 1980s, 
the existence of this adjustment factor allows us to effectively eliminate CO emissions 
through accounting measures without changing the chemistry of the atmosphere8.  Initial 
attempts to balance the carbon cycle including CO reductions led to a significant decrease 
                                                 
8 This bookkeeping adjustment is visible in Figure 7.  After 2100, the TEM uptake adjustment factor is 
presumed to decrease at 1% per year, and the effective total carbon emissions are decreased appropriately to 
compensate.   
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in CH4 concentrations as OH levels increased in response.  Physically, given how low-CO2 
scenarios result in significant dependence on biomass energy sources which have no net 
CO2 emissions but do produce CO, it is possible that CO will continue to be emitted in 
significant quantities into the distant future, depending on the efficiencies of the 
technologies involved in combustion of these substances.   
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Figure 1-11:  Temperature Change to 2400 for MIT IGSM extensions to the scenarios developed for 
CCSP Product 2.1. 
Figure 1-12 demonstrates again the necessity of reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
drastically in the post-2100 world in order to achieve stabilization.  The extension of the 
CCSP analysis requires a reduction to 2 GtC levels by 2200.  Note that the 3 dimensional 
ocean included in these long term stabilization analyses to 2400 has a much smaller ocean 
uptake post-2100, and therefore the carbon emissions in that period are even more 
constrained than in the first century of the policy.  This uptake in this 3 dimensional model 
is much lower than the uptake in the IGSM1 2D model had been, not only because of a 
slower uptake parameter, but also because the model captures physical processes that tend 
to shut down circulation at higher temperatures.  This analysis reinforces the point that if 
we are serious about stabilization, we will need to create significant new zero carbon 
emitting technologies.  Even if actual stabilization is not the goal, but merely reduction of 
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CO2 growth to levels that may prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference, there will 
have to be significant advances in the energy production and transport sectors in order to 
achieve low levels of emissions.  
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Figure 1-12:  Components of the carbon-cycle budget and CO2 concentrations for the MIT IGSM 
extension of the Level 2 scenario used in CCSP Product 2.1.   
Differences between the EPPA simulations used for the CCSP scenarios and the 
previous Sarofim et al. (2005) analysis include the use of EPPA4 rather than EPPA3, 
IGSM2 rather than IGSM1, and a 3D ocean rather than a 2D ocean.  Also, the climate 
parameters used were updated based in part on a recent pdf estimation study (Forest et al, 
2006).  Therefore, the ocean heat uptake was significantly lower.  A Kz of 0.4 cm2/s was 
used which is approximately equivalent to a 2D Kv of 3 cm2/s, compared to a Kv of 9.2 
cm2/s used in Sarofim et al. (2005).  Because the 3D ocean includes a biological carbon 
uptake mechanism, the reduction in carbon uptake was not as drastic as it might have been 
otherwise.  Climate sensitivity (CS) was 2.0 (lower than the pdf estimation study median, 
though still consistent with 20th century climate), and the aerosol forcing parameter (Faer) 
was -0.35 W/m2 (later versions of the model, used in subsequent chapters adjust Faer to 
-0.85 W/m2  in order to appropriately balance BC forcing).  These changes in parameters 
lead to a warmer 21st century, but significantly less additional warming post stabilization, 
as the upper layers of the ocean rapidly enter into equilibrium with the atmosphere and the 
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deep ocean hardly enters into the equation.  The slow ocean also leads to significantly less 
sea level rise (Figure 1-13), and even the reference scenario has little more rise than either 
of the stabilization scenarios from Sarofim et al. (2005).  If this update of ocean uptake 
parameters proves accurate, the need for short term reductions in GHG concentration 
growth becomes even more important, but perhaps we may not need to worry as much 
about system inertia carrying on long after we stabilize concentrations.   
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Figure 1-13:  Sea level rise to 2400 for MIT IGSM extensions to the scenarios developed for CCSP 
Product 2.1. 
Finally, the importance of the non-CO2 gases is demonstrated in Figure 1-14.  Using 
as a baseline the 550 ppm scenario from EPPA produced for the CCSP exercise, one 
simulation controlled CO2 but none of the other greenhouse gases, the other constrained the 
non-CO2 GHGs but not CO2.  This experiment shows that in the 550 ppm stabilization 
scenario we created for the CCSP exercise, fully half of the temperature reductions during 
the 21st century are due to reductions in non-CO2 gases.  Of course, due in large part to the 
inclusion of methane, the temperature reductions of the Other Gases scenario are weighted 
towards the early part of the century.  We can expect that in a manner similar to Figure 1-8, 
the Other Gases scenario which is barely warmer than the CO2 only scenario in 2100 will 
become relatively much warmer as time progresses.    
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Figure 1-14:  Temperature change from CO2 and non-CO2 scenarios   
Reference and 550 ppm (or Level 2) scenario from CCSP Product 2.1.  The two other scenarios are 
hybrids:  CO2ONLY uses the reference scenario for all gases other than CO2 which are emitted as in 
the 550 ppm scenario, and the Other Gases scenario uses the 550 ppm scenario for all gases but the 
reference CO2 emissions. 
Many other groups have simulated stabilization scenarios, with wildly different 
assumptions and cost estimates.  A special issue of the Energy Journal on endogenous 
technical change and the economics of atmospheric stabilization shows a range of costs for 
a 450 ppm CO2 constraint of 8 percent of Gross World Product in 2100 to a gain of nearly 
4 percent (Grubb et al., 2006).  Gains can result either from optimistic assumptions about 
revenue recycling or manner in which the endogenous technical change itself was 
implemented.  The average cost of climate policies for stabilization at 450 or 550 ppm 
(after excluding the most experimental of the models) was 0.39% and 0.1% respectively 
(Edenhofer et al., 2006), still lower than any of the CCSP models, and significantly lower 
costs than calculated by the MIT IGSM.   
 
1.5 Conclusions 
 
Climate change is widely acknowledged to be one of the major international policy 
challenges of this century.  Problems that make climate change especially difficult to deal 
with include environmental commons issues resulting from the global scale of climate; 
intergenerational equity issues because of the long time scale of climate change; north-
south equity issues because industrialized nations have high per capita emissions and a 
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large historical burden while at the same time there is a perception that developing nations 
will ultimately need to be involved in any serious attempt at mitigation; action under 
uncertainty resulting from the complexity of the climate system and the difficulty of 
projecting anthropogenic emissions into the future; and the potentially very high cost of 
reducing emissions from activities that are integral to worldwide economies.   
Due to the UNFCCC Article 2, the historical focus of international climate policy has 
been stabilization.  While exact consensus on its meaning may not be needed to proceed 
with mitigation efforts in the near term, we have shown in this chapter that different 
interpretations of how other greenhouse gases are considered in a stabilization target have a 
substantial affect on how much warming is avoided and at what cost.  As stated by 
Hasselmann et al. (2003), successful climate policies should take into account both short 
term policies and long term goals.  Judgments about the adequacy of climate policy in light 
of a long term target, whatever it might be, will need to consider just what is meant by 
stabilization and how, in terms of the mix of GHG reductions, a target will be achieved.  As 
seen in the heated debates over forest and agricultural sinks in the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations, settling on definitions may ultimately be a political matter, but these debates 
can only benefit from being placed in a framework that elucidates the discussions (Watson 
and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change., 2000).  The analysis within this chapter 
suggests that any policy measure that does not take into account all greenhouse gases will 
be both more expensive and less effective through the next century and beyond. 
Political and academic dialogue in the past decade has centered in large part on 
carbon dioxide, and we posit that this focus is a natural result of the long term nature of 
stabilization.  Perhaps due to this long term CO2 focus, progress in this direction becomes 
tied up with the issue of whether or not there should be global targets as in the Byrd-Hagel 
resolution (Sen Byrd, 1997) and has historically stalled or been watered down to the point 
of inconsequential impacts (Paltsev et al., 2004).  Our work shows that in fact CO2 
reductions will clearly need to be a central part of any climate solution.  But are there 
legitimate alternative approaches to the stabilization and CO2 paradigms for short term 
policy making?  The problems with stabilization are that long term and global scale 
thinking makes it difficult to implement short term and local policies, and that CO2 is 
tightly linked to energy production and therefore economic vitality and international 
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competitiveness.  Therefore we must search for policy options that could complement, 
supplement, or improve on standard approaches, as well as to better understand what is 
involved in a comprehensive policy analysis to guide future such analyses.   
This thesis concentrates on options that involve controlling non-CO2 gases.  Potential 
key characteristics of these substances include the ability to have near term impacts (mostly 
through substances with short lifetimes), lower costs and significant impacts of mitigation, 
and the potential for offsetting local benefits.  Are there non-CO2 substances that have 
these characteristics?  The answer to this question is clearly affirmative, as both methane 
and various air pollutants meet these criteria, but the mere existence of such substances is 
not sufficient.  We need to address whether or not abatement of these substances has the 
potential for significant temperature change, whether or not realistic policies can address 
these substances, what the impact of such a policy focus would be on the long term issues, 
and how such policies would best be enacted given the characteristics of the controlled 
substance.  Already we see some potential confusion when we examine the case of methane 
and CO2 where exchange of reductions of one gas for the other by GWP weighting leads to 
very different future scenarios. 
Regardless, it is important that we begin to address climate change mitigation 
seriously in the near term.  We are uncertain about the threshold for reaching disastrous 
tipping points, therefore it would be wise to take precautionary measures while we attempt 
to better understand those thresholds.  This especially holds true for reductions that can be 
achieved at low costs, technology advances that may yield dual benefits, policies that may 
yield double dividends through reduction of other economically distorting policies, or 
abatement policies that have ancillary or complementary benefits in air pollution or other 
areas.  CO2 reduction will remain central to any comprehensive set of mitigation policies 
and it is urgent that policies be enacted to address carbon dioxide, in terms of the near term 
emission reductions, avoiding CO2 intensive capital investments, and researching the 
technologies necessary for radical CO2 reductions in the future.  However, if reductions in 
other substances, especially methane, can yield significant mitigation benefits at low cost it 
would make sense to address such gases as best we can.   
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2 Methane Policy:  An Integrated Approach argues against 
GWP based trading 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Methane has begun to play a role in academic debate, galvanized in particular through 
the efforts of Hansen who proposed a scenario where a constant CO2 growth over the next 
5 decades would be offset in large part through methane reductions (Hansen et al., 2000). 
Methane is the second largest contributor to anthropogenic forcing caused by well-mixed 
gases and there exist many low cost abatement opportunities.  With the advent of the 
Methane to Markets Initiative created by the US government (US Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2006b), methane has also become a part of international policy on its own merits 
rather than just as part of the larger bundle of GHGs.  Our own stabilization work, as 
summarized in the previous chapter, suggested that including other gases, especially 
methane, was an important part of making effective policies at reasonable costs.   
In this chapter, we reiterate the importance of methane as a low cost component of 
climate policies, and show the extent to which methane reduction can contribute to 
temperature reduction in this century.  Through analyzing methane policies by economic 
modeling, climate modeling, and political analysis methodologies we argue that methane 
policy should be implemented separately from CO2 policy.  GWP based trading between 
CO2 and CH4 was intended to include “what” based flexibility in broader climate policies 
such as Kyoto, where efficiency is gained by allowing the market to equalize marginal 
abatement costs of different substances using a common metric.  However, it is our 
contention that there are a series of drawbacks inherent to doing this.   
First, we noted in Chapter 1 that CH4 is likely mischaracterized by its GWP exchange 
value as supported by our own work and that of other researchers (O'Neill, 2000; O'Neill, 
2003; Reilly et al., 1999; Sarofim et al., 2005).  Modeling runs in this chapter show that on 
a 100 year basis, CH4 constraints can lead to more than three times as much temperature 
reduction as does a GWP equivalent CO2 policy.  We showed in previous research 
(Sarofim et al., 2005) that this temperature advantage is likely to last at least 2 centuries.  
Alternative GWP methodologies have been proposed; Shine et al. (2005) use various 
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alternative computational metrics, but conclude that their new metrics lead to only a small 
increase in methane valuation compared to CO2.  However, we argue that the difference 
between methane and CO2 lifetimes is such that there is no GWP value that would suffice 
to address all of our concerns.  Furthermore, GWPs have problems with the variability of 
the OH radical and thus methane lifetimes, the arbitrariness of a 100 year integration 
period, and the complexity of the carbon cycle.  The IPCC Second and Third Assessment 
Report GWP estimates are presented in Appendix D.    
Second, we argue that the difference in accuracy of source inventories is perhaps even 
more important than lifetime differences between CH4 and CO2.  CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuels can be measured very precisely.  Ideally, fossil CO2 policies would allocate permits or 
taxes at the wellhead or minemouth, but even if the policy is enacted to cover downstream 
emissions it is fairly simple to keep track of fossil fuel inputs and thereby be able to 
calculate CO2 output.  Anthropogenic methane emissions, on the other hand, are relatively 
hard to measure.  Estimates of rice paddy emissions over the past decade, for example, vary 
by up to a factor of five.  Recent inversion results from a top down approach creates tighter 
constraints on such sources that invalidate many bottom-up estimates (Chen and Prinn, 
2006).  This is because bottom-up inventory methodologies for methane emissions are 
often fairly crude.  Therefore, in order to allow trading on a GWP basis between methane 
and CO2, it is necessary to determine how strict to be when certifying methane reductions.  
It is quite possible that the certification process would not be sufficient to prevent 
“fictional” reductions, while at the same time discouraging actual methane reductions. 
Third, there are structural economic differences which interact with CO2 and methane 
abatement in ways that need to be considered.  The first is that policies that constrain CO2 
interact with existing taxes in such a way that CO2 reduction causes greater consumption 
losses than would be indicated by the CO2 price.  Given that the goal of trading is in theory 
to allow the market to find a solution that minimizes net societal cost, this interaction 
between policies results in more CO2 abatement and less methane abatement than would be 
optimal as the price does not fully reflect the actual net present consumption loss.  The 
second is that methane and CO2 policies have differential impacts on developing nations.   
Developing nations have a smaller proportion of CO2 emissions, and a larger proportion of 
methane emissions.  Depending on how permits (in a theoretical trading case) are allocated, 
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this can lead to methane constraints leading to a larger percent welfare reduction in non-
Annex B nations than in Annex B nations.  Therefore, it might be desirable to allocate 
permits for the two gases differently.   
Fourth, and finally, political differences lead us to suggest separating the two gases.  
CO2 constraints have a history of political inertia, and by tying methane policy to CO2 
policy we are potentially slowing down adoption of useful abatement methodologies.  
Indeed, there is a history of apparently successful methane abatement policies in the US 
and the EU.  Reaching a broad geographic coverage may also conflict with multiple gas 
coverage, as developing nations may be more willing to take on methane abatement 
commitments than CO2 commitments.  The design and incentive structure of the methane 
policy would of course be critical in securing such developing nation accession.   
There are some caveats in this analysis.  The primary issue is whether our reference 
case has overpredicted methane growth, thereby overpredicting the available temperature 
reduction from methane.  Given that CH4 concentrations have leveled off in recent years, 
this is certainly a possibility.  This does not change our argument that methane is best dealt 
with separately because the source estimation issue remains as large as ever.  But it would 
mean that the benefits of methane reductions would be smaller than presented herein.   
The point of this analysis is that policy design needs to be based on the characteristics 
of the substance being controlled, and that the characteristics of methane and CO2 are 
sufficiently different that reductions of the two substances should not be considered 
interchangeable.  Methane is also significant enough in and of itself that it is worth crafting 
a separate policy to address it.  However, this research does not support any proposal that 
methane reduction can be a substitute for action on CO2:  rather, that the two gases are best 
addressed with separate strategies, and that policy should move forward as quickly as 
possible on both fronts.   
 
2.2 Modeling Costs and Benefits of Methane Policies  
 
2.2.1 Modeling 
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Modeling is a useful tool to answer some basic questions about methane abatement in 
order to understand its place in climate change policy.  What is the potential for 
temperature reduction from methane control?  How expensive is it to abate methane 
compared to a GWP equivalent quantity of carbon dioxide?  How does an efficient trading 
policy allocate reductions across nations within the modeling framework?  We recognize 
the limitations of modeling, some of which can be addressed by sensitivity or uncertainty 
analyses, others of which require stepping back and analyzing the broader picture.  
However, within those limitations modeling continues to be a useful tool and starting point 
for policy discussions.   
We begin the study of methane control by modeling abatement within the framework 
of the MIT IGSM.  The MIT EPPA4 model is used to project emissions into the future 
under different policy scenarios, and to project the economic costs of those policies.  The 
projections of business as usual methane emissions and the elasticity assumptions that go 
into the model are both important in determining how much reduction can be achieved at 
what cost.  The policy case and reference case EPPA emissions projections can then be 
used as input into the MIT IGSM version 2.3 (Prinn et al., 1999; Sokolov et al., 2005) 
which takes into account all the chemistry feedbacks important to determining methane 
lifetime and secondary ozone interactions (though the standard version of the model still 
does not take into account ozone impacts on ecosystems).  The EPPA4 model has been 
described in depth in several publications, most recently in Report 125 of the MIT Joint 
Program (Paltsev et al., 2005b).  The model versions used for this study are similar in most 
part to that described in Report 125 and is described in more depth in Appendix B.   
It is worth repeating here key details of the model that pertain to methane and 
methane abatement.  Hyman et al. (2003a) chose to simulate methane emissions as an input 
at the top of the production nest.  If the elasticity of substitution between methane and the 
rest of the nest is zero, the implication is that methane emissions cannot be reduced without 
reducing the production of that sector.  Hyman et al. used EPA data to estimate elasticities 
of substitution for individual sectors.  Elasticities in the agricultural sector were further 
specified by region, and updated to match the new regions in EPPA4.  Note that methane 
abatement through this mechanism (as differentiated from sectoral shifts) is mostly 
independent of other gas abatement:  this is not a perfect assumption, but for methane is 
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probably a fairly good approximation.  In fact, in both our model and reality, this kind of 
methane abatement may actually lead to an increase in emissions of other substances, as the 
abatement will require an increase in other input factors which may have their own related 
emissions. 
Using the EPPA model with the above elasticities we are able to estimate costs of 
various policy constraints.  In general throughout this section we only model cap and trade 
policies.  Within the modeling framework these kind of policies (or an equivalent carbon 
tax) are generally the most economically efficient means of achieving a given abatement 
target.  Clearly, even if we assume that the model accurately represents the real world, a 
real world policy is unlikely to actually cover all sectors and all nations, nor to have perfect 
compliance and measurement techniques.  However, for evaluating policies this is a natural 
choice to use for comparison purposes.   
 
2.2.2 Abatement Opportunities 
 
We first applied our model to examining the impact of methane constraints on the 
economy.  Figure 2-1 shows the major economic rationale behind addressing methane.  
Worldwide constraints were placed on each gas in 2010, and the trading costs were plotted 
on the graph.  For a price of $10/ton, 600 MMT carbon equivalents of methane can be 
reduced per year.  For the same price, only 200 MMT of carbon dioxide are abated.  If we 
presume that GWP weightings are close to accurate, this set of modeling simulations 
confirm the result shown in previous studies that significant reductions of methane can be 
made cost effectively (Hyman et al., 2001), and show that the quantity of inexpensive 
reductions available in the near term is on the order of one half gigaton to one gigaton of 
carbon equivalent per year.  For comparison purposes, when we model the Kyoto Protocol 
in this framework, without the US and including hot air from the FSU nations, there were 
negligible reductions in 2010 and only 140 MMT reductions in 2015.  An additional 
comparison is that had the US not withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, its CO2 reductions 
from a BAU emissions case of 1800 MMT would have been 550 MMT, and therefore the 
entire Kyoto agreement would have had about 550 MMT of reductions in 2010, which is 
on the order of available very inexpensive methane reductions.   
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Figure 2-1:  Global Marginal Abatement Curves derived from EPPA4 in 2010 for CO2, N2O, and CH4 
 “No-regret” options are those abatement opportunities that can be achieved at zero or 
even negative cost.  Such an opportunity in the methane case might include capping a 
landfill where the captured methane has a larger net present market value than the cost of 
the capping.  Some economists claim that these “no-regrets” options do not actually exist, 
because an efficient market would have already found and used them.  Other researchers 
examine the reasons why a no-regret option might not have been implemented, because of 
lack of information, political barriers, or other issues.  In any case, computable general 
equilibrium models do not usually include “no-regrets” reduction options.  However, 
marginal abatement curves can be estimated such that what might be “no-regrets” 
reductions under a bottom-up approach will merely be very low cost options under a CGE 
approach.   
As mentioned previously, the United States has spearheaded the international 
Methane to Markets (M2M) initiative.  This policy is designed specifically to capture those 
no regrets policies that do not exist in a CGE framework.   M2M is discussed in more detail 
later, but for the modeling simulation the important characteristic of the policy is that it has 
a target of 8 MMT of CH4 reductions across the member nations.  We can still apply the 
EPPA4 model to examining low cost methane emissions reduction in a group of regions 
similar to that addressed under the M2M policy, and compare it to various other “methane-
only” policies in order to gather an idea of the realism and scope of M2M.  Therefore we 
 65
examined one policy that was an 8 MMT quantity constraint on methane, and additional 
policies that put constraints yielding carbon prices of $1/ton on both the M2M regions and 
all regions.   
Methane reduction 
in 2010 (MMT) 
 
M2M M2M regions 
All sectors 
(~$1/tonCE) 
All Regions 
 All sectors 
(~$1/tonCE) 
Total Reduction 8 51 87 
Non-Ag Reduction 8 36 63 
From Agriculture 0 15 24 
Table 2-1:  Calculated costs using EPPA4 of near term methane reduction scenarios 
We see in Table 2-1 that by our estimates a minimal price yields about 4 times as 
much reduction from the non-agricultural sector in the M2M regions.  This indicates that 
the M2M goal is not only achievable, but perhaps not sufficiently ambitious.  Those nations 
included in the M2M partnership do, however, include the majority of easily abated 
emissions, and while there is some loss of low cost abatement opportunity by not including 
the agricultural sector, it represents less than a third of such opportunities according to our 
model.  
 
2.2.3 Modeling Climate Impacts 
 
One of our contentions in this chapter is that GWPs are not in fact an accurate 
measure of the impact of greenhouse gas reductions.  Recalling Figure 1.2 from Chapter 1, 
we would ideally be able to measure some net present marginal cost to humanity from each 
ton of gas emitted, and then trade off between gases based on such an accounting.  
However, the uncertainties and complexities involved in such accounting make it 
practically impossible.  Therefore, we need to choose an intermediate variable to measure 
in order to determine policy impacts.  Global mean average temperature is the normal 
metric used to measure climate impacts – it is not a perfect metric, but it is likely to capture 
most of the desired information.  There is significant uncertainty due to climate sensitivity 
and ocean uptake (Webster et al., 2003) in determining temperature from a given emissions 
scenario, but various model simulations indicate that the percentage reduction of 
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temperature increase across the century is fairly robust across the most likely range of 
climate parameters, and we will therefore use it throughout this thesis. 
Temperature 
Reduction in 2020 
M2M M2M regions 
All Sectors 
$1/tonCE 
All Regions 
All Sectors 
$1/tonCE 
CO2 
$1/tonCE 
Percent reduction in 
rise from reference 
11% 13% 26% 14% 
Table 2-2:  Temperature reductions resulting from near term climate policies 
We first examine the temperature impact of the Methane to Markets scenarios we 
modeled in the previous section.  These three scenarios were used as inputs into the earth 
systems component of IGSM1, and the results are shown in Table 2-2. Given the noise in 
the model, examining temperature reductions in 2020 must be taken with caution, but we 
can see that a global CO2 policy at $1/ton carbon equivalent gives temperature reductions 
on the order of a methane policy concentrated on the M2M regions.  The indication here is 
that methane control has substantial implications for reducing near term warming.  
However, when comparing temperature impacts of methane reductions to carbon 
dioxide reductions, we have much more confidence in century long experiments.  We 
examine multiple policies, with two different versions of EPPA and the MIT IGSM.  In 
Figure 2-2 we show the results of three runs performed with IGSM1:  a $15/ton (carbon 
equivalent) methane reduction policy, a CO2 policy of similar price, and a policy wherein 
Annex B nations meet their Kyoto Protocol commitments and maintain them until the end 
of the century (and the non-Annex B nations are unconstrained).  We see here that a fairly 
inexpensive methane policy has significant returns in terms of temperature reductions on a 
century timescale, but that the equivalent CO2 policy has a minimal impact.  Part of this 
may be due to methane being undervalued by the GWP metric.  This could easily occur due 
to secondary impacts on ozone and changes in CH4 lifetime.  We also used a GWP of 21 to 
be consistent with the Kyoto Protocol and other current policies, whereas as is discussed in 
the appendix, the IPCC TAR (Ramaswamy et al., 2001) has updated methane’s GWP to be 
23.  This GWP increase is less than 10%, and therefore should account for only a small 
fraction of the difference between the CH4 and CO2 scenarios.  The other reason that the 
temperature impact of the methane policy is so much larger than the temperature impact of 
 67
the carbon dioxide policy is due to the large lifetime differences between the two gases.  In 
the short term, methane reductions are expected to lead to larger temperature reductions.   
In the long term we would expect to see that CO2 reductions would eventually have a 
larger climate mitigation impact than the GWP equivalent methane reductions, but this 
timescale is to be likely to be on the order of three hundred years (Sarofim et al., 2005).  
Three hundred years is a much longer time horizon than most policy planners are seriously 
considering.  For reference we have included a “Kyoto forever” policy in which the current 
Kyoto nations (i.e., not including the US) maintain their targets until the end of the century, 
but developing nations continue on a business as usual path.  We see that a fairly 
inexpensive but global policy targeting only methane yields more climatic benefits on the 
century time scale than a much more expensive all gas policy limited to the Annex B 
nations, or a global CO2 policy of comparable cost to the methane policy.   
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Figure 2-2:  Impact on global mean temperature increase over the 21st Century in three selected 
policies using IGSM1 
CO2, CH4:  $15/ton carbon equivalent.  Kyoto:  Hold emissions in Annex B constant at Kyoto target 
levels 
We have repeated a similar analysis with IGSM2, but this time rather than analyzing 
a cost-equivalent CO2 policy, we analyzed a GWP equivalent CO2 policy.  The results were 
fairly similar (Table 2-3).  We chose two scenarios to examine, using EPPA4 for the 
emissions projections.  The first scenario was a “25% methane reduction from reference” 
scenario, which yields methane prices that start at $3.5/ton C equivalent ($20/ton CH4 
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equivalent) to $11/ton C equivalent by the end of the century.  The second scenario kept 
methane emissions constant at 2010 levels.  This policy has zero price in 2010 (of course) 
but yields prices of $1700/ton C equivalent by the end of the century.  Then we ran runs 
that were equivalent in terms of GWP weighted emissions, but constrained only CO2.  In 
the 25% reduction case, while the CH4 reduction run led to a 7% temperature change 
reduction (with a peak decrease of 24% in 2035), the GWP-equivalent CO2 run only led to 
a 1% decrease in temperature change.  We do expect CO2 reductions to be accompanied by 
SO2 reductions, and the SO2 reductions will lead to a warming effect that will counter some 
of the cooling.  For the most part, CH4 constraints should not be directly associated with 
SO2 reductions.9  However, tight CH4 constraints can lead to an overall reduction of 
economic growth, thereby indirectly reducing sulfate emissions.   Indeed, in the constant 
emissions case SO2 reductions are actually larger in the CH4 case than the CO2 case by the 
end of the century, and yet we still see a 15% temperature change reduction in the CH4 case 
compared to a 4% reduction in the equivalent CO2 case.  Therefore we can reject the 
hypothesis that the differential in temperature between the GWP equivalent scenarios is 
due to reductions in SO2.  The price of the carbon reductions in the 25% reduction case are 
much higher than the equivalent methane run (starting at $25/ton C equivalent), but are 
nowhere near the extremely high prices reached at the end of the constant methane 
emissions run.   
 25% CH4 Reduction CH4 Constant Scenario 
 CH4 CO2 CH4 CO2 
Total GHG Reduction 3.4%  3.3% 6.4% 6.4% 
SO2 Reduction (2100) 0% 2.7% 3.7% 3.3% 
BC Reduction (2100) 0% 0.2% 2.2% 3.6% 
O3 Concentration (2100) (ppb) 38.4 40.0 36.8 40.1  
Temperature Change 
Reduction (2100) 
7.4% 1.0% 14.9% 4.0% 
Table 2-3:  Comparing GWP equivalent CH4 and CO2 policies in terms of impact on CO2 equivalent 
emissions reductions (sum over century), sulfate aerosol and black carbon emissions in 2100, ozone 
concentrations, and reduction in global mean temperature change over the 21st century. 
Methane reduction does not only yield direct radiative forcing benefits, but it also 
interacts with atmospheric chemistry which can yield secondary effects on ozone levels 
                                                 
9 In the EPPA model we assume that the use of natural gas leads to no sulfur emissions:  however, sour 
natural gas fields do contain some quantity of H2S.  However, amine extraction methods are fairly effective 
for cleaning natural gas.     
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with further beneficial health and cooling impacts.  Methane, like other VOCs, reacts with 
hydroxyl radicals to produce an organic peroxy radical.  That organic radical, in the 
presence of NOx, can lead to the creation of ozone molecules.  In addition, the reduction of 
hydroxyl radical concentrations due to methane concentration increases leads to longer 
lifetimes for a variety of other pollutants.  Because methane’s lifetime is sufficiently long 
for the gas to be fairly well mixed globally, its impacts on ozone and OH levels occur on a 
global scale, unlike the local impacts of air pollutants which will be addressed in the next 
chapter.   
Ozone also has a negative impact on ecosystems, and therefore on carbon uptake, as 
was shown in Felzer et al. (2005) and discussed in more depth in the next chapter.  
However, this ecosystem uptake effect is not included in the standard version of the IGSM.  
In a scenario using EPPA4 reference emissions and IGSM2.3 , global background ozone 
concentrations rise from 34 ppb in 2000 to 39.9 ppb by the end of the century.  In the 
constant methane emission case, ozone concentrations plateau at levels 8% smaller (36.9 
ppb) (or only 50% as much increase!).  This is more than half as effective as capping the 
other major ozone precursors (NOx, VOCs, and CO) at 2005 levels (3CAP from Chapter 
3).  The 3CAP policy yields a background ozone concentration of 35.0 ppb.  Of course, the 
3CAP policy would presumably be much more effective at reducing local urban ozone 
levels in addition to impacting global background ozone levels.   
West et al. have estimated impacts of ozone mitigation through methane reduction on 
global health (West et al., 2006).  They showed a 1 ppb reduction in daily maximum 8-h 
surface ozone from a 20% methane emissions reduction (compared to a 40% emissions 
reduction by the end of the century in our constant methane emissions case leading to a 3 
ppb decrease).  Their estimates were that this reduction would eliminate 30,000 premature 
mortalities per year, which extrapolated would indicate 90,000 avoided deaths per year by 
the end of the century in our constant methane scenario.  Of course, we note that CO2 
reductions also have similar air pollutant benefits through complementary reductions of 
other combustion derived emissions, as will be explored more thoroughly in the Chapter 3.   
We can calculate methane lifetime over the timescale of a simulation, where the 
lifetime is defined as the atmospheric burden divided by the sum of sinks in a specified 
time period.  The burden is equal to 2.76 Gt times the methane concentration in ppm.  We 
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expect that higher methane emissions will lead to longer lifetimes as the methane sink (the 
OH radical) is consumed, and indeed by the end of the century the lifetime of methane 
increases by 22% from its 2005 lifetime in the reference simulation.  In the constant 
methane emission scenario, the methane lifetime is about the same in 2100 as in 2005.  For 
comparison, keeping NOx emissions constant (which also reduces OH) but leaving all 
other emissions at reference levels leads to a 32% increase of methane lifetime over the 
2005 lifetime.  This increase in methane lifetime is significantly higher than the 6% 
projected to occur in the IS92a scenario by Lelieveld et al. (1998) (the Lelieveld paper also 
references a historical increase of 25 to 30% for methane lifetime over the past 150 years).   
Therefore, this work demonstrates that a constant GWP for methane over the century 
significantly undervalues methane in terms of century timescale temperature reductions.  
Likely physical culprits10 for this undervaluation include underestimating lifetime feedback 
effects, impacts on ozone concentrations.  While it is possible that GWPs could be 
continually manipulated over the century to compensate for these effects, given that the 
IPCC is still using GWPs from the 2nd assessment report in 2007, after the 4th assessment 
report GWP estimates have been released, indicates that there is significant inertia in the 
political system that will resist updating these numbers.   
 
2.2.4 Limitations of Market Trading 
 
Trade as a means for mutually beneficial enrichment is enshrined in all economics 
textbooks (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2001).  There are a set of standard caveats:  false 
information can lead to non-optimal trades; in the case of environmental cap and trade 
systems trading can potentially lead to unjust geographic redistribution of pollutant 
emissions; the market needs to be competitive, where no individual agent has monopolistic 
power.  But greenhouse gas emissions seem like an ideal target, as they become globally 
well-mixed on a timescale much shorter than their lifetime, and therefore reduction of a ton 
of CO2 emissions in China is equivalent to a similar reduction in the US (Goulder and 
                                                 
10 It should also be noted that because reductions occur throughout the century in question, 100 year GWPs 
would a priori be expected to undervalue short lifetime gases in a century long policy because some of these 
short lived gas reductions are occurring at the very end of the period.   
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Pizer, 2006).   Indeed, as a long term stock problem, a reduction of CO2 today is equivalent 
to a similar reduction in a year, and therefore greenhouse gases seem like an ideal case for 
intertemporal trading as well as geographical trading.  And for the same reasons that 
geographical and intertemporal trading create benefits, it seems likely that trading between 
gases for “what” flexibility would also be beneficial.  Therefore, theoretical considerations 
would suggest creating a policy that was as broad as possible in both geographical 
coverage and multiple gas coverage, allowing emissions trading to find the cheapest 
possible reductions to meet a given total GHG constraint.  However, such trading turns out 
to have both political and economic disadvantages.   
Recent work has shown that inter-regional market trading of CO2 can interact with 
existing taxes in such a way as to reduce welfare for trading nations compared to the non-
trading case (Babiker et al., 2004; Paltsev et al., 2005a).  We see similar results when we 
compare the marginal abatement curves developed in Figure 2-1 with the actual global net 
present consumption loss suffered in those scenarios.  Figure 2-3 shows that the marginal 
consumption loss in $/ton is significantly higher than the actual carbon price in $/ton, 
starting at $25/ton for a minimal constraint.  In a system without distortions the starting 
price should be $0/ton.  Methane constraints, on the other hand, lead to marginal 
consumption losses that have a close correspondence with marginal prices.  Presumably 
this is a result of the fact that methane production has much less interaction with the key 
taxes.  Therefore, we can expect a significant difference in cost between a policy based on 
equalizing GWP based gas prices and equalizing marginal consumption losses with 
differentiated gas policies, without even regarding the differential impact on climate 
change.  In fact, a GWP-based policy would be both more expensive and less effective in 
terms of temperature change reduction than would a hypothetical policy that equalized 
marginal consumption losses.  Note that we are examining 2010 marginal abatement curves 
here:  the curves are expected to be different in different time periods as sectoral production 
and available technologies shift.   
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Figure 2-3:  Global marginal consumption loss in 2010 derived from EPPA4 for CO2 and CH4 
constraints. 
The above marginal consumption loss analysis examined global consumption loss, 
which is a reasonable metric to use when comparing the cost of different policies. 
However, for reasons of equity it might also be important to examine how the loss is 
distributed between Annex B and non-Annex B nations.  We use the case of the 25% CH4 
reduction policy and its GWP equivalent CO2 policy from section 2.2.3 to look at the near 
term cost distribution implications.  Naturally, this distribution of loss will depend heavily 
on how the policy constraint is structured.  The standard approach we use to generate our 
policy is to take every EPPA region and enact a cap on emissions of the constrained gas 
equal to 75% of the business as usual (BAU) baseline for that gas in that region, and then 
allow trading between all regions to reach a common marginal price.  However, such a 
policy is not consistent with the “common but differentiated responsibilities” delineated by 
the UNFCCC.  One approach to differentiated responsibilities is to delay constraints on 
non-Annex B nations until an indeterminate future time.  Such a policy by nature would 
have limited “where flexibility”, excluding many low cost abatement opportunities, and 
additionally would likely be politically unpopular with nations such as the United States.  
Another approach would be to place emissions constraints on all regions, but design the 
constraints such that the reductions are large in Annex B nations and small in non-Annex B 
nations.  For the purpose of our calculations, we take the extreme example where non-
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Annex B nations are given a constraint equal to their BAU emissions.  The Annex B 
nations are then required to reduce emissions more sharply such that the total global 
emissions are still only 75% of the reference value.  Trading enables the Annex B nations 
to purchase reductions from non-Annex B nations to reach a solution that should be similar 
to the solution in the original equal percentage allocation case in terms of the distribution of 
regional emissions and the global consumption total (Coase, 1960), but with very different 
distributional welfare implications.   
We therefore analyzed the consumption loss in 2010 in four cases using the EPPA 
model.  We started with the 25% CH4 policy and the GWP equivalent CO2 policy in the 
equal percent allocation form that we had previously modeled, and then take each policy 
and use the reasoning in the paragraph above to allocate all the reductions to Annex B 
nations while constraining non-Annex B emissions at their BAU levels in order to generate 
a second pair of policies.  Because, as discussed in Chapter 1, CO2 emissions comprise a 
greater percentage of Annex B GWP weighted emissions than they do of non-Annex B 
GWP weighted emissions, we expect for equal percent allocation that Annex B to have a 
larger share of total consumption loss in the CO2 constraint case than in the CH4 constraint 
case.  Table 2-4 demonstrates that our expectations are met, as the ratio of the consumption 
loss between Annex B and non-Annex B in the CO2 case is 0.97, whereas for CH4 it is 
0.33.  This may indicate that a global CH4 policy is less fair to non-Annex B nations, 
though it is still almost two orders of magnitude less expensive than the CO2 policy.  
However, if we look at the differentiated responsibilities case with the reductions allocated 
entirely to Annex B, we see a different picture.  Here, the CH4 policy actually leads to an 
increase in welfare for non-Annex B nations as they sell permits for cheap reductions.  In 
the CO2 case the non-Annex B nations, while better off than in the even allocation case, 
still have a net consumption loss as global economic damage overwhelms the benefit from 
selling a small number of permits.   There are also small differences in total welfare loss 
between the even allocation and the distributed responsibilities cases, indicating 
complicated interactions in the economy that cause it to deviate from a pure Coase 
allocation problem.   
 Even Allocation (% basis) 
Consumption Loss (2010) 
(billions) 
Annex B-only Reductions 
Consumption Loss (2010) 
(billions) 
Total Reference 
Consumption 
(trillions) 
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 CH4 policy CO2 policy CH4 policy CO2 policy  
Annex B 0.063 11.3 1.44 19.9 21.2 
Non-Annex B 0.189 11.7 -1.09 6.46 6.7 
Table 2-4:  Consumption loss in Annex B vs. non-Annex B nations for the 25% reduction CH4 
constraint policy and the GWP equivalent CO2 policy 
The distribution results in these cases may be further exaggerated if we include the 
difference between purchasing power parity (PPP) and market exchange rates (MER).  
EPPA uses MERs for calculating consumption.  PPPs take into account the fact that a 
dollar in a developing nation will purchase more goods than a dollar in an industrialized 
nation.  Therefore, a reduction in consumption of a given number of dollars for a non-
Annex B nation will have a greater welfare impact than the same consumption change in an 
Annex B nation.  An odd result of this calculation is that if the average PPP/MER ratio in 
non-Annex B nations is greater than 1.3, then the global methane policy in the case where 
reductions are only allocated to Annex B nations can actually lead to a global net welfare 
increase. 
  This scenario in which Annex B nations take on the burden of reductions but 
purchase reductions from non-Annex B nations is similar to the goal of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol.  While the CDM does not have 
the capability to set non-Annex B national targets at their reference emissions levels, 
because such emissions levels would be difficult to predict, it approximates this by 
attempting to certify “additional” credits for reductions from specific projects.  In an ideal 
world, where it would be possible to take advantage of all projects that could generate 
CDM credits for less than the market price of the gas, where no “fictional” credits were 
generated due to unscrupulous companies or inventory issues, and no leakage occurred due 
to increased emissions from companies not involved in CDM projects, then the CDM 
would enable the Kyoto Protocol to exactly match a cap and trade policy like our Annex B 
only Reductions case.  CDM will also be discussed in greater length in the air pollution 
chapter.  
Ancillary benefits of air pollution emissions reduction from carbon abatement further 
complicate this story.  Specifically, reductions of CO2 emissions in non-Annex B nations 
are likely to carry much greater simultaneous reductions in air pollution, and therefore lead 
to larger increases in welfare from health improvements, than will the same CO2 reductions 
in an Annex B nation.  In addition to increasing the ratio between Annex B and non-Annex 
 75
B consumption losses (presumably an improvement from an equity viewpoint), ancillary 
benefits also reduce the total welfare loss in the CO2 cases compared to the CH4 cases.   
However, the ratio of consumption loss of a CO2 policy compared to a CH4 policy 
will still be much larger than issues such as air pollution ancillary benefits and less just 
distribution between Annex B and non-Annex B.  Therefore, our conclusion that emissions 
trading between CH4 and CO2 is inefficient due to interactions effect still holds.  
Furthermore, though it is unrealistic to expect implementation of a policy wherein Annex B 
nations subsidize methane reductions in non-Annex B nations to the extent shown in the 
Annex B-only case in Table 2-4, it should be possible to design a system that takes 
advantage of the non-Annex B reductions opportunities without being an economic 
hardship for those nations.   
 
2.2.5 Uncertainty in Modeling 
 
Any projection of the impact of policies will depend on assumptions about reference 
emissions and economic response to policies.  We summarize in this section some of the 
potential issues involved with our modeling, and discuss the implications of prior 
uncertainty work and comparisons to other modeling groups.  While no model is perfect, 
however, we do believe that our major conclusions are not likely to be very sensitive to 
these issues.    
 The first issue involves projections of methane emissions in the reference scenario.  
The first stage of emissions projections involves benchmarking the model in 1997 using the 
best estimates available for emissions.  Section 2.3 is devoted to the difficulty of creating 
accurate source inventories, and if the inventories are not accurate, the model will by 
necessity be benchmarked to the wrong numbers.  Indeed, there is even uncertainty in the 
value for the total anthropogenic CH4 source term.  The result of allocating wrong 1997 
emissions to a sector is that as that sector changes in different proportions to the remainder 
of the economy, total emissions will diverge from an accurate number – even if the global 
total term was correct in 1997.  These methane projections also depend on assumptions 
about how a given sector’s emissions will evolve in relation to the sector’s activity.  The 
combination of these uncertainties determines how realistic the business as usual scenario 
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will be.  This projection is important because if methane is not actually on a growth path, 
then there is less value to addressing methane as a separate issue.   
There are time-varying emissions coefficients within the EPPA model to reflect 
changing relationships between sectoral outputs and methane emissions.  As discussed in 
Hyman et al. (2001), industrial sources become more efficient and have higher value 
product per unit mass, which means that less raw material is used per unit output, and 
therefore fewer emissions.  Additionally, methane emissions related to landfills are linked 
with final demand (eg, consumption) within EPPA.  However, we expect these CH4 
emissions to rise at a rate approximately proportional to population and not proportional to 
the much larger consumption increase over the century.  Therefore, in order to get a 
reference CH4 trend in the final demand sector that follows population growth, we apply a 
CH4 emission coefficient that is approximately equal to the value of population divided by 
consumption in the reference case.  This approximation is fairly rough, as the details are 
complicated; for example, while an increase in income leads to a reduction in wastewater 
emissions for Annex B nations, for very impoverished nations (where waste is not normally 
collected) an increase in income actually leads to an increase in emissions per capita as 
landfill use increases.   
An indication of a potential problem in our projections is that observed methane 
concentrations from the period 1997 to 2003 have shown a leveling off effect.  
Measurements indicate that long term hydroxyl radical trends have been small (Prinn et al., 
2005b) implying a fairly constant oxidative capacity of the atmosphere (though with some 
interannual variability).  Therefore this halt in methane concentration growth would be an 
indication that methane sources have leveled off or decreased in the 1990s.  The reference 
simulation of EPPA4 projects an increase in methane emissions of 10% from 1997 to 2005.  
Due to this increase in emissions, the IGSM system yields a fairly constant concentration 
growth during the past decade, unlike observations, resulting in a methane concentration in 
2004 of 1823 ppb compared to 1783 ppb (World Meteorological Association, 2006) or 
1775 ppb (NOAA/GMD).  However the most recent evidence shows that the post 1999 
portion of this leveling off phenomenon may have been a temporary artifact of wetland 
drying masking a renewed anthropogenic emissions increase (Bousquet et al., 2006).   
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We can also compare the EPPA4 model to the other models used in the CCSP 
exercise (Figure 2-4) (US Climate Change Science Program, 2006).  The Stanford-EPRI 
MERGE and PNNL MiniCAM base-year emissions are similar.  The MIT IGSM reference 
scenario has higher initial anthropogenic methane emissions than the other models, 
reflecting an independent assessment of historical emissions and uncertainty in the 
scientific literature regarding even historic emissions.  Note that the IGSM has a 
correspondingly lower natural methane source (from wetlands, termites, etc.) to balance the 
observed concentration change, rate of oxidation, and natural and anthropogenic sources.  
Both the MIT IGSM and Stanford-EPRI MERGE models exhibit steadily growing methane 
emissions throughout the 21st century as a consequence of the growth of methane-
producing activities such as ruminant livestock herds, natural gas use, and land-fills.  
Unlike CO2, where the combustion of fossil fuels leads inevitably to emissions (absent 
capture and storage), slight changes in activities can substantially reduce emissions of the 
non-CO2 gases (Reilly et al., 2003a). The PNNL MiniCAM reference scenario assumes 
that, despite the expansion of human activities traditionally associated with methane 
production, emissions control technologies will be deployed in the reference scenario in 
response to local environmental controls.  This leads the PNNL MiniCAM reference 
scenario to exhibit a peak and subsequent decline in CH4 emissions in the reference case. 
 
Figure 2-4:  Global CH4 and N2O Emissions Across Reference Scenarios  
(US Climate Change Science Program, 2006) 
Some existing projections suggest that the relative contribution of CH4 to radiative 
forcing may decrease somewhat in the future.  Webster et al. (2003) estimated that CH4 
might contribute another 0.6 (-0.17 to 1.71) W/m2 of radiative forcing by 2100 (95% error 
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bars in parentheses), compared to an additional forcing from CO2 of 4.2 (2.1 to 7.5) W/m2.  
At the median values the additional CH4 contribution drops to about 15% of that from CO2, 
from the historical share of 1/3.  CO2 and CH4 are produced in part by related processes 
such as fossil fuel production, and the two gases are produced in part by separate processes 
such as agriculture, biomass burning, land fills and other waste disposal.  Also CH4 
emissions from both fossil and non-fossil sources are subject to uncertainties independent 
from those affecting CO2 emissions (Webster et al., 2002).  Thus, low and high levels of 
the two gases are correlated to some degree but it is possible to have relatively high levels 
of CH4 and low levels of CO2. This does not rule out cases where the CH4 contribution 
remains high or even increases relative to CO2. 
The EPPA4 reference being used in this thesis has the CH4 contribution to radiative 
forcing increase over the century from 0.5 W/m2 to 1.0 W/m2, but decrease as a fraction of 
total well-mixed GHG forcing from 21% to 12%.  However, as we showed in the previous 
section, reductions in methane emissions can still lead to greater than a 12% reduction in 
temperature increase over the century despite the decrease in methane’s relative 
contribution.   
The other major sensitivity involves the elasticities of methane within a given sector.  
This does not affect the reference scenario, but is extremely important for calculating the 
response of the model to policy constraints.  Hyman et al. (2001) generated elasticities 
based on EPA data which include known abatement opportunities, but the costs and 
magnitudes of these known abatement technologies are not known precisely.  There may be 
other reduction options which were not included in the study, and it is to be expected that 
abatement technology will change over time.   
 
2.3 The Source Estimation Problem 
 
Methane emissions are hard to measure because they do not come from point sources, 
there are significant natural emissions that can confound inverse calculations, there are 
large geographic and temporal emission variations, and much of the emissions come from 
regions that do not have sophisticated inventory capabilities.  This difficulty in source 
estimation leads to problems in modeling, as EPPA has been calibrated against data from 
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EDGAR (bottom up analysis) with adjustments due to top down analysis by Yu-Han Chen 
et al. (2006), and adjusted again such that the IGSM yields concentrations consistent with 
observations.  In addition to a modeling issue, however, this also has significant policy 
implications:  how do you judge if constraints are being met if it is difficult to measure the 
emissions?   
A detailed analysis of methane source estimations in the literature is included in 
Appendix E, with the anthropogenic estimates from three inventory estimates presented in 
Table 2-5.  The issue of relevance is that most methane emissions come from area sources, 
not point sources, and this makes them difficult to quantify.  Quantification of fossil fuel 
CO2 emissions are accomplished easily by measuring the fossil fuel inputs.  In addition, 
there are significant natural sources of methane (30 to 40% of the total), and the sink term 
(mainly reaction with the hydroxyl radical) is difficult to calculate.  Only recently has the 
total annual emission of methane become well constrained to 589 Tg (Chen and Prinn, 
2006) based on the most recent OH radical estimations (Prinn et al., 2005b).  Certain 
sectors such as rice paddy emissions are especially contentious, with significantly different 
estimates from bottom-up and top-down estimations, as seen in Table 2-5.  For modeling 
purposes, total emissions have to be calibrated to the specific treatments of natural source 
and OH sinks in the earth systems model to ensure that near term methane concentrations 
behave in a believable manner similar to observations.  However, it is not obvious that only 
CH4 emissions should be adjusted.  The hydroxyl radical concentration, and therefore the 
methane lifetime, depends on emissions of CO, NOx, and VOCs as well as CH4.  There 
exist a number of ways to adjust multi-gas emissions such that CH4 concentrations become 
consistent with observations, especially given the poor constraints on inventories of most 
non-GHG emissions.  And of course, it is always possible that the earth systems model 
itself has source and sink process flaws.   
Inverse Modeling Results Bottom-up Inventory Results Anthropogenic 
CH4 emissions in 
2000 
(Chen and Prinn, 2006) EPA Inventory 
(US EPA, 2006) 
EDGAR 32FT2000 
(Olivier et al., 2005) 
Rice 112 30 39 
Biomass Burning 48 22 22 
Animals & Waste 185 156 147 
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Energy 48 75 94 
Other 37 3 19 
Total 430 287 321 
Table 2-5:  Anthropogenic methane inventories using different methodologies 
Given the uncertainty in all factors of the methane lifecycle, it is interesting to ask 
how we appropriately choose to model them all together.  Taking separate “best estimates” 
of anthropogenic emissions (whether from bottom-up studies or inverse modeling), natural 
emissions, hydroxyl levels (and all the emissions that feed into determining hydroxyl 
radical concentrations), may yield a poor fit to the observed concentrations for the past 
decade.  As unwieldy as an adjustment factor is for balancing the carbon cycle (as 
discussed in Chapter One), an adjustment factor for methane is worse because we do not 
even know whether our uncertainty is in the sink, natural emissions, or anthropogenic 
emissions.   
Ongoing work by Sokolov, Asadoorian, and myself to simulate historical climate 
using the coupled climate-chemistry model with estimated historical emissions may shed 
further light on the relationships between these uncertain variables and may even elucidate 
what should be fixed.  For example, if it looks like there is a fixed emission term missing 
over the past century, then perhaps the issue is that we have not included geological 
emissions (Kvenvolden and Rogers, 2005).  We could then add that quantity to the EPPA 
emissions postprocessor.  However the very large variability due to wetland and biomass 
burning emissions (Chen and Prinn, 2006) may prove to confound such attribution.  The 
IGSM natural emissions module (NEM) projects a small (20 Tg) and approximately linear 
increase in natural emissions over the century, but given the modern variability in natural 
methane emissions the confidence in historical NEM projections would be low, making it 
difficult to attribute discrepancies in our historical simulations to natural versus 
anthropogenic origins.  We are also unlikely to have great confidence in our simulated 
historical hydroxyl radical concentrations.   
We will also note that the difficulty of measuring emissions from area sources will 
inherently impact the creation of policies to address it.  If the estimates of global methane 
emissions from rice paddies can range from 30 Tg or less to 112 Tg or more depending on 
whether bottom-up (Chen and Prinn, 2006; Olivier, 2005; US EPA, 2006) or top down 
 81
(Chen and Prinn, 2006) techniques are being used, how does one credit a country that 
changes its rice cultivation techniques to reduce methane emissions?  New Zealand 
proposed but failed to institute a so-called “flatulence tax” on its livestock, but the tax was 
based per animal – varying by species, but not by diet or other factors that impact actual 
emissions.  Methods do exist that can reduce emissions from ruminants without reducing 
their number, but a tax per animal will not encourage such changes in the way that a tax on 
actual emissions would accomplish.  In any case, the removal of subsidies for sheep likely 
has had much more impact than the tax would have had, in much the same way that 
breaking the coal unions in Great Britain may have had a greater impact on their GHG 
emissions than all the actual greenhouse measures they have implemented combined.  One 
study attributes 45% reduction in sheep numbers from 1982 peak to subsidy reforms in the 
mid 1980s (New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003). 
The point here is that a per-head tax is not necessarily the most efficient way to 
reduce methane emissions (in fact, the New Zealand flatulence tax was actually designed 
more to raise funds to research methane reduction methods than to discourage raising 
livestock).  Yet current IPCC inventories use the number of animals to determine national 
emissions (Monteny et al., 2006), with the precise equation shown in Figure 2-5.  Therefore 
we might expect that inventory methodology can directly impact what is considered to be a 
desirable solution.  Changing the methodology at this point may be difficult, as those 
nations which may have higher rice or livestock emissions than predicted by bottom-up 
methodology would be resistant to change.  But what are the alternatives?  Tax or cap and 
trade policies are standard economic instruments, but how can they be easily applied to 
livestock methane emissions, other than on a per-head basis?  Surely farmers will not be 
required to use sulfur hexafluoride tracer techniques to measure methane emissions.  
Similar problems arise with all the other non-point-source emissions.  Such problems are 
endemic to methane and N2O emission inventories, but it may be just as difficult to 
measure CO2 sources and sinks resulting from land use change.  For example, returning 
again to the case of rice paddies, given the variation in emission estimates how can it be 
possible to accurately calculate credits for emissions reductions to a particular nation?  
IPCC guidelines instruct nations to first estimate emissions from a continuously flooded 
field as a baseline, and then apply adjustment factors for water management style (five 
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possible types), fertilizers (the EPA assumes that 40% of fields have doubled emissions due 
to fertilization), and soil type, finally summing across harvested areas of each type of rice 
paddy (IPCC, 2006) (Figure 2-6).  Even if a superior method for quantifying such area 
emissions existed, it will be politically difficult to change previously agreed upon 
methodologies for inventories. 
 
Figure 2-5:  IPCC inventory methodology for livestock methane emissions (IPCC, 2006) 
 
Figure 2-6:  IPCC inventory methodology for rice cultivation methane emissions (IPCC, 2006) 
In the area of methane inventory methodology, there are significant potential political 
pressures.  The worry is that politics will interfere with scientific development.  
“Theoretical uncertainty about the causal impact of particular human activities on the 
environment – may fuel political controversy.  In turn, political conflict may contaminate 
processes of knowledge production and dissemination” (Underdal, 2002).  Those nations 
who have been reporting low emissions using EPA’s current methodology might object 
strenuously to any attempts to change the methodology to more closely match Chen’s 
inverse estimates (Chen and Prinn, 2006).  In fact, there have been discussions between 
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EPA officials and this researcher on how to reconcile our two very divergent estimates.  
We have been encouraged to examine potential solutions to the discrepancy such as 
including possible emissions from dams (Giles, 2006) or from living plants (Keppler et al., 
2006) that would not lead to necessity of adjusting the EPA rice paddy methane emission 
estimates.  Of course, a large natural plant source would mostly lift responsibility from the 
involved nations, whereas a dam source might merely shift the burden within the nation 
from farmers to dam operators.   
There might be some way to set national scale caps where emissions are either 
measured by inverse modeling or by some agreed upon national inventory methodology 
that takes into account the practices used in that nation.  Then each nation can determine its 
own method for reducing emissions, such as a cap and trade mechanism or a flatulence tax 
or research subsidies or command and control systems or economic reforms to reduce 
subsidies.  While a more accurate means of creating incentives to reduce methane is 
intellectually appealing, it may be the case that we will remain with the current simple 
method which has the advantage that it is easily applied and already ensconced in current 
practice.  However, if we are using admittedly limited inventory methodologies, we should 
not continue to allow trading of poorly quantified methane and N2O reductions for fossil 
fuel CO2 reductions that are well measured.  As was stated by Reiner, “Bringing all 
possible countries and source categories and gases and sinks on board simultaneously 
where data is weak and methodologies are still in the process of being developed seem to 
be a surefire recipe for fraud, corruption, and bias by allowing for trading across 
categories” (Reiner, 2002) 
 
2.4 Implications of uncertainty 
  
We have seen that there is uncertainty in many aspects of methane reduction, from 
future projections to estimating current emissions to determining the costs of policy 
constraints to determining interactions with atmospheric chemistry.  However, uncertainty 
is not a valid reason to avoid making policy:  rather, the existence of uncertainty should 
inform policy creation.  One of the major conclusions of this chapter, in fact, derives in 
large part from the difference in uncertainty in anthropogenic methane source inventories 
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and fossil fuel CO2 source inventories.  As we have stated, this uncertainty difference is a 
significant reason for us to suggest that methane and CO2 should be separated and not 
traded by GWP weighting.   
There are other uncertainties that should be taken into account while creating methane 
policies.  First, we address the uncertainty in climate predictions.  Webster et al. (2003) 
calculate a 95% probability range of possible temperature rise in the next century from 1.0 
to 4.9 ºC.  It is likely that an ongoing repeat of this study will yield higher temperature 
results due to modifications of the input probability distribution functions (pdfs) (Forest et 
al., 2006).  We are especially interested in policies that can reduce the probability of 
dangerous consequences – e.g., reducing the size of the high temperature tail of the 
warming pdfs.  Work on determining optimal R&D policy under uncertainty (Baker et al., 
2006) or optimal abatement given uncertainty with learning (Webster, 2002) show that it is 
not always obvious how to best structure policy given the breadth of possible mitigation 
strategies and the likelihood of different information becoming available in the future.  
However, we argue that, because of its low cost, significant methane abatement in the near 
term is a low risk immediate action in this arena.  Indeed, low cost climate policies of all 
kinds should be implemented.  We expect fewer such inexpensive reductions to exist for 
carbon dioxide because the high cost of fuel will have created incentives to implement such 
reductions.  Chapter 3 explores the idea that pollution abatement might be another 
approach where, while the policies themselves might not be low cost, their additional 
benefits in terms of air quality improvement may also move them into this low risk 
category.  There is a further question about whether having separate policies for methane 
and carbon dioxide will make it easier or harder to adapt to new information about various 
climatic change outcomes.  We argue that if the new information changes our perception of 
the carbon cycle or methane lifetime, it will be easier to adjust separate policies to take this 
new information into account than to reach agreement about changing the GWPs of a 
global integrated policy such as the Kyoto Protocol.  This is especially true if future 
versions of Kyoto allow banking (does a carbon equivalent banked credit carry a memory 
of whether it was originally abated methane or CO2?).  For additional information about 
climate sensitivity, critical thresholds, or other non-gas specific information, there is not an 
obvious conclusion.  If such information requires a tightening of constraints, will it be 
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harder to tighten one global integrated policy, or to achieve equivalent reductions from two 
separated policies?  Answering this question requires more specific information about the 
adaptability designed into the policy to begin with.   
The next area of uncertainty is that of uncertainty in projections and costs.  
Effectively, the original rationale for including “what” flexibility is that decision makers do 
not have full information about abatement costs of CO2 and CH4 and other gases.  
Therefore, if a common metric such as GWP can be developed, then the market can 
optimally allocate reductions between the difference gases to ensure a common marginal 
cost of reduction.  Therefore, if CH4 abatement turns out to be more expensive than 
expected, CH4 reductions can easily be traded for CO2 reductions, and vice versa.  
However, we are recommending that this kind of trading should not be allowed for the 
reasons argued throughout this chapter.  The problem is that if there is significant 
uncertainty involved in calculating the abatement curves in Figure 2-1, it becomes very 
difficult for a decision maker to choose abatement levels of the two gases in order to 
approximately equalize marginal costs of reduction.  Of course, there are alternatives to cap 
and trade policies that perhaps should be explored.  Anything from tax policies to cap and 
trade policies with safety valves, or even policies based on standards and measures may be 
useful inclusions in a methane-only abatement policy.  Standard and measures approaches 
would also avoid some of the issues resulting from inventory estimation problems.   
Note that reduction of uncertainty does not automatically make policy design easier.  
For example, there is a lack of knowledge about the regional impacts of climate change and 
the economic impacts of constraints that leads to a “veil of uncertainty”.  If it becomes 
possible to project regional impacts precisely, those nations with the least to lose would 
have an incentive to free ride on the rest of the world.  As in insurance pools, it may be the 
very uncertainty of risk which leads to a pooling of resources.   
 
2.5 Policy Analysis 
 
2.5.1 Historical policies and Methane to Markets 
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It is worthwhile to examine historical and current methane reduction efforts.  In the 
decade of the 1990s (using bottom up estimation methods) the OECD and EU nations 
decreased their methane emissions by 6%, non-EU Eastern Europe by 9%, and the former 
Soviet Union by 38% (US EPA, 2006).  The reductions in the FSU and Eastern Europe can 
be attributed to the post-break-up economic collapse event.  But the OECD reductions may 
be in part the result of intentional policymaking and economic development, which would 
be a hopeful sign for future abatement of methane.  The OECD trend was attributed to 
landfill and coal mine methane reductions in the US, landfill methane reductions in the EU 
resulting from waste directives, and decreased use of coal in England and Germany (US 
EPA, 2006).  Based in part on this experience, the US government launched the Methane to 
Markets (M2M) program in an inaugural meeting held in November of 2004 (US 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2006b).   
The stated goal of M2M is to reduce methane emissions by 50 MMt Carbon 
Equivalent per year by 2015 from the participating nations (though occasional press 
releases have, presumably accidentally, confused this with 50 MMt of actual methane 
reductions, which would be a larger number by a factor of six).  The policy is designed to 
be a voluntary, non-binding agreement that works through encouraging “public-private 
partnerships”.  There were 14 signatory nations included in the original partnership 
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Russia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States), accounting for approximately 60% of 
worldwide methane emissions in 2000, and several more nations have joined the 
partnership since then.  It is noteworthy that China, India, and the US are all members of 
this treaty, when none of these three major greenhouse gas emitters have taken on binding 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol.   
The methane reductions are supposed to come from four sectors:  oil, natural gas, 
coal, and landfills.  We can see from Figure 2-7 that these sectors make up slightly less 
than half of total worldwide anthropogenic emissions.  The theory behind the treaty is that 
in each of these sectors there exist opportunities to capture methane that can be sold or used 
as fuel in order to offset the costs of capture.  If energy prices are high enough, and the 
capture equipment is inexpensive, these capture technologies could even be implemented 
for net profits.  The theory is that since these near-zero or negative cost technologies exist 
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but are not being used, there must be non-market barriers (such as unclear ownership rights 
or imperfect information) that could be easily removed by the member nations.    
Agriculture
(rice, livestock)
Gas
Coal
Landfills
Manure
Oil
Other
(Combustion,
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Figure 2-7:  Global anthropogenic methane budget by sector in 2000.   
‘Capturable’ methane represented by exploded slices.  (US EPA, 2002) 
The US has allocated $53 million over a five year period in order to pay for 
administrative costs, which will be spread across the EPA, DOE, and AID agencies.  Some 
of it may be used for feasibility analysis, technology demonstration, and outreach.  
However, this money is not designed to provide direct incentives.  The hope is that either 
these projects will pay for themselves, or that they will be able to access CDM or World 
Bank Carbon Fund moneys, or that local governments will provide preferential pricing or 
other mechanisms in order to encourage project development.   
The US EPA had already started an emphasis on reductions of methane for global 
warming rationales in 1988 (Beck, 1993) because it could produce impacts in a short 
timescale.  Early on, the research program identified landfills, coal mines, and natural gas 
systems as being good targets for cost-effective methane reductions, in part because of the 
recoverable properties of the methane.  In 1992, when estimates of total emissions were 
between 400 and 600 Tg of methane, Hogan et al. (1991) estimated that a 40 to 60 Tg 
reduction would halt the rise of methane concentrations. Lelieveld et al. (1998) estimated 
that only a 20 Tg reduction would be necessary, and Dlugokencky et al. (2003) concluded 
that concentrations might have already plateaued beginning in 1999.  The most recent study 
showed that plateau to possibly be a temporary situation (Bousquet et al., 2006).   
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The EPA programs implemented in order to reduce methane emissions were AgStar, 
the Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP), and CMOP (coal mine methane).  Large 
landfills have been regulated since 1996 under the New Performance Standards for 
Municipal Landfills.  For the most part they control methane by using flaring, though 
electricity-generation also occurs.  In either case, combustion creates further pollutants 
such as NOx, CO, SO2, and PM10.  Unflared gas is 50% methane, 45% CO2, 5% N2, and 
trace amounts of other gases including NMVOCs (Jaramillo and Matthews, 2005).  The 
EPA has used both incentives and controls in reducing methane emissions.  For example, 
landfills are covered under both Section 29 of the Windfall Profits Tax Act and the New 
Source Performance Standards.  Of 2300 active landfills in the US, 382 have landfill gas-
to-energy projects, there are 25 projects under construction, and 630 further candidates 
have been identified.  EPA data shows that the 10% decrease of US methane emissions (17 
Tg C equivalents) from 1990 to 2004 resulted mainly from landfill and coal mining 
improvements.  However, manure and wastewater emissions continue to grow (U.S. EPA, 
2006).  It is interesting that these improvements seem to come in large part from standards 
and tax incentives, while M2M expects similar improvements to come abroad from 
voluntary partnerships with no provided funding.   
Attempts to extend the geographic range of the Kyoto Protocol has mostly been 
through instruments such as the CDM.  However, experience has shown that crediting 
features of cap and trade systems, of which CDM is an example, are usually not very 
effective at getting reductions from the creditable sources.  These credit systems get 
bogged down in the bureaucracy of defining the baseline against which a credit is allowed.  
The Designated National Authority (DNA) for the Kyoto process in Mexico City described 
the difficulty of certifying “additionality”, given the difficulty in objectively demonstrating 
that a project would not have occurred in the absence of CDM funds.  In many cases, the 
kind of methane projects that CDM and M2M are trying to target are exactly those projects 
which are “no-regret” options that have faced institutional or informational barriers, and 
where the opportunity for extra funds from international climate funds will serve as the 
tipping point.  Also, given the uncertainty about future credits, there is a natural hesitance 
to investing in a project which will not be sustainable without continuing carbon funds.  
One potential “silver lining” of the bureaucratic hurdles involved in CDM is that the 
 89
difficulty of finding appropriate projects may keep the trading price high, enabling 
implementation of otherwise marginal projects.   
In response to these difficulties for CDM, the Mexican DNA suggested that a national 
cap might be more effective than attempting to ascertain credits for specific projects.  His 
theory was that a cap with a fairly tight constraint but no penalty for exceeding the 
constraint might provide the appropriate incentives to reduce emissions without the 
problems of certifying CDM reductions project by project, and avoid the problems of 
“additionality”.  This would still, however, require trust in the nationwide inventory 
system.  The same official was dubious about M2M as well, calling it a treaty “en pañales” 
(diapers), and wondering what it brought to the table given that Mexico already had a 
methane initiative of its own.  He posited that the only near term likely benefit that he saw 
was aid for analysis, but granted that M2M might evolve into a more useful treaty as time 
passed.  One interesting observation was that he believed that the majority of the projects 
he saw were initiated at the industry level, and not the government level.  He saw the 
function of his office as that of a facilitator.   
Why might it be possible to get global agreement on the methane when it has been 
impossible to get such agreement on CO2?  The simple answer is that there are a lot of 
abatement opportunities that are not very expensive.  Given that CO2 emissions are much 
more closely linked to energy which is quite fundamental to the economy, and given the 
existing price of fuels, people have already exhausted many of the easy ways to reduce fuel 
use.  A small additional carbon charge which would produce a small increase in the price of 
fuels would only yield marginal reductions in fuel use and carbon dioxide emissions.  In 
contrast, venting of the non-CO2 GHGs as a means of disposing of them is unpriced and 
little attention has been paid to preventing this release.  To be sure, many of the non-CO2 
GHGs do have some price: CH4 is an energy source and venting it means the opportunity 
value of the energy is lost, and the industrial gases (SF6, HFCs) have a production cost, and 
the cost of venting them is the cost of purchasing replacements.  But, because of the high 
GWPs of these gases, one ton of gas will be dozens (in the case of methane) or thousands 
(in the case of the industrial gases) of tons carbon-equivalent.   Therefore, the opportunity 
cost of venting a gas in the absence of a price on GHGs is pennies per ton carbon 
equivalent.  Looked at in another way, a $15 per ton carbon-equivalent incentive would be 
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several multiples of the opportunity cost of not venting these substances (Reilly et al., 
2003a).  Specifically, the current natural gas price is about $7/Mcf (Henry Hub price at the 
time of this writing), which is about $30/ton of methane, which amounts to $1.25/ton CO2-
equivalent, or $4.60/ton C-equivalent.  Compare this to a European Trading System price 
that has reached as high as $36/ton CO2 ($130/ton C).  The ETS price may not reflect the 
price that will be seen when trading volumes become large (Reilly and Paltsev, 2005), but 
clearly the value of capturing methane for energy is much less than that of preventing its 
release to the atmosphere for global warming purposes.    
Detailed studies suggest that preventing release of these substances may even be 
economic in some cases, given the opportunity cost of purchasing the replacements (US 
EPA, 1999).  Such “no regrets” options have been likened to finding $50 bills on the 
sidewalk, and if they existed many argue that most would have been spotted and picked up 
already.  But abatement opportunities for the non-CO2 GHGs, if they are no regrets, are 
comparatively nickels, dimes, and quarters on the sidewalk.  Yet, if we recognize that in 
climate terms they are worth several dollars that may make it worthwhile to stoop, pocket 
the change, and make substantial progress in slowing climate change.  Even if the spare 
change does not fully compensate for the bother of stooping, we still have the climate 
benefits.  Developing countries looking for energy without having to spend hard currency 
may find it particularly attractive to recover CH4. 
Not all non-CO2 emission reductions are completely without pain, however.  Cutting 
agricultural sources of N2O and CH4, tied as they are to food production, are potentially as 
big an economic burden as limits on CO2 and energy use.  The good news is that it appears 
that substantial mitigation of CH4 from paddy rice is possible with mid-season drainage, 
and this appears to also increase yield.  The practice has thus spread widely in China quite 
apart from any concern about CH4 emissions.  CH4 from ruminants is by comparison not an 
easily solved problem.  There are some indications that diet and other factors can lead to 
reductions in emissions, but these reductions are often small or hard to quantify.  Diet alone 
has been shown to reduce methane emissions by 16% (Griggs, 2002), and diets that result 
in lower CH4 emissions could be promoted, and might even increase the efficiency of 
animal growth.  There have even been tests of vaccines against methanogens living in the 
stomachs of ruminants.   
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Manure is another potential CH4 source.  Manure disposal, however, need not follow 
the manure pit operations prevalent in the US that, due to the anaerobic conditions, 
generate large amounts of CH4.  Alternatively, building in the capacity to collect and use 
the methane from these pits as an energy source could be cost-effective.  We discuss how 
we deal with these issues below.  
 
2.5.2 Unintended Consequences 
 
How you structure the incentives for methane reductions will have an impact on the 
final results.  If you give incentives for extracting methane from cow manure, then you may 
give some incentive to shift from open field grazing (where the dung decomposes 
aerobically with little methane generation, and serves to fertilize the soil) to a more 
industrial method where you can make giant manure pits and capture the methane to get 
subsidies or credits.  Not only would such a hypothetical switch not generate any real 
methane reductions (though the power production could displace some fossil fuel 
combustion) and siphon money away from other methane projects, but confined animal 
raising is often considered to be less environmentally friendly.  There are other possible 
negative consequences of methane reduction incentives:  for example, Jared Diamond cites 
decreased water quality resulting from coal bed methane extraction in Wyoming (Diamond, 
2005) (this water quality problem was also described by Robbins (2006)):   
“Another form arises from an industrial method to extract methane for natural gas from 
coal beds by drilling into the coal and pumping in water to carry the methane up to the 
surface.  Unfortunately, water dissolves not only methane but also salt.  Since 1988, the 
adjacent state of Wyoming, which is almost as poor as Montana, has been seeking to boost 
its economy by embarking on a big program of methane extraction by this method, yielding 
salty water that drains from Wyoming into southeastern Montana’s Powder River Basin”  
This coal bed methane is currently distinguished from ‘coal mine methane’, the 
difference being that ‘coal mine methane’ is from an active mine and therefore can be 
considered to be a reduction of methane that would otherwise have been vented into the 
atmosphere, whereas ‘coal bed methane’ is extracted from deep seams and therefore any 
leaks actually add to atmospheric methane levels.  If methane capture becomes valuable, 
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there might be pressure to classify seams as active mines in order to generate additional 
credits.  Of course, under most climate regimes, methane from any source will still have a 
carbon efficiency advantage over electricity generation from coal or oil, regardless of 
additional capture credits.  However, this may actually lead to more coal mining, as the 
cost of mining becomes offset by the sale of methane credits.   
The possible perverse incentives identified above are mostly small edge cases.  The 
benefits of methane reduction almost certainly outweigh the risks of these potential 
perverse outcomes, but it is always important to consider a broad a range of probable 
impacts when evaluating new large scale programs.  This applies to large scale methane 
policies in much the same way it does to large scale solar, CO2 sequestration, wind 
projects, or any other mitigation proposal.  Or indeed, to the large scale ongoing 
atmospheric perturbation that these mitigation methods are designed to solve.   
 
2.5.3 Policy Design 
 
Given the amount of uncertainty involved in methane inventories, how should a 
policy be designed to control it?  To take the problem of sheep, for example:  current 
methane inventories are based on the number of animals.  Should we design a policy that 
encourages better inventory methods?  Will nations who have signed up under the old 
policy be willing to change to a new one if it ends up raising their emissions?  Is there a 
way to reward nations for improved inventory methodology?  Should there be a move 
towards inverse methodologies because they may be a more accurate measure of large scale 
emissions?  Or should sources be addressed individually?  The inventory methodology 
enshrined in climate treaties must be chosen carefully because the monetary incentive will 
be to reduce the calculated inventory, a number which may not always be well correlated 
with actual emissions.  Dales wrote about attempting to “draw a clear distinction between 
making a policy and implementing it, yet I realize that the interrelations between a policy 
and at least the main strategy of its implementation are so close that a good decision about 
policy goals may easily be rendered ineffective by an inferior strategy of implementation” 
(Dales, 1968) 
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The Mexican DNA suggested that a national cap would be much more useful for 
Mexico than the project based CDM approach.  While this statement was about overall 
GHG emissions, it may also apply to methane only policies.  Otherwise it is too easy to 
shift emissions from one place to another, or to take credits for reducing from a “baseline” 
that does not really exist.  Of course, a national target does not eliminate the need to 
address sources individually, as within a nation permits need to be allocated.  The case of 
European Trading System demonstrates the complexity involved in negotiating initial 
permit allocations.  Nor does a national target solve the problem of uncertainty in 
inventories.  Taxes or auctioning might work to address the initial allocation problem, but 
are considered to be politically less desirable.  But, should national targets be determined in 
some manner, then each individual nation could design its own measures, whether taxes, 
standards and measures, or other approaches.   
Then remaining questions become how to allocate national targets, whether to allow 
trading between nations, designing penalties for exceeding the targets, and choosing 
appropriate inventory methods for determining whether the target has been met or not.  If 
bottom up inventory methods will be used to determine methane emissions, then the 
recommendation of this work is that trading between nations should be avoided.  There is 
the potential to use inverse methodologies for determining regional emissions, and in that 
case trading between regions might be acceptable even if emissions at the level of rice 
paddy or cattle herd are not well quantified.  Such a system based on inverse methods 
would have to be designed carefully to avoid incentives to eliminate natural methane 
sources with ecological value such as wetlands and bogs.  This design would be especially 
difficult in cases where natural and anthropogenic emissions have similar temporal and 
geographic patterns.  Nor do the regions used in inverse methodologies necessarily 
correspond well to national boundaries, which will interfere with creating trading 
structures. 
Therefore in the short term, it appears that global trading regimes for methane may 
not be wise.  On a national level, however, experimentation with different policy structures 
for methane reduction could be encouraged.  Inverse methodologies can be used to 
determine methane policy success at a regional level.  Work should continue to improve 
bottom-up inventory methods which will enable more efficient policies that require project 
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level resolution, and a broader network of methane sensors should be installed in order to 
increase the geographical resolution of the inverse methods enabling better evaluation of 
national level policies.   
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have presented converging lines of reasoning that favor eliminating 
trading between methane and CO2 in climate policies, and instead addressing the two gases 
separately.  These reasons include differences in their atmospheric reactivity and difficulty 
in determining an accurate GWP, the sticky issue of trading well quantified fossil fuel CO2 
abatement for poorly quantified methane abatement due to difficulties in measuring 
methane emissions accurately, political issues of including CO2 which is difficult to abate 
and historically tied to powerful political interests with a gas like methane where policies 
like M2M indicate that there are fewer political barriers to implementing control policies, 
and economic reasons due to the disconnect between GHG trading price and actual societal 
costs.  This separation of gases would also allow CO2 policies to continue on a cap and 
trade path, to which CO2 may be well suited (especially if the cap and trade is applied to 
the mine mouth or well head rather than the point of combustion), while methane can be 
controlled using standards and measures which may be well suited to many of the methane 
abatement methodologies.  This conclusion is directly opposite to that of researchers who 
argue the benefit of “what flexibility”, but would require more attention from policy 
makers to achieve an appropriate balance between reductions of the gases.   
Given that this research initially began with an analysis of stabilization and its 
limitations, it is ironic that the conclusion arrived at in this chapter is to not allow trading 
between CH4 and CO2.  In chapter one, we noted the inconsistency between stabilization 
and GWP trading:  therefore, separating these gases will enable the implementation of 
actual stabilization pathways for each gas individually, if so desired.  However, this 
increased feasibility of stabilization was certainly not one of our primary goals.  
It may be important to ask what the drawbacks are to forbidding trading between CO2 
and CH4.  Persson et al. (2003) analyzed the economic inefficiencies in using GWPs for 
methane control given a stabilization target and determined that these inefficiencies were 
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small compared to likely “political controversies and large transaction costs”.  What are the 
unspecified costs of having two separate policies for CO2 and CH4?  We find three 
categories of possible losses.  The first is political.  There is significant commitment to 
Kyoto among Annex B nations, and they may not be willing to change at this late date.  Of 
course, with the second commitment period under debate, there may be significant changes 
regardless.  Additionally, there would be worry that nations would pick and choose whether 
to belong to both the CO2 and CH4 policies, or only one.  While this is a disadvantage in 
the case of nations that would have otherwise constrained both gases, this is an advantage 
in the case of nations that would not have constrained either gas in the counterfactual.  The 
second category of loss is economic inefficiency:  without “what” flexibility, the ratio of 
the price of methane to the price of CO2 will likely not stay at a constant “optimal” level.  
However, part of the point of our analysis is that this optimal ratio is hard to determine, and 
changes over time, and policymakers can adjust the constraints in rough ways to attempt to 
minimize this loss.  The third category of loss is administrative overhead.  This overhead 
can occur both in the literal sense of the necessity of maintaining two different treaties and 
trading systems, but also in the sense that it is simpler to build policy around one number 
representing CO2 equivalent emissions rather than needing to determine different targets 
for different gases.   
However, we believe that these possible drawbacks to separate policies are 
outweighed by the political, economic, methodological, and scientific benefits that accrue 
from separate consideration of the two gases.  Some of the costs, such as the administrative 
overhead of having two separate policies rather than one, are in some sense “fixed” 
regardless of the quantity of methane reduction available, whereas the advantages of this 
separate policy approach scale to a certain extent with the importance of methane.  Is 
methane sufficiently important to be worth independent consideration?  The argument that 
it is can be supported by the fact that methane constraints alone can yield almost as much 
temperature reduction in the 21st century as a 550 ppm CO2-only stabilization policy, and at 
a much lower cost.  In the longer term, of course, CO2 becomes relatively more important.  
The Methane to Markets program is the only current international attempt at such a 
methane reduction program.  The signatory nations do comprise a significant majority of 
methane emissions, and therefore as a group could achieve most of the reductions modeled 
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in this study.  However, the stated targets of the M2M policy are very modest compared to 
our projections for available inexpensive near-term reductions.  Additionally, it is not clear 
whether the non-binding and voluntary nature of the public-private partnerships in M2M 
will be effective in achieving even their modest goals.  US and EU methane reductions in 
the past decade can serve as historical examples of apparently effective methane emissions 
abatement, but those emissions reductions relied in part on standards, subsidies, and other 
policy changes.  If public-private partnerships in OECD nations did not achieve reductions 
without policy instruments in place, then it might be overly optimistic to hope that merely 
lowering information barriers will be sufficient to lead to significant methane abatement in 
developing nations.  And if standards or subsidies are indeed necessary, then it is not clear 
exactly how M2M will encourage such abatement behaviors on the part of its member 
nations.   
A number of potential tipping points were discussed in the first chapter, including the 
consequences of rate of change on biological systems that adapt slowly (whether human or 
natural), and on physical systems such as the thermohaline circulation.  Because methane 
has short term impacts, and because we have seen that more than 20% of near term 
warming can be avoided through methane abatement alone, we believe it is worthwhile to 
make a significant effort to abate methane now as perhaps the only way to avoid near term 
crucial thresholds.  Unfortunately, if these near term thresholds exist, it may be that we 
would be able to do no more than delay them. 
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that because of its characteristics of lifetime, 
poor source inventories, inexpensive abatement opportunities, and significant climate 
impact, there should be a significant effort made to push for international policies to reduce 
methane emissions without allowing trading between methane and CO2.  We also believe 
that project based approaches such as CDM are not an ideal manner in which to include 
non-Annex B nations.  Methane abatement in such nations might be better addressed by 
incentives to implement local standards and measures, or perhaps nationwide caps.   
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3  Air pollution Constraints:  Interactions with Climate Change and Policy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
In the previous chapter we used modeling and other analysis tools to study how 
methane and CO2 should be included in climate policies, and determined that GWP based 
trading is likely to lead to suboptimal outcomes.  Methane was chosen as a target for study 
because of its significant contribution to radiative forcing past and present, because of the 
existence of many inexpensive reduction options, and because there is tension between 
basket policies such as Kyoto with GWP trading and single gas policies such as the 
European Trading System or the US Methane to Markets policy.   
In contrast to methane, air pollution policy starts in a position where minimal 
coordination occurs with climate policy, despite a number of academic studies on 
“ancillary benefits” and “complementarity” (these studies are described in Appendix F).  
Air pollution is a worthy target of study in relation to climate policy for parallel but 
differing reasons from methane.  In the broadest general outline, air pollution reduction 
does have a similar temperature mitigation potential as methane, if one includes both direct 
effects (mainly from black carbon) and ancillary reductions of other gases (because 
combustion is a source of a large portion of both air pollution and carbon dioxide).  And 
where for methane there are many low cost emissions reduction opportunities, in part due 
to the high value of natural gas and the ease of flaring, for air pollutants there are desirable 
mitigation opportunities because of the health benefits that arise from local pollution 
reductions.  Air pollutants, with methane, share the advantage of not being inherent 
byproducts of the processes that create them:  unlike in the case of CO2, one can use end-
of-pipe solutions or more efficient combustion processes to reduce emissions of most 
pollutants.  Because of the temperature reduction potential, and the fact that the abatement 
costs are offset by ancillary benefits, air pollution mitigation in the context of climate 
policy is clearly worthy of analysis.   
However, atmospheric pollutants differ from methane in many ways.  Therefore, we 
have applied our multi-pronged analysis methodology of climate modeling, economic 
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modeling, and policy analysis to the question of whether and how to incorporate pollution 
policies into climate policy planning.  Several issues need to be resolved in order to make a 
recommendation on this policy coordination.  The first is to determine the direct impact of 
air pollutants on climate.  This requires our atmospheric climate-chemistry integrated 
modeling system in order to properly model the transformation of emissions into 
concentrations and then to calculate radiative impacts.  A coupled ecosystem model also 
allows for examination of ozone impacts on carbon uptake.  The second step of analyzing 
coordination between air pollution policy and climate policy is to recognize that emission 
constraints on air pollutants impact greenhouse gas emissions and vice versa.  In order to 
examine this issue, it is necessary to have an emissions predictions program that has both 
the capacity to model sectoral shifts in response to constraints as well as to capture the 
changes within a sector such as the use of end-of-pipe pollution mitigation options.  There 
are three kinds of interactions to be studied between greenhouse gas emission policies and 
pollution mitigation policies.  The first is the impact of pollutant constraints on GHG 
emissions, the second is the impact of GHG constraints on pollution emissions, and the 
third is to understand how GHG and climate policies will interact when implemented 
simultaneously.  The third step is to examine air pollution and climate in the context of 
current policies and political realities, recognizing that there are significant heterogeneities 
that are not captured by a global level CGE model.   
In this chapter we therefore use the MIT IGSM to analyze the direct impacts of air 
pollutants on climate and show that of the pollutants studied only black carbon constraints 
have any significant impact on reduction of the temperature increase over the 21st century, 
and even that reduction is in large part negated by the warming that occurs due to 
concomitant reductions in SO2.  Controls that lead to ozone reductions also cause increases 
in methane concentrations, such that the temperature effects are effectively zero; though, if 
ozone impacts on ecosystems are included, the increase in carbon uptake does lead to there 
being a small net reduction in temperature change.  We then use the EPPA model to study 
the interactions between greenhouse gas policy and pollution policy.  The first step was to 
update the treatment of air pollution emissions in the EPPA model.  In order to examine the 
impact of air pollution policy constraints, it is necessary to have an estimate of the cost of 
mitigation.  We developed a set of marginal abatement curves for each pollutant, 
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differentiating between Annex B and non-Annex B nations, and used these curves to derive 
elasticities of subsitution.  These elasticities are then used within the production functions 
within the model.  With the upgraded model we are able to demonstrate the impacts that air 
pollution policy can have on GHG emissions and vice versa.  We are also able to analyze 
the benefits of coordination between the two kinds of policy.  Finally, we briefly examine 
how these interactions differ depending on the characteristics of regional areas using Los 
Angeles, Mexico City, and China as case studies.  We also address how current climate 
policies such as CDM are currently interacting with air pollution reductions.  This analysis 
allows us to make recommendations on how policymaking should proceed in order to take 
advantage of the coordination benefits between air pollution and GHG emission 
constraints.   
 
3.2 The Direct Impact of Air Pollution on Climate 
 
Our first step in addressing air pollution and climate interactions is to examine the 
direct effect of atmospheric pollutants on climate, but without including any complications 
from economic interactions.  It would be difficult to estimate these direct impacts without 
modeling.  Unlike well-mixed gases, where it is at least sometimes possible to use simple 
lifetime estimates to calculate concentrations from emissions, and from there directly 
calculate radiative forcing, the direct and indirect impacts of air pollutants are much more 
complex.  In this work we concentrate on carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), black carbon (BC) aerosols, and sulfur oxides (SOx, the 
collective term used for the emissions of some sulfate aerosols, some SO3, but mostly SO2 
gas which subsequently undergoes atmospheric transformation to form white sulfate 
aerosols). In order to accurately simulate the atmospheric lifecycles of common air pollutants 
such as CO, NOx and VOCs, the climatically important methane (CH4), and sulfate aerosols, 
it is important to capture the fast photochemistry of the hydroxyl free radical (OH) (Ehhalt, 
1999; Prinn, 2003).  
The relationships of these compounds are complex.  The nonlinearity of these 
connections are exemplified by the fact that concentrations of ozone in urban areas for a 
given level of VOC emissions tend to increase with increasing NOx emissions until a 
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critical VOC-dependent NOx emission level is reached. Above that critical level, ozone 
concentrations actually decrease with increasing NOx emissions emphasizing the need for 
air pollution policies to consider CO, VOC and NOx emission reductions jointly rather than 
independently. In contrast to urban chemistry, concentrations of ozone in the climatically 
critical global middle and upper troposphere are determined significantly by long-range 
transport from urban areas below and the stratosphere above, and the photochemical ozone 
production is limited by the low ambient NOx levels. 
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Figure 3-1:  EPPA4 emissions in 2000, weighted by 100 year GWPs, including best estimates for 
pollutant GWPs.  Black carbon is included in the second figure.   
There have been attempts to give pollutants GWP weights in a similar fashion to 
greenhouse gases.  Using some standard GWP estimates for the ozone precursors CO, 
NOx, and VOCs we produced a chart of 100 year GWP weighted emissions for the year 
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2000 and 2100 (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2).  The GWPs of the three substances included 
are highly uncertain, both because of scientific uncertainties and because the climate 
impacts of the substances can depend on time of day, location of emissions, and various 
climatic conditions in the area.  For example, we have assigned a GWP to NOx of 5, but 
high altitude NOx emissions from aircraft could potentially have a GWP of 400 or more.   
The uncertainties in impacts of black carbon and the aerosols are even larger than those of 
the ozone precursors, and therefore have been included in as secondary options in both 
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2. Bond and Sun (2005) suggest that black carbon’s GWP should 
be on the order of 680, but for various reasons, including uncertainty in impact but also the 
fact that the warming due to black carbon has a very different vertical profile from well-
mixed gases or ozone, it is difficult to assign a GWP to black carbon.  And our calculations 
suggest that even the ozone precursor GWP estimates may be flawed, with NOx reductions 
having no (or even a warming) temperature effect in the absence of concurrent CO and 
VOC reductions, and with CO and VOC reductions leading to little or no cooling.  Other 
researchers (Fiore et al., 2003) have hypothesized that anthropogenic VOC reductions other 
than methane should have little impact because methane is the dominant VOC on the 
global scale. 
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Figure 3-2: EPPA4 emissions in the year 2100, weighted by 100 year GWPs, including best estimates 
for air pollutant GWPs. 
The MIT IGSM can be used to investigate such climate-chemistry interactions.  The 
coupled atmospheric chemistry and climate submodels have sufficient detail to capture 
most of the important reactions in the troposphere.  An urban submodel serves to age 
emissions before releasing them to the remainder of the model in order to more accurately 
simulate conditions (Mayer et al., 2000).  Additionally, a version of the MBL ecosystem 
model exists that allows us to examine ozone effects on ecosystems (Felzer et al., 2005), 
though it is not yet directly coupled into the main IGSM.  The computational demands of 
the IGSM are modest enough (36 hours on a single processor) that it is possible to easily 
perform many experiments with different emissions scenarios.  We performed a first pass 
at analyzing these interactions previously (Prinn et al., 2005a), but repeat the experiments 
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here with updated model components.  The direct comparison of the Prinn et al. (2005) 
results using the EPPA3 and IGSM1 framework to the new results within the EPPA4 and 
IGSM2 framework is a start towards examining structural uncertainty within these results 
rather than just parametric uncertainty.  More importantly, repeating the experiments 
ensures consistency with the subsequent sections which use EPPA4 and IGSM2 to explore 
the economic side of the interactions between air pollution and climate policy, allowing the 
direct effect of pollutant controls to be separated from the ancillary reductions of other 
greenhouse gases. 
 
3.2.1 Scenarios of Air Pollution Reduction 
 
To examine the direct impacts of air pollution control on climate, we establish 
reference and control scenarios.  Our reference scenario (denoted “ref”) includes no explicit 
policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and no specific new policies to reduce air 
pollution (Reilly et al., 1999; Webster et al., 2002).  It is therefore somewhat dirtier than an 
expected “no-climate policy” future which would be expected to include air pollution 
constraints for health reasons alone.  For the control scenarios, emissions were artificially 
constrained by the EPPA post processor to remain constant from 2005 to 2100 for 
individual pollutants, or combinations of these pollutants from all anthropogenic activities.  
Specifically, in six scenarios, we consider caps at the reference 2005 levels of emissions of 
the following air pollutants:   
(1) NOx only (denoted “NOx cap”),  
(2) CO plus VOCs only (denoted “CO/VOC cap”),  
(3) SOx only (denoted “SOx cap”),  
(4) BC only (denoted “BC cap”), 
(5) Cases (1) and (2) combined (denoted “3 cap”),  
(6) Cases (1), (2), (3) and (4) combined (denoted “all cap”),  
(7) An “allurb” scenario from Section 3.3 that includes all economic impacts is also 
included in some figures in this section for comparison purposes 
 104
Cases (1) and (2) are designed to show the individual effects of controls on NOx and 
reactive carbon gases (CO, VOC), although such individual actions are unlikely. Case (3) 
addresses further controls on emissions of sulfur oxides from combustion of fossil fuels and 
from industrial processes.  Case (4) similarly addresses selective reduction of black carbon 
from these processes, though again, this is not only politically unlikely but also physically 
unlikely.  Cases (5) and (6) address combinations more likely to be representative of a real 
comprehensive air pollution control approach. Some complexities arise due to the fact that 
we define urban areas for the purposes of the model as any grid cell in which NOx 
emissions are greater than 5 kg/km2/day.  Therefore the caps on NOx emissions in cases 
(1), (5), and (6) lead to a smaller number of total urban areas, and therefore less emissions 
of all substances passed through the urban module.  Note also that all anthropogenic VOC 
contributions occur within urban areas:  it is assumed that the global VOC budget is 
dominated by natural sources.   
In Figure 3-3 we show the ratios of the emissions of NOx, CO, VOC, BC, and SOx in 
the year 2100 to the reference case in 2100 when their emissions are capped at 2005 levels. 
Because these chemicals are short-lived (hours to several days for NOx, VOCs, and SOx, 
few months for CO), the effects of their emissions are largely restricted to the hemispheres 
in which they are emitted (and for the shortest-lived pollutants restricted to their source 
regions). Figure 3-3 therefore shows hemispheric as well as global emission ratios. For 
calibration, the reference emissions in 2100 of CO2, CH4, SOx, NOx, CO, BC and VOC’s as 
input into the IGSM are 23.7 gigaton C/year, 731 megaton CH4/year, 283 megaton 
SOx/year, 349 megaton NOx/year, 4.6 gigaton CO/year, 45 megaton BC/year, and 677 
megaton VOC/year respectively (1 megaton = 1012 gm). The reference global emissions of 
NOx, CO, BC, and SOx in 2100 are about 1.9, 2.7, 2.3, and 1.5 times their 2005 levels. Note 
that while our reference emissions are similar to the central IPCC IS92a scenarios 
(Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), they differ specifically in having substantially increasing 
SOx, NOx, CO and VOC emissions through 2100 since they assume no specific air 
pollution policies beyond those already existing (Webster et al., 2002).   
The major difference in terms of emissions between this study and our earlier paper 
(Prinn et al. 2005) besides the inclusion of black carbon is that NOx emissions only double 
in the reference, rather than increasing nearly fivefold.   
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Figure 3-3:  Global, northern hemisphere (NH), and southern hemisphere (SH) pollutant emissions.   
Emissions are shown in the year 2100 as a percentage of global reference levels, with the global 
increase in the reference case over 2005 levels noted.  The Cap policy maintains all emissions at 2005 
levels. 
3.2.2 Effects of pollution controls on concentrations of key atmospheric 
species 
 
In Figure 3-4, the global and hemispheric average lower tropospheric concentrations 
of CH4, O3, sulfate aerosols, and OH in each of the above seven pollution constraint cases 
are shown as percentage changes from the relevant global or hemispheric reference.  While 
most of the impacts on concentrations are similar to the Prinn et al. (2005) results, there are 
some differences.  First, we have included the effects of a black carbon simulation, and the 
effects of the “allurb” simulation which includes the effect of structural economic shifts on 
GHG emissions as well as the actual urban emission reductions (the impacts on CO2 and 
N2O of these shifts will be examined in a subsequent section).  We see that black carbon 
reductions have little impact on any of the four substances in this chart.  This is not 
surprising, as the only possible interaction mechanism by which black carbon reductions 
could impact the concentration of other species is through effects of temperature changes 
on the reaction rates of the other species.  The major difference of the allcap case from the 
allurb case is an increase in methane concentration rather than a decrease.  The allcap and 
allurb cases have similar emissions of air pollutants, because in one case the emissions path 
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was designated artificially in the postprocessor, in the other the same emissions path was 
used as a constraint within the EPPA model.  However, the emissions of the major GHGs 
are significantly lower in the allurb case because of the interaction effects between 
emissions constraints on air pollution and GHG emissions (as discussed in Section 3.3).  
The next difference is that the CO/VOC reductions, which had led to a small increase in 
ozone and a slight decrease in methane in Prinn et al. (2005a) now exhibit the reverse 
effect.  This appears to be mainly a southern hemisphere phenomenon, possibly linked to a 
decrease in OH rather than the expected increase.    Additionally, we now see decreases in 
OH simultaneously with increases in SOx in the NOx reduction scenario.  This result is at 
odds with both expectations (Unger et al PNAS 2006) and our previous results, as we 
expect lower OH levels to result in less SO2 oxidation to sulfates , but because of the 
relationship between NOx emissions and assignment of urban areas there are complicating 
factors making explanations of this behavior difficult.   
The relationship of NOx and O3, OH, and CH4 remains normal.  Capping of NOx 
leads to decreases in O3 and OH and an increase in CH4 (caused by the lower OH which is 
a CH4 sink).  In the 3cap case, we see similar results to the previous study, where 
combining NOx, CO and VOC caps leads to a substantial O3 decrease (driven largely by the 
NOx decrease) and a slight increase in CH4 (the enhancement due to the NOx caps being 
partially offset by the opposing CO/VOC caps). Finally, capping all emissions causes 
substantial lowering of sulfate aerosols and O3 and a small increase in CH4, as before.  In 
sum, we see ozone reductions of 7.4% due to NOx restrictions, 3.8% due to CO/VOC 
restrictions, and 12.8% from capping all three pollutants.  This can be compared to the 8% 
reduction that was seen in the methane control case in the previous chapter.   
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Figure 3-4:  Hemispheric concentrations of climatically and chemically important species. 
Concentrations shown in 6 cases where emissions are capped singly or in groups in an EPPA 
postprocessing step (3cap = CO/VOC and NOx, urbonly constrains all urban species) and one case in 
which all the urban emissions are capped within the EPPA4 model (allurb).  The changes shown are in 
reference to the relevant hemispheric average.   
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Figure 3-5:  Global concentrations of climatically and chemically important species.  
Concentrations shown in 6 cases where emissions are capped singly or in groups in an EPPA 
postprocessing step (3cap = CO/VOC and NOx, urbonly constrains all urban species) and one case in 
which all the urban emissions are capped within the EPPA4 model (allurb).  The changes shown are in 
reference to the global average.  The lower figure from (Prinn et al., 2005a) is included for comparison, 
and does not include the BC or allurb cases.
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The two hemispheres respond somewhat differently to these caps due to the short air 
pollutant lifetimes and dominance of northern over southern hemispheric emissions. The 
northern hemisphere contributes the most to the global averages and therefore the globe 
responds to the caps similarly to the northern hemisphere. The southern hemisphere shows 
very similar decreases in sulfate aerosol from its reference when compared to the northern 
hemisphere when either SOx or all emissions are capped. 
When compared to the southern hemisphere, the northern hemispheric ozone levels 
decrease by much larger percentages below their reference concentrations when NOx is 
capped. Capping NOx emissions leads to significant decreases in non-urban OH and thus 
increases in methane in both hemispheres. Because methane has a long lifetime of about 9 
years (Prinn et al., 2001), relative to the interhemispheric mixing time (about 1 to 2 years), 
its global concentrations are influenced by OH changes in either hemisphere alone, or in 
both. Hence CH4 also increases in both hemispheres when NOx or all emissions are capped 
even though the OH decreases only occur in the southern hemisphere in these two cases.  In 
the case of CO/VOCs the story is slightly more complicated:  we see OH and O3 decreases 
in the southern hemisphere, but an OH increase in the northern hemisphere.  Again, the 
aerosol concentrations move in the opposite direction from the OH concentrations, which is 
not the expected correlation.  Further experiments show that all the concentration changes 
are mainly due to the CO reductions, with the VOCs playing a lesser role.  Further 
examination of this chemistry is ongoing.   
Effects of air pollution on the land ecosystem sink for carbon can be significant 
through reductions in ozone-induced plant damage (Felzer et al., 2005; Prinn et al., 2005a). 
Net primary production (NPP), the difference between plant photosynthesis and plant 
respiration, as well as net ecosystem production (NEP) (NEP is the difference between 
NPP and soil respiration plus decay, and represents the net land sink), both increase when 
ozone decreases. In the Prinn et al (2005) study, when all pollutants were capped ozone 
decreased by about 13% globally.  The result on ecosystem production was to increase 
NEP by 30 to 49% (0.6 to 0.9 gigatons of carbon) depending on fertilization assumptions.  
The increase in uptake over the century resulting from capping pollution in the reference 
case ranged from 36 to 75 gigatons of carbon, or about 6 to 13 years of fossil carbon 
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emissions at current annual rates.  In the absence of any other climate policy, the central 
value of this uptake range is sufficient to decrease temperature increases over the century 
by almost 5%.   
Of course, as a supplement to a GHG policy, pollution reduction will not be as 
effective at increasing uptake, both because the GHG policy will lead to some amount of 
ancillary pollution reductions resulting in less ozone to begin with in the counterfactual, 
and because the starting level of uptake will be lower due to there being less of a CO2 
fertilization effect.  However, when applying pollution caps to a 550 ppm stabilization 
case, the cumulative 2000-2100 increase of carbon uptake was still 13 to 40 gigatons of 
carbon, which is about one-half of the above increased cumulative uptake when the 
pollution cap occurs assuming there is no climate policy.  This uptake would decrease the 
cost of such a 550 ppm policy significantly (of order 10 to 20%) because it would eliminate 
the need to undertake the most costly of the carbon emission reduction options.  This 
reduced pollution would come at a cost:  the interaction effects are explored more fully 
later in this chapter. 
The ecosystem calculations do not include the additional positive effects on NPP and 
NEP of decreased acid deposition and decreased exposure to SO2 and NO2 gas, that would 
result from the pollution caps considered. They also do not include the negative effects on 
NPP and NEP of decreasing nutrient nitrate and possibly sulfate deposition that also arise 
from these caps.  
3.2.3 Effects of air pollution controls on temperature change and sea level rise 
 
The impact of these pollutant caps on global and hemispheric mean surface 
temperature and sea level changes from 2005 to 2100 are shown in Figure 3-6.  The results 
are stated as percentages relative to the global-average reference case changes of 4.0°C and 
0.51 meters respectively.  The largest changes in temperature and sea level occur when 
black carbon alone is capped.  Because most BC emissions are in the northern hemisphere, 
the temperature decreases are greatest there.  Reduction of cooling sulfate aerosols leads to 
a change half as large in magnitude but opposite in sign from the black carbon impacts.  
For the NOx caps, global methane increases lead to a small temperature increase in the 
southern hemisphere.  However, as shown in Figure 3-4, O3 reductions in response to the 
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decrease in NOx emissions occur mainly in the northern hemisphere where the majority of 
the emissions reductions occur, and therefore there is a temperature decrease in that 
hemisphere.  For CO and VOC reductions, there are small increases in temperature 
especially in the southern hemisphere, despite what looks like decreases in forcing.   
Combining NOx and CO/VOC reductions may lead to non-linear effects.  For 
example sea level rise, which serves as an indicator of integrated warming over time, is 
negative in the 3cap case even though it is positive in the cases where the pollutants are 
capped individually.  However, the magnitudes of these changes are too small to be able to 
state anything definitively.  Finally, capping all the pollutants leads to a net cooling, as 
might have been expected due to the effects of BC reductions being twice as large as those 
of SO2 reductions, with the other substances being minor impacts in comparison.  Note that 
these climate calculations in Figure 3-6 omit the cooling effects of the CO2 reductions 
caused by the lessening of the inhibition of the land sink by ozone.  This omission is valid 
if we presume that anthropogenic CO2 emissions, otherwise restricted by a climate policy, 
are allowed to increase to compensate for these reductions.  If not, our previous work 
(Prinn et al., 2005a) suggests that the increased CO2 sink would lead to another couple of 
percent of cooling, for a sum total of 7 or 8% reduction below reference, or about half as 
much as keeping methane emissions constant through the century.   
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Figure 3-6:  Effects of air pollution caps on global, southern hemispheric and northern hemispheric 
temperature increases and global sea level rise 
Tempereature change and sea level rise shown as a percent difference from the reference increase 
between 2000 and 2100.  3cap includes CO/VOC and NOx, UrbOnly includes constraints on all 
pollutants but no interaction effects with the major GHGs.  IGSM1 figure comes from (Prinn et al., 
2005a) and does not include BC impacts.  The IGSM1 figure does include one run (UrbOnly+sink) that 
includes ozone impacts on terrestrial ecosystem carbon sinks.   
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3.3 Air pollution constraints in the context of an economic model 
 
3.3.1 Motivation for Inclusion of Economics 
 
One of the limitations of both Prinn et al. 2005 and the preceding section of this 
chapter was the lack of an economic analysis of the pollution policies, which were 
implemented artificially in a post-processing step to the EPPA model.  Figure 3-6 
demonstrates the temperature impact of various policies, but gives no guidance as to the 
relative costs of the policies to each other or to greenhouse gas policies.  In order to give 
policy guidance such cost estimations are necessary.  Additionally, we expect that a 
constraint on a given urban gas will have impacts on the emissions of other gases.   
There is a considerable literature on “ancillary benefits” and “complementarity” 
between air pollution policies and carbon dioxide policies.  The rationale for this extensive 
literature is that fossil fuel combustion emits both CO2 and air pollutants.  Therefore, we 
can expect that a constraint on CO2 emissions would likely lead to an ancillary benefit of a 
improvement in air quality, and a constraint on air pollution emissions will lead to an 
ancillary benefit of a reduction of CO2 emissions.  In the case where both CO2 and air 
pollution are being constrained simultaneously, the two constraints can be seen to serve as 
“complementary goods”, where a reduction of CO2 emissions leads to a reduction of  the 
cost of reducing air pollution emissions and vice versa.  Most of the literature in this area 
has used ancillary benefits of CO2 reductions to justify climate policies, but there has also 
been some work on complementarities, ancillary benefits of air pollution, and designing 
optimal policies to combine air quality and climate policies.  This research has been done 
with a variety of approaches:  bottom-up analyses, regional CGE models, health models, 
and others, as presented in more detail in Appendix F.  However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this problem has rarely been addressed on a global spatial scale, a century long 
timescale, including climate impact analysis, or within a modeling structure where the 
economic feedbacks well represented in a CGE model have been coupled with substitution 
elasticities grounded in empirical studies allowing for end-of-pipe abatement effects.   
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Certainly no work has attempted to combine all these challenges into a single integrated 
study, which we do here.   
3.3.2 Model Development 
 
3.3.2.1 EPPA implementation 
 
The first step of integrating 
pollution abatements into an 
economic model is determining the 
appropriate functional form.  The 
EPPA model, as detailed in Appendix 
A, has production sectors based on 
nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) functions.  In 
order to integrate air pollution 
abatement into such a structure, we 
decided to model air pollution 
Air Pollutant Conventional Inputs 
σpollutant 
Output 
Figure 3-7:  Generalized production structure for 
including air pollutants in the EPPA4 model 
emissions as an input into the sector rather than as an output (Figure 3-7).  In effect, one 
can consider disposal of air pollutants as the input.  An elasticity of substitution between 
this pollutant disposal input and the remainder of the inputs implies that pollution 
abatement can be achieved within a sector by increasing the supply of other inputs such as 
labor and capital.  In this structure, if the substitution elasticity of the pollutant with the 
other sectoral inputs is zero (eg, a Leontief relationship) then the only way to reduce 
emissions is to reduce the output of the sector.  A positive elasticity indicates some ability 
to abate pollutant emissions without reducing output, at some cost of other inputs.  The 
larger the elasticity, the fewer other resources are necessary to yield the same quantity of 
abatement.  This implementation parallels the manner in which non-CO2 GHGs are treated 
in the model, as originally described in Hyman et al. (2003a).  
Ideally, each pollutant in each sector in each region would be given a separate 
elasticity.  However, the estimation problem is large:  6 major pollutants (CO, VOCs, BC, 
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OC, SO2, and NOx) multiplied by sixteen sectors plus eleven electric generation 
technologies with relevant emissions possibly including different fuels for each sector 
would mean over a hundred different elasticities to estimate, and then attempting to make 
estimates for each of sixteen regions would make the problem completely unmanageable.   
 
3.3.2.2 Parameter Estimation 
 
In order to derive elasticities of substitution, it is necessary to base them on available 
data.  We had access to the RAINS-Europe database with tables of pollution abatement 
technologies in Europe, their costs, and abatement characteristics for all of our desired air 
pollutant emissions except for carbon monoxide.  Additionally, the RAINS-Asia databases 
had equivalent data for SO2 in China, but not for any of the other pollutants.  Following the 
methodology of De Masin (2003) and Hyman (2001) it is possible to construct marginal 
abatement cost curves from this data (Figure 3-8), and then create a fit that will enable 
determination of an abatement elasticity.  Given a price P and an abatement A(P) and a 
relationship 
∂
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
1
0 )(1
1
PA
PP , it is possible to do a linear regression on (log(P), log(1-
A)) to derive the elasticity sigma.  Most of the fits had R square values of 0.85 to 0.95, but 
some (especially for the fits to the RAINS-Asia database) were as low as 0.7.   
It was assumed that all Annex B nations would have the same elasticities as Europe, 
and that all non-Annex B nations would have elasticities equal to those of China.  Sectors 
where data were not available were assumed to have an elasticity of 0.05.  There was 
limited sectoral coverage for the VOC data, but where it existed the elasticity was only 
0.04.  For non-SO2 substances in non-Annex B nations, it was assumed that the elasticity 
would be 1.5 that of the appropriate Annex B sector.  Backstop technologies were given an 
elasticity of 20% larger than that of the conventional technology they most resembled (eg, 
advanced coal such as pulverized coal or integrated coal gasification are assigned 
elasticities 20% larger than that of standard coal power).  The elasticities are presented in 
Table 3-1. 
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Figure 3-8:  Sample marginal abatement curves derived from RAINS data 
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 SO2 NOx BC Asia-SO2 
COAL 0.25 0.12 0.13 0.33 
ROIL 0.28 0.11 0.37 0.17 
GAS 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 
FD 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.10 
TRANS 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.06 
ELEC 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.32 
EINT 0.12 0.08 0.21 0.24 
OTHR 0.08 0.1 0.04 0.33 
Table 3-1:  Elasticities of substitution by substance and sector11 
There are various model limitations that should be noted.  First, elasticities are based 
on current technology options.  This has two pertinent implications:  one is that elasticities 
might be expected to grow in the future (though we also have some technology 
improvement in our baseline).  The other implication is that when we extrapolate from 
Annex B pollution control elasticities to their equivalent non-Annex B elasticities using the 
European SO2/Chinese SO2 elasticity ratio we assume that this ratio will hold across other 
gases, which is not necessarily true.  Additionally, some of the abatement curves had less 
than ideal fits, and, as mentioned above, there was a necessity to extrapolate into sectors 
and pollutants not covered in the databases.  Therefore we felt that an analysis of the 
sensitivity of the model to these elasticities would be useful, and that is covered in a later 
section in this chapter.  Our cost estimates may therefore be considered to be rather 
preliminary.  In the future, it would be an improvement to have a more consistent means of 
dealing with pollution projections that would allow for nations at different points on the 
Kuznet curve as a default policy, and then further constraints could be added to examine 
tighter air pollution policies imposed as part of a climate regime.  Also, the current version 
of the model does not distinguish between different transportation fuels.  This lack of 
resolution means that policies that control air pollution will not, for example, lead to a 
substitution of gasoline for diesel in Europe which would actually increase greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Similarly, we do not include the tradeoff between CO reduction and NOx 
reduction, where higher temperature combustion reduces the first (and often has higher 
efficiency in general) but increases emissions of the latter pollutant.  Note that most CO 
reductions are presumed to occur through more complete combustion:  therefore, most of 
                                                 
11 CO abatement was not included in the RAINS database:  elasticity of substitution was assumed to be 0.05 
in this study, except in transport and power sectors, where it was assumed to be 0.2.    
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the CO reductions are indeed balanced by an increase in CO2 emissions in the IGSM.  
Other end-of-pipe technologies might be presumed to reduce multiple pollutants 
simultaneously, most obviously in the case of scrubbers that would reduce both warming 
and cooling aerosols at the same time.  Many of these technologies (such as flue gas 
desulfurization), however, lead to slightly reduced efficiency and therefore greater CO2 
emissions.  The switch to bio-fuels which reduces GHGs but may increase air pollution is 
included in the model, however, as that is a sectoral shift and not an end-of-pipe technology 
represented through an elasticity of substitution. 
 
3.3.3 Pollution Control impact on GHG emissions 
 
The first case to study is the impact that increased pollution control might have on 
greenhouse gas emissions and therefore on climate.  Similarly to the direct impacts case, 
we have examined the results of various policies, the difference being that in this case we 
have constrained pollutant emissions within the framework of the EPPA model, and can 
examine the impacts on the economy and other emissions.  Additionally, we examine three 
different sets of substitution elasticities as a sensitivity study for the case where we control 
all pollutants.  We used three possible sets of elasticities:  a reference elasticity based on 
the RAINS datasets, an elasticity of zero (requiring that all air pollutant reductions result 
from sectoral shifts), and a “high elasticity” of five times the reference in all sectors.  In 
each case, all pollutants were capped at 2005 levels for the whole century, in similar 
fashion to the previous section.  Additionally, individual runs using the reference 
elasticities were performed for caps on each individual pollutant.  The ratios of reference 
run emissions in 2100 to 2005 were 3.2, 2.0, 3.5, 2.3, and 1.6 for CO, NOx, VOCs, BC, and 
SO2 respectively (the ratios for the emissions in EPPA are slightly different than for 
emissions entering the IGSM due to certain natural sources that are added into the process 
in a post-processor step).  While unrealistic in terms of actual policy, emissions within a 
region of a given pollutant was capped from 2005 to 2100 at the level at which it had been 
emitted in 2005.  Trade was allowed between regions in order to yield as low a global cost 
policy as possible.   
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Figure 3-9:  CO2 emissions under constant air pollution emission constraints given different elasticities 
The direct impact on CO2 emissions over the century of the three elasticities is shown 
in Figure 3-9.   In the reference case for the first two decades the constraints are sufficiently 
loose that nearly all the pollution reductions are accomplished without any ancillary 
reductions in CO2 emissions.  In the zero elasticity case the lack of “end-of-pipe” options 
leads to immediate CO2 reductions.  σelas from Figure 3-7 is zero when there are no 
abatement opportunities available within a sector – eg, in Figure 3-8 the marginal 
abatement cost would be infinite at 0% reductions.  Therefore, in order to get abatement 
from a given sector, that sector must reduce production rather than reallocating its use of 
input resources.  In the high elasticity case on the other hand, it is many decades before 
CO2 reductions become noticeable, as there is no barrier to reducing emissions in a given 
sector by increasing the use of other resources such as capital and labor.  The reductions in 
CO2 concentrations in 2100 (Figure 3-10) show the integrated effect of emissions 
reductions over time.  The no policy scenario has a concentration of nearly 890 ppm, while 
it is reduced to 751 ppm in the emission control scenario with reference elasticities.  Of the 
individual pollutant constraints it is the NOx reductions that have the largest ancillary CO2 
reduction.  The relationship between pollution reduction and CO2 reduction results from a 
combination of the quantity of pollutant being reduced, the elasticities assigned, and which 
sectors are the source of the emissions.   
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Figure 3-10:  CO2 concentrations resulting from air pollution constraint scenarios:  5 individual 
pollutant constraints, and three sensitivities for constraining all pollutants 
CO2 concentration in reference is 889 ppm 
Given that the majority of CO2 emissions come from energy production, in Figure 
3-11 we can examine the breakdown by energy source to further examine how different 
pollution policies will impact the economy.  We see in the reference elasticity control case 
that there is a significant reduction in coal use, along with some reduction of bio-oil and 
normal oil, but an increase in gas use.  A shift from coal to gas is a textbook example of 
ancillary benefits of air pollution reduction:  gas is a much cleaner fuel and also happens to 
be much less carbon intensive.  The bio-oil reduction is less clear-cut, as bio-oil is in fact 
carbon neutral in our model.  There is a clear difference in the impact of an air pollution 
policy from the impact of a carbon policy, which would also cause a similar shift away 
from coal towards gas, but would encourage rather than discourage bio-oil use.  The large 
reduction in overall energy production results from the tight constraints – there are factor of 
three reductions in some pollutant emissions by the end of the century.  It is possible that 
the elasticities of substitution should increase over time, as more pollutant abatement 
technologies become available.   
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Figure 3-11:  Energy production by technology in the reference scenario and an air pollution constraint 
scenario controlling all pollutants with the reference value for pollutant elasticities. 
The individual constraints (all using reference elasticity values) have varying effects, 
depending on which substance is being controlled.  Table 3-2 shows the impact of the 
various different pollution constraint policies on energy demand by source.  For example, 
gas combustion has no SO2 or black carbon emissions in our model, so controlling those 
substances leads to large increases in natural gas use.   On the other hand, NOx, VOC, and 
CO are all products of natural gas combustion and processing, and therefore constraints on 
these emissions lead to reductions in natural gas use.  Our coal technologies, as 
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implemented in EPPA4, are assumed to have efficient combustion processes and therefore 
low CO emissions, so CO constraints do not lead to reductions in coal use though the CO 
constraints do lead to reductions in bio-oil.  Because there is little reduction in coal and a 
decrease in zero carbon technologies such as bio-oil, CO constraints lead to very little 
reduction in actual CO2 concentration.  There is some amount of further detail in the model 
that is not shown in this chart involving switching between conventional coal and advanced 
pulverized coal technologies, or between conventional gas and NGCC.  Note that in the 
zero elasticity and black carbon cases, a small quantity of power from coal is actually 
coming from IGCAP.  In general, the BC constraint is too limiting on pulverized coal, and 
conventional coal and IGCAP both have insufficient BC emissions.  This is unrealistic, but 
we do not have IGCC without capture currently implemented as a separate sector in the 
EPPA model.   
 Bio-oil Coal        Gas        Oil         Renewable Nuclear Total 
Ref 379 657 149 425 91 36 1737 
HighElas 341 514 163 397 96 36 1548 
RefElas 309 341 178 305 100 37 1270 
ZeroEals 203 257 137 267 102 37 1002 
BC 366 481 204 422 96 36 1606 
CO 276 613 146 389 90 36 1550 
NOx 296 415 135 400 107 38 1620 
SO2 356 436 213 421 96 36 1557 
VOC 330 596 129 316 88 36 1495 
Table 3-2:  Energy Demand in Quadrillion Btu by Energy Source for different control 
scenarios 
Gases other than CO2 are also impacted by air pollution control policies.  Methane 
and N2O emissions decrease by 11% and 8% respectively by 2100 in the reference 
elasticity case, compared to 30% for CO2.  This is because CO2 emissions are much more 
tightly linked to activities that also have high pollutant emissions (coal use, transport), 
whereas the largest N2O sources are in the agriculture sector and a large portion of methane 
emissions are also linked to agriculture as well as fairly clean natural gas use.   
The temperature decreases resulting from the combination of GHG reductions and 
pollutant reductions are shown in Figure 3-12.  Naturally, they are largest in the zero 
elasticity case, where CO2 emissions are drastically reduced.  For single pollutants, black 
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carbon reductions have the largest impact, with a total reduction of 17% from reference.  
As we saw from the artificial constraint in the earlier modeling approach, there is a 10% 
reduction from black carbon alone, so the remaining 7% can likely be attributed mainly to 
reductions in carbon dioxide.  Interestingly, the 6% temperature increase from capping SO2 
is nearly exactly balanced by compensating reductions of other gases:  this is the flip side 
of the story where CO2 emissions increases in the 50s and 60s from combustion were 
mostly masked by simultaneous SO2 emissions before pollution policies were enacted.   
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Figure 3-12:  Percent temperature reduction resulting from air pollution constraints as a percent of 
reference temperature increase, including all GHG interactions 
These constraints naturally have an impact on welfare (ignoring any climate or health 
benefits), as they force the economy to reallocate resources.  Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 show 
the impact of pollutant constraints on net present consumption.  Table 3-3 shows the 
different impacts of the three possible elasticities on both global net present consumption 
(NPC) and on NPC in Annex B versus non-Annex B nations.  Table 3-4 shows the impacts 
of single pollutant control on NPC in the reference elasticity scenario.  There are various 
caveats to keep in mind when examining the welfare results.  First recall that in a CGE 
model “no-regret” options do not exist.  Second, we do not include health valuations in this 
model.  Also, the distribution of the constraints across regions is fairly unrealistic, as is the 
temporal allocation of reductions, wherein the costs do not follow a Hoteling path.  Finally, 
though the high elasticity case has a fairly large elasticity, not all sectors have been given 
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abatement potential; therefore there are limits in the model for adoption of efficient end-of-
pipe abatement solutions. 
However, the general magnitudes of the costs are still informative.  A 1.2% global net 
present consumption loss is on the order of the cost of a 550 ppm CO2-only stabilization 
policy (Sarofim et al., 2005).  The temperature reduction of such a policy is about 21% 
below reference (not including additional ozone reduction effects on carbon uptake), which 
is not much less than the 27% below reference of the 550 ppm policy, and has much larger 
ancillary health benefits.  We also see that the majority of the cost comes from VOC and 
CO constraints.  The black carbon constraint, which leads to a 17% temperature decrease, 
has a cost of only 0.19% of net present consumption in our modeling system, which 
reinforces the Hansen and Jacobson conclusions (Hansen et al., 2000; Jacobson, 2002) that 
vigorous particulate matter policies would be extremely beneficial for climate.  Of course, 
because we have implemented the emissions structure of the model to make pollution 
abatement independent between substances, this does not take into account the fact that 
black carbon abatement would likely be linked to simultaneous reflective aerosol 
abatement which might reduce this effect.    
 Elasticities of Urban Control 
 Zero Ref High 
Global NPC Loss 3.34% 1.17% 0.24% 
Annex B NPC Loss 1.22% 0.36% 0.07% 
Non-Annex B NPC Loss 9.26% 3.44% 0.72% 
Global 2100 C Loss 11.6% 5.8% 1.8% 
Table 3-3:  Sensitivity of Welfare Cost to elasticity 
 Allurb BC CO NOx SO2 VOC 
Global NPC Loss 1.17% 0.12% 0.55% 0.23% 0.10% 0.96% 
Non-Annex B NPC Loss 3.44% 0.19% 2.17% 0.87% 0.42% 2.72% 
Table 3-4:  Sensitivity of Welfare Cost to Pollutant Controlled 
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3.3.4 Climate control impact on air pollution 
 
Our second case to analyze is the impact of climate control scenarios on air pollution 
emissions.  In the literature there are many cases where climate control policies are justified 
based on expected ancillary health benefits.  These health benefits may, in some cases, be 
illusory.  In cases where the air pollution policy is based on air quality standards or cap and 
trade measures, as in many industrialized nations, reductions in air pollution emissions due 
to climate mitigation efforts may result in countervailing emissions increases elsewhere in 
the economy.  For example, imagine a hypothetical nation with an SO2 cap and trade policy 
with a trading price of $50/tonSO2.  This nation enters a climate regime, and the CO2 
constraints result in a coal fired power plant shutting down.  This would nominally lead to a 
reduction of some tons of SO2 emissions:  however, the idle plant is now able to sell its 
unused emission permits to the rest of the economy.  SO2 emissions will therefore stay at 
the level of the counterfactual, but the permit price will decrease due to increased supply.  
If the permit price drops to zero, then, and only then, will climate policy lead to actual SO2 
reductions in this hypothetical example.  Of course, it is possible that the effective 
reduction in cost of air pollution control due to complementarities between CO2 reduction 
and air pollution reduction will enable localities to impose tighter air quality constraints.  
Also, in non-OECD countries there is some hope that climate projects from the OECD 
nations, through CDM or the GEF, might fund air quality projects that would otherwise 
have gone undeveloped.   
CO VOC NOx SO2 BC 
84% 80% 57% 42% 56%
Table 3-5:  Reduction of Urban Gas emissions in CCSP 550 ppm policy  
(percent reduction of total emissions from 2005 to 2100) 
In any case, in Table 3-5 we present the impact on air pollution emissions that results 
from implementing the 550 ppm CCSP scenario in EPPA4, as the policy was described in 
Chapter One (US Climate Change Science Program, 2006).  This both addresses questions 
of ancillary benefits, and will aid in understanding the interactions between climate policy 
and air pollution policy in the following section.  We can see that the integrated emissions 
over the policy period decrease significantly, especially in the cases of SO2, BC, and NOx.  
In fact, in the SO2 case emissions in 2100 are nearly equal to their 2005 levels, meaning 
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that the CO2 control scenario nearly meets the emission constraints set in the previous 
section.   
 
3.3.5 Complementarity:  The policy interaction between air pollution control 
and CO2 mitigation 
 
We have seen literature claiming that the air pollution reduction due to climate policy 
will lead to large health benefits, larger than the cost of the climate policy (Cifuentes et al., 
2001b; Davis et al., 1997).  But what climate policy has been enacted in a region without 
air pollution controls?  The only way this might happen is for an international climate 
regime to invest in developing countries with little or no air pollution policy, but already 
countries like China and Mexico are instituting their own pollution policies, and even if 
they were not addressing their own pollution issues, our analysis of CDM shows that so far 
few registered projects have significant air pollution benefits (CDM Registry, 2006).  The 
previous section does show the potential for significant reductions in pollutants, but this is 
a case in which air pollution constraints, which are nearly certain to exist, have not been 
included in the reference scenario.   
We have also done an analysis showing that air pollution policy can have ancillary 
CO2 reductions in the general case, though there are obviously local cases (Los Angeles) 
where it appears that the increased costs of transport and energy use due to pollution 
controls have certainly not halted GHG growth.  Indeed, emissions per capita of 
greenhouse gases may actually be inversely correlated with local air quality standards 
because of the correlation between air quality standards and the wealth of a society.  
Perhaps a better measure to demonstrate the relationship between air quality standards and 
GHG emissions might be emissions intensity (CO2 equivalents per unit of GDP) rather than 
emissions per capita, though there are likely various other confounding factors as well.     
In this section, we examine the third possibility, namely that there are synergies 
between pollution prevention and CO2 reductions.  This synergy could take one of two 
forms:  enabling tighter targets for the same cost, or reducing the cost of the initial targets.  
Therefore we did the modeling study of a combined CO2 policy and pollution policy to 
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show how the economic adjustments to the combined policy differ from the policies 
individually, in order to measure this synergistic reduction in cost.   
For our sample policies we took the CCSP 550 ppm scenario from Chapter One and 
the previous section, and the air pollution policy that we examined for the ancillary GHG 
benefits (Chapter 1.4.2 and Chapter 3.3.3).  The CCSP 550 scenario constrains CO2 to be 
on a path to 550 ppm, but also constrains CH4 and N2O separately with no trading allowed, 
and the air pollution policy maintains all pollutants at their 2005 levels for the period of the 
simulation.  The version of the model used with these policies was slightly modified from 
previous versions for computational reasons:  the largest change was the removal of the 
carbon capture backstops (an unfortunate necessity).  Our initial expectation is that the 
reduction in net present consumption in the CCSP policy scenario plus the reduction in 
NPC in the air pollution policy scenario should be greater than the reduction in NPC of the 
two constraints applied simultaneously.   
And indeed, the net present consumption loss (using a 5% discount rate) from the 
CCSP policy is 2.58%, the NPC loss from the urban constraint is 2.90%, and the NPC loss 
from applying both policies is 3.34%.  Now, a simplistic view would say that the efficiency 
gain from implementing the two policies simultaneously is 2.14% of net present 
consumption (2.58 + 2.9 – 3.34), or effectively a 65% surcharge for inefficient 
policymaking.  However, this does not account for the fact that there is already some 
pollution abatement in the scenario with the CCSP policy, and similarly, some GHG 
abatement in the urban policy case.  This would serve make the efficiency gains look much 
larger than they actually are.  In order to compensate for this double counting, we would 
want to know the cost of achieving the pollution abatement resulting from the CCSP 
scenario in the absence of any actual GHG policy.  Conversely, we also want to calculate 
the cost of achieving the GHG abatement in the pollution scenario in the absence of a 
pollution policy.  This comparison can be stated in the form of a mathematical equation: 
 
Cost of inefficient policymaking = Cost(550ppm policy + no air pollution reduction) + 
Cost(no GHG reduction+ air pollution policy) – Cost(550ppm policy+ air pollution policy). 
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However, we can not determine the cost of a 550 ppm CO2 policy with no air pollution 
reduction directly, because of the ancillary pollution reduction that results from the GHG 
constraint.  We can estimate the policy cost, however, as the following equation: 
 
Cost(550ppm policy + no air pollution reduction) = Cost(550ppm policy + ancillary air 
pollution reduction) – Cost(no GHG reduction + ancillary air pollution reduction).   
 
We can calculate the cost of a 550 ppm policy and its ancillary air pollution 
reductions directly merely by imposing the CCSP constraint and calculating the NPC.  We 
cannot, however, calculate the cost of the ancillary air pollution reduction without 
additional GHG reductions, for the same reason that we could not calculate the cost of a 
normal air pollution policy without ancillary GHG reductions.  However, we can calculate 
the costs as follows: 
 
Cost (no GHG reduction + ancillary air pollution reduction) = Cost( (ancillary GHG 
reduction from the ancillary air pollution reduction) + ancillary air pollution reduction) – 
Cost( (ancillary GHG reduction from ancillary air pollution reduction) + no air pollution 
reduction) 
 
using the same methodology as above.   Fortunately, these additional GHG reductions will 
be much smaller than the GHG reductions from original CCSP 550 ppm constraint, so 
enough iterations of this methodology should approach the right answer.  We have 
demonstrated this methodology in Appendix H in a simple system, wherein we elucidate 
the rationale for this approach as well as demonstrate its accuracy. 
In order to estimate these costs, we generate two new scenarios.  For Scenario 1, 
“urban from CCSP” or “ufc”, we use the urban emissions from the CCSP runs as the 
constraint for a new run.  Scenario 2, “ghg from urban” or “gfu” uses the GHG emissions 
from the pollution runs as a constraint.  The “ufc” scenario still results in a 0.87% loss of 
net present consumption, or a third of the cost of the CCSP scenario overall.  Similarly, the 
“gfu” scenario results in a 1.2% loss of NPC, or 40% of the cost of the pollution constraint.  
If we apply these adjustments to our earlier calculations, then the cost of the CCSP 
constraint minus the urban benefit is 1.71%, and the cost of the urban constraint minus the 
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GHG benefit is 1.7%.  The total is 3.41%, or only 0.07% more than the two constraints 
applied simultaneously. 
However, this does not yet resolve the problem.  We are now underestimating the 
efficiency gains, for the same reason that we were previously overestimating them.  The 
“gfu” and “ufc” scenarios both have their own ancillary impacts.  We can run another 
iteration, a “ufgfu” and “gfufc” calculation, yielding 0.34% and 0.4% reductions of NPC 
respectively, and leading to a 4.15% total loss (CCSP – ufc + gfufc + URB – gfu + ufgfu).  
Of course, this iteration can be carried on ad infinitum.  If we assume that every urban 
constraint taken from a GHG constraint leads to scenario with 30% of the NPC loss of the 
original scenario, and every GHG constraint taken from a urban constraint leads to a 
scenario with 46% of the loss, then we can extrapolate and estimate that the NPC loss 
actual GHG policy (minus the cost needed to achieve any urban gas reductions) is 2.03% 
and the loss from the urban policy is 1.92% as shown in Table 3-6.  We can perhaps state 
therefore that 21% of the cost of a 550 ppm policy, and 34% of the cost of a similarly strict 
urban air pollution policy, is balanced by reductions in the other arena.  Note that this not a 
statement about actual benefits, which would require valuing either health effects or 
climate impacts:  this is balancing the cost of air pollution reduction with the cost it would 
take to achieve the ancillary ghg reduction, or vice versa.   
 Net Present  
Consumption Loss 
Modified  
NPC Loss 
CCSP 550 ppm 2.58% 2.03% 
Urban constraint 2.90% 1.92% 
Simultaneous policies 3.34%  
Table 3-6:  Net present consumption loss from the CCSP policy, the air pollution constraint policy, and 
both policies enacted simultaneously.   
“Modified” loss refers to the loss after taking into account interaction effects between air pollution 
constraints and GHG constraints. 
Therefore, the total NPC loss from the two policies enacted separately would be 
3.95%.  This cost is 0.61% of net present consumption higher than that of the two policies 
implemented simultaneously, which is $6.4 trillion of net present value.  Implementing the 
policies in a way that does not allow for coordination would effectively lead to an 18% 
surcharge.  Additional calculations show that this surcharge is fairly constant in any given 
time period in this calculation, plus or minus a couple percent.   
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We can examine how the 3 different policies impact energy demand in a different 
fashion.  Table 3-7 shows the average demand in each sector over the period of the policy.  
The most obvious difference is the reliance on bio-oil for reducing CO2 emissions, but the 
avoidance of bio-oil in the urban constraint case.  This is a fairly obvious response to a 
technology which is carbon free but polluting.  In addition to shifting away from bio-oil, 
adding an urban policy to a CO2 policy also leads to shifting even further away from coal, 
which is a rather dirty technology, and compensating with small increases in gas, oil, and 
renewables.  Again, this version of the model does not include CO2 sequestration, which 
might otherwise give IGCC plants with capture an advantage over other technologies.   
 Bio-oil Coal Gas Oil Renewable Nuclear Total 
Ref 150 328 172 328 64 31 1073 
CCSP 550 306 89 96 165 72 30 757 
Urban 119 135 131 247 79 31 741 
CCSP+Urban 221 75 102 176 78 31 682 
Table 3-7:  Average energy demand in quadrillion Btu from 2005 to 2100 by energy source 
Table 3-8 shows the results of modeling these emissions scenarios in the earth 
systems component of the IGSM.  This table shows that an urban constraint in and of itself 
leads to a 30% decrease in temperature.  In our modeling of direct impacts compared to 
total impacts, about a quarter of the temperature reduction was due to direct impacts of air 
pollution reduction and three quarters was due to ancillary greenhouse gas reductions, and 
presumably this scenario has a similar breakdown (though a slightly larger temperature 
reduction due to the use of a slightly different model).  However, the addition of the urban 
constraint to a fairly stringent greenhouse gas constraint only reduces temperature increases 
by a small amount.  This occurs because there are no ancillary GHG reduction benefits 
because those emissions were already constrained, and in addition, as we showed in the 
previous section, the CCSP scenario by itself had already led to significant pollutant 
reductions.  Therefore there are only small further decreases of black carbon reductions 
from the CCSP scenario by itself to the combination of a CCSP scenario coupled with the 
air pollution constraint. 
 Ref CCSP-550 Urb-Const CCSP+Urb 
2100 T (°C) 3.6 1.5 2.5 1.3 
Table 3-8:  Temperature increase from 2000 to 2100 in four scenarios 
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3.3.6 GHG and Air Pollution Policy Interactions:  The case of GWP Trading 
 
Another interesting way of looking at the interactions of GHG and air pollution 
policies is to consider the case of GWP trading.  A priori, we expect CO2 emission 
reductions and air pollution reductions to be complementary, but we expect that methane 
and N2O reductions will have fewer interactions with air pollution policies because they are 
emitted in sectors that are not as polluting, and because methane and N2O both have 
elasticities of subsitution within sectors to represent types of control options that do not 
exist for CO2.  Therefore if we run a CCSP scenario with GWP trading and no air pollution 
policy, intergas trading will lead to an optimal mix of CO2, CH4, and N2O according to 
their GWP values.  However, if we add an air pollution constraint to this scenario, the 
complementarities between air pollution constraints and CO2 constraints will effectively 
reduce the cost of mitigating an additional ton of CO2.  Therefore, we would expect that 
additional CO2 emissions would be abated, and the other GHG emissions would grow in 
response.  And indeed, there is a 1.9% decrease of total CO2 emissions over the century in 
the urban constraint case compared to the straight CCSP scenario, balanced by increases in 
CH4 emissions of 6.9%, in N2O emissions of 2.3%, and HFC emissions of 29%.   
This adds an extra note to our methane analysis from Chapter Two.  The result 
showing that a world with GWP trading will abate more CO2 emissions in response to air 
pollution constraints does not detract from our contention that methane should be addressed 
separately from CO2. However, when policymakers weigh methane reductions compared to 
CO2 reductions, the realization that CO2 constraints leads to ancillary air pollution benefits 
should encourage tighter CO2 caps compared to caps of other gases (or increasing the GWP 
value of CO2).  This is in slight opposition to the various results in the previous chapter 
which had all indicated that methane was significantly undervalued by its current GWP 
estimation.   
We have shown that there is an interaction effect between air pollution policy and 
GHG policies of 18% of the policy cost.  What does this mean for actual policy 
coordination?  On the one hand, policymakers could search for abatement options that 
reduce CO2 and air pollutants simultaneously, and create legislation appropriately.  
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However, this not only creates a lot of administrative overhead, and requires picking 
“winners” which is a historically difficult task, but it would also open up opportunities for 
system abuse.  On the other hand, there may be no need for an explicit policy creating 
incentives for solutions that abate multiple gases at the same time, but rather these 
efficiency benefits can be gained as long as the two policies are sufficiently flexible.  If 
policies create a price for air pollutant emissions and for greenhouse gas emissions, then 
economic theory suggests that the market will arrive at an efficient solution – in much the 
same way as the EPPA model arrives at an efficient solution given a constraint on both 
kinds of emissions.  Taxes or cap and trade policies would both achieve this purpose of 
creating prices.  On the other hand, policies which mandate specific solutions to address 
only one issue at a time (eg catalytic converters, forest regrowth) will, if poorly designed, 
miss out on these coordination benefits.  And constraining air pollution without a climate 
constraint or vice versa will naturally also lead to less adoption of these coordinated 
solutions.   
 
3.4 Political Analysis of Air Pollution Policies and Climate 
 
3.4.1 Motivation for Political and Geographic Analysis 
 
There are many uncertainties involved in linking air pollution policy and climate 
impacts.  Our computational analysis shows that there is significant potential for climate 
benefits resulting from pollution reduction, especially black carbon.  We can perhaps 
conclude that the direct climate benefits of NOx and VOC reductions will be small, though 
the complexity of the ozone cycle and the contribution of these substances to aerosol 
chemistry both make it hard to state even this simple result with confidence.  We also see 
that temperature increases resulting from global SO2 reductions would be compensated in 
large part through balancing CO2 reductions.  Black carbon has more potential for direct 
temperature reduction, according to our modeling, but there is significant uncertainty 
involved in determining the forcing.   
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In our modeling analysis, we have not evaluated actual health impacts nor 
investigated uncertainty in a methodical fashion.  And there are limits to disaggregation 
within EPPA.  Diesel and gasoline are not modeled separately, and even if they were, 
within diesel we have potential differences between high-sulfur and low-sulfur diesel.  
Similarly, within coal there exist differences between high and low sulfur (O'Connor, 2000) 
– though these details, at least, are partially captured by the elasticities derived from the 
RAINS data.  And when multiple pollutants co-vary we have problems in modeling them 
without the inclusion of separate sectors.  Another critique of our reference scenario is that 
pollutant emission projections may be higher than realistic.  A more realistic projection 
might have BAU emissions remain roughly constant over the century, as developed world 
technology diffuses into the non-Annex B nations even as their production continues to 
grow.  In this case, we could then compare the “constant pollution” counterfactual to a 
policy reducing emissions below reference, and believe that it might not be too dissimilar 
from our modeling study.   
However, one of the major reasons that estimates of complementarities and ancillary 
benefits vary so widely is regional heterogeneity.  Source types, current pollution policies, 
and air basin characteristics all vary from city to city.  This heterogeneity has significant 
implications for policy creation.  We can examine diverse locations such as Mexico City, 
Beijing, and LA to see how the assumptions of homogeneity made in our modeling study 
breaks down.  The dirtiness of local industry and sectoral balance, the inclusion of power 
generation close enough to impact air quality in major metropolitan areas, vehicle mix, 
local air pollution policies, and even the local geography are all vital to actually designing 
appropriate policies.  In one location ozone abatement could be best served through NOx 
reduction, and in another through VOC reduction.  This makes air pollution policy a very 
local issue in a way that GHG control is not.  This was part of the reasoning behind 
examining air pollution policy:  e.g., use local benefits to give incentives to implement 
policies with global implications, but this also creates problems when attempting to design 
scenarios that explore the implications of a globally coherent set of air pollution policies.   
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3.4.2 Analysis of Mexico City 
 
Mexico City is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world, and has historically 
been one of the most polluted, both because of its size and the fact that it is situated in a 
mountainous bowl which serves to trap pollution effectively.  Mexico City’s pollution 
issues are a result mainly of vehicular traffic, especially diesel freight and the taxi system.  
The power generation for the city mainly takes place outside the mountainous bowl of the 
city, limiting the impact of pollution from power on health.  More than half of Mexico 
City’s GHG emissions come from this consumption of electricity from outside the valley, 
which severely limits the opportunities for co-benefits.  Of the GHGs generated inside the 
valley, more than 50% come from transport, 20% from industrial sources, 15% from 
residential sources, 8% from electricity produced within the city, and a couple percent from 
aviation.  Given that transport is responsible for a large fraction of both the GHG emissions 
and the pollutant emissions, there seems to be an opportunity for co-benefits here, and in 
fact linear programming studies by West et al. (2004) show that the 3% reduction in CO2 
emissions resulting from PROAIRE measures in process of implementation for air 
pollution issues are mainly from transport related measures.  The transport measures with 
good cobenefit potential are vehicle turnover programs, expansion of the metro and the 
new rapid bus transit system.  Of course, if rather than being replaced with new vehicles, 
the 50% of the Mexico City automobile fleet that still lack catalytic converters are instead 
retrofitted, their miles per gallon rating would actually decrease.  Similarly, switching from 
diesel to gasoline to meet standards would also likely increase CO2 emissions.  Meanwhile, 
the major GHG reduction policies involve cogeneration, forest management, renewables 
such as wind and hydro, efficient lighting subsidies, and various agricultural management 
programs, none of which serve to reduce pollution within the MCMA.   
In addition to the lack of power generation within the valley, one issue is that Mexico 
City has already implemented a large number of air pollution policies, thereby eliminating 
a lot of the low hanging fruit.  The closing of the “18 de Marzo” oil refinery led to large 
drops in SO2 emissions, fuel oil has been switched over to natural gas in many areas, other 
programs have significantly reduced the upper bound of NOx concentrations and kept the 
average concentration constant over the past decade, and ozone, CO, and particulates are 
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all below their 1986 levels (Molina and Molina, 2002).  According to one World Bank 
study, Mexico City has dropped from being widely considered one of the most polluted 
cities in the world in the 1980s to being 87th on the list of cities larger than 2 million people 
with the highest particulate matter concentrations by 2000 (Pandey et al., 2006).   
Therefore, when West et al. ran their linear programming model for Mexico City they 
estimated that for Mexico City benefits from “integrated planning of urban-global co-
control” were small (West et al., 2004).  One issue that has not been treated is whether 
there are health benefits from reduction of pollution outside the MCMA.  It is hoped that 
CDM will play a role in projects with ancillary benefits, but it seems from our analysis that 
there are few good opportunities in Mexico.  And indeed, of Mexican CDM projects, the 
vast majority (by number) are wastewater management systems for methane capture, 
though a HFC treatment project had a similar magnitude of reductions in GWP weighted 
emissions.  The remaining 20% of CDM credits are divided between landfill gas capture 
and renewables projects (hydro and wind).  None of these projects will lead to much, if 
any, local air pollution reduction, and the wastewater projects do not seem to involving any 
actual treatment beyond methane flaring.  Two plant retrofitting projects for sugar cane 
processing were actually rejected by the CDM commission.  The reasoning was that 
barriers to implementation were not demonstrated.  While these specific projects would not 
have yielded urban clean air benefits, being located in rural regions, they are similar to the 
kind of industrial upgrade project that might actually have some benefits in urban areas.   
Politically, Mexico is a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol and a member of the Clean 
Air Initiative for Latin American Cities (CAI-LAC), but practically there is little political 
will to make significant climate policy happen.  Even pollution abatement within Mexico 
City appears to be slowing down as the populace feels that the worst excesses have been 
solved and the remaining sources are more difficult to deal with.  There will be continuing 
improvements in vehicle technology, but it is difficult to institute good maintenance 
practices.  Also, given that there has already been a recent round of vehicle buybacks and 
upgrades for the microbuses, it is difficult to convince the drivers to cooperate with further 
such shifts.  Therefore many of the efforts of Mexican environmental agencies have been to 
improve inventories, educate the public in order to build up more support, and coordinate 
available CDM and GEF funding with private industry where projects are available.  
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Interestingly, while much of the funding comes from EPA, a significant fraction of that was 
channeled through the Western Governors association because it was harder to work 
directly at the federal level (Instituto Nacional de Ecologia (INE), 2005).   
 
3.4.3 Analysis of China 
 
The mega-polluted cities of China are different in many ways from Mexico City.  The 
first major difference is that much of the pollution has coal-based emission sources:  
coking, combustion, etc.  Transport is also a rapidly growing source.  China has many of 
the world’s most polluted cities, according to the World Bank (Pandey et al., 2006)12, and 
is therefore an obvious target for studying possible climate gains from air pollution 
policies.     
Whereas in Mexico City a couple of percent CO2 reduction is the best that can be 
gained from air pollution control measures, in China where many basic efficiency 
improvement measures remain untapped, there are many more opportunities for co-benefits 
measures with significant benefits.  The Aunan et al study (2004) identified 3 different 
measures in Shanxi which would each independently reduce more than 10 million tons of 
CO2, 30000 tons of particulates, and 100 thousand tons of SO2.  The issue is that these 
opportunities are the type of basic upgrades to equipment and improved techniques that are 
hard to sell as climate measures for outside funding because they would be expected to 
happen gradually over time in any case, much like the rejected Mexican projects.  The fact 
that these upgrades might actually pay for themselves makes it even more difficult to 
qualify for funding.  However, the plain fact is that there are sizeable numbers of these 
upgrades that have not happened, and additional funding would almost certainly speed up 
the process.   
China expects 37 million CERs, the most of any participating nation (41% of total 
expected CERs).  However, of its currently registered projects, 34.7 million are HFC 
decomposition related, with no co-benefits potential.  Not only do these HFC reductions 
                                                 
12 I note here that many sources, including the Economist, the BBC, and Congressional Testimony, cite a 
World Bank study to back up the claim that 16 out of 20 of the world’s most polluted cities are in China.  In 
fact, the database that these respected sources cite is only a “selected” list of those cities:  on the full list 
China has only 3 of the most polluted cities (by PM10 concentration) of greater than a million population.   
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lack co-benefits, but they may even have the perverse incentive of encouraging HCFC-22 
production which produces HFC-23 as a byproduct, and even the choice of HCFC-22 
production methods which will generate more HFC-23 (Bradsher, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; 
McCulloch, 2004; Schwank, 2004).  Of the remainder of China’s CERs, 461 thousand 
come from small hydro projects, 1224 thousand CERs come from wind projects, 608 
thousand from landfill gas, and 106 thousand from a waste heat to power project (CDM 
Registry, 2006).  All of these projects at least have the potential to displace coal power, 
though given China’s voracious growth it seems likely they will only serve to displace 
some percentage smaller than 100% of their energy production.  Note again that the 
registered projects are for the most part easily quantifiable and defendable in terms of 
CDM additionality.  CDM, in its current form, is also not very appropriate for funding the 
construction of new, efficient capital projects.  Carbon credits might be the difference 
between building a new efficient boiler and a new inefficient boiler, but if it can be difficult 
to show that retrofits are additional, it would be nearly impossible to be able to claim new 
boilers under current CDM rules.  And in general, in the rapidly growing developing 
nations, the key point may not be the improvement of old facilities but rather constructing 
new facilities to be efficient.  But in that case, incentives for modern methods will serve as 
incentives to actually increase emissions.  The question is whether or not that increase 
would be more or less than the counterfactual.  Though here, given that the subsidies would 
likely serve to increase local human welfare, there may be reason to err on the side of laxity 
rather than tight rules.   
 
3.4.4 Analysis of Los Angeles 
 
Finally, it is useful to address one of the more polluted cities in a highly developed 
country.  Los Angeles continues to rank as having the worst air quality in the US by some 
measures (American Lung Association, 2005), despite being the testbed for new air 
pollution policies through CARB and the increased pollution levels of various cities in 
Texas and the southwest.  Other measures (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2005) 
actually list Phoenix as having the worst PM levels in the country, but Los Angeles still 
ranks high and has the worst ozone levels in this database.  Pollution in Los Angeles is also 
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mainly vehicular, but here we have a very modern gasoline based fleet, mainly for 
passenger travel.  After a fairly successful campaign to reduce pollution between the 1970s 
and the 1990s, pollution levels have stabilized recently as increasing popularity of SUVs 
and continued increase in vehicle miles traveled balanced improvements in catalytic 
converters and engine technology.  This is true for both ozone and PM10 trends (California 
Air Resources Board, 2006). 
Los Angeles also serves as a good example of the fact that high CO2 emissions and 
low or moderate pollution emissions are quite compatible possibilities:  major advances in 
pollution control for NOx, SO2, particulate, and CO emissions occurred, without concurrent 
sizeable GHG decreases.  There was, however, significant complementarity between 
reductions of different pollutants, where ozone reduction did lead to particulate reduction.  
And indeed, there have been efficiency improvements and decreases in open burning both 
of which may reduce some CO2 emissions.  In the transport sector in the US, emissions of 
hydrocarbons, CO, and NOx have all been reduced by a factor of 15 or more since 1973 (or 
a factor of more than 30 since pre-1968), with the last 50% occurring during the last decade 
with the Tier I to Tier II standard shift (Faiz et al., 1996).  However, the fuel economy of 
the fleet increased by only 60% from 1975 to 1987, and has actually decreased since (US 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2006a). Actual vehicle miles traveled has, of course, 
increased dramatically over this time, leading to an increase in actual GHG emissions from 
the transport sector.  California has even more stringent LEV and ULEV standards than 
Tier II, and is in the process of trying to implement CO2 emission standards, but this last is 
in a potential conflict with federal prerogative to set fuel economy standards.   
 
3.4.5 US State and Regional Policies 
 
As in Mexico City, much of the power for Los Angeles comes from outside the air 
basin:  coal plants in Utah and hydro from the northwest send a lot of their power into 
California.  The state is currently implementing guidelines that will lead to demand for 
cleaner power, but that is not related to air pollution.  Again, the state’s requirement for 
more efficient transport may reduce air pollution slightly, but unless there is a shift towards 
electric vehicles (which seems highly unlikely) the incremental pollution benefit from 
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efficiency improvements will be very small compared to continued end-of-pipe measures.  
And electric vehicles are only a solution to GHG emissions if the electricity comes from 
carbon free sources.  However, if California does manage to institute a policy which leads 
to a CO2 price (whether cap based, tax based, or credit/subsidy based), it will allow agents 
within the state to determine their own optimal co-benefit methodologies rather than 
requiring an outside agency to analyze them.  Achieving such an optimal result from price 
based mechanisms presumes that good monitoring systems exist, which is a reasonable 
assumption for a state like California.   
New England is the other major US region with a climate initiative, and there we see 
transport account for 37% of CO2 emissions and electricity production another 28%.  
Interestingly, the Connecticut Climate Action plan recognizes black carbon as part of its 
GHG emission baseline, and expects black carbon reductions to meet 10% of the 2020 goal 
of the program.  The Transport Working Group used Jacobson’s work to assign black 
carbon a value of 220 to 500 CO2 equivalents, if it is assumed that black carbon and 
organic carbon are emitted in a one to one ratio.  Much of the proposed control comes from 
switch to ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel and upgrading diesel vehicles to include particulate 
traps.  While other pollutants are not included in the GHG accounting, impacts on health 
through ancillary benefits are certainly used as partial compensation for GHG reductions.  
Many cities have implemented small scale climate projects, some in coordination with 
ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection campaign, and presumably many of these local area 
programs take air pollution reduction goals into account.  STAPPA and ALAPCO (State 
and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administration and Association of Local Air 
Pollution Control Officials) also released a report on “harmonized options” for reducing 
GHGs and air pollution, but their major recommendations all centered on shifts towards 
gas combined cycle power plants, with limited possibilities found in efficiency and demand 
side management measures, improved urban design and transport management, and similar 
programs.  Nor were there clear recommendations on how to implement these measures 
outside of market mechanisms such as mandatory cap and trade constraints or GHG 
reduction subsidies.   
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3.4.6 International Cooperation 
 
On an international level in the United States, we can see parallels between the 
formulation of M2M and the new Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate which was inaugurated in January of 2006.  The Bush administration proposed $52 
million in funding.  In the Whitehouse fact sheet (Office of the Press Secretary, 2005) the 
administration states that the Asia-Pacific Partnership builds on M2M as well as Carbon 
Sequestration and Hydrogen Economy initiatives.  Similar to M2M, it seems its goal is to 
encourage private industry to engage in technology transfer to developing nations in order 
to implement clean technologies especially in the industrial area.  Again, while the goal is 
worthwhile, the lack of actual funding and binding constraints makes it difficult to believe 
that there will be significant results from this initiative.   
Involvement of air pollution control in future climate policies can occur in one of 
three environments.  The first is a regime where GHGs are controlled, but air pollutants are 
not.  The second is a regime where air pollution is controlled, but GHGs are not.  And the 
third is a regime where both air pollutants and GHGs are limited by policy.  In the first 
regime, air pollution abatement is an ancillary benefit to GHG control.  If the ancillary 
health benefits and climate benefits from black carbon control are not taken into account, 
then the GHG policy will not be optimally strict.  Moreover, the partitioning of the GHG 
policy into different gases, or the use of trading, will not properly weight the various gases.  
In this case, CO2 reductions would be more desirable, on average, than otherwise expected.  
Of course, even within the realm CO2 reductions, there might be a theoretical benefit from 
steering those reductions towards those solutions with the greatest co-benefits.  However, 
given that any nation which is likely to take on GHG targets is virtually certain to already 
have implemented air pollution controls, this policy environment is unlikely to be 
represented in reality.   
The second regime, that of air pollution control without GHG control, can be 
expected to apply to most developing nations, as well as those portions of the United States 
which are not implementing local GHG control measures.  Here we have the opposite story 
from the above, with a difference.  The ancillary benefits of pollution control apply towards 
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a global commons and not the local good.  Therefore, we expect to see co-benefits happen 
under two circumstances.  The first is with subsidies from outside – CDM, GEF, etc.  The 
second is where a country expects to join a climate regime, and the accession details are 
such that they encourage early action rather than perversely given incentives to increase 
GHG emissions baselines before joining.   
In 2005, non-Annex B nations contribute nearly three times as much black carbon 
emissions as Annex B nations, and over the century our modeling runs project that their 
emissions will increase more than 6 times as much as Annex B emissions increase.  While 
the magnitudes of the future increases may be uncertain, the fact is that there will be much 
more potential for BC reductions beyond the counterfactual in non-Annex B nations than in 
Annex B nations.  As in the case of methane, non-Annex B nations are unlikely to take on 
significant constraints without international aid.  Again, the question comes as to how to 
give this aid.  GEF deducts some domestic ancillary benefits from grants for GHG control, 
but not “all” ancillary benefits (Pearce, 2000).  This “frees up” moneys for more grants, but 
requires resources for analysis, introduces further uncertainty into the grant request process, 
and reduces incentives to seek out such dual-benefit policies.  We have discussed CDM in 
the context of Mexico and China.  The CDM already has over 1,200 projects in the pipeline 
and an overall emission reduction potential of about 1.4 billion tonnes by 2012.  But 
additionality is not the only problem with CDM.   Those projects that most clearly require 
CDM funding, and therefore can provide additionality, are also those that will most depend 
on continuous monetary flow for credits.  This runs into problems both with the possibility 
that CDM will be discontinued post 2012, and the uncertainty in future carbon prices due to 
hot air and possible future accession of new nations.  One must also consider the other side 
of additionality, the “additionality” of funding to normal development assistance.  
Developing nations continue to worry that increased contributions to GHG reductions will 
come at the cost of decreased economic aid.  Given the magnitude of health costs in 
developing countries compared to global climate benefits from the reduction of these 
substances, perhaps the OECD should be stepping in to help reduce local air pollution on 
purely humanitarian grounds, and any climate benefits could be purely a side benefit.   
There may also exist, in a few cases, potential for transboundary air pollution to play 
a role.  Japanese investment in China (Evans, 1999) or US investment in Mexico could 
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follow parallels to Nordic investment in Baltic States and the push towards a Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Pollution in Europe (Wettestad, 2002).  The advantage here 
for Japan, at least, is that it gains both the local benefit of air pollution reductions and the 
CERs for Kyoto purposes.  We will ignore for now the worry that foreign acquisition of 
CERs from developing country projects will make it more difficult for those nations when 
they take on GHG targets in the future.   
The third possible environment is one where there exists both a climate policy and an 
air pollution regime:  the Annex B Kyoto signatories all fall into this category, as will 
California and New England should their climate policies move forward.  If the climate and 
pollution policies are both based on economic instruments which create prices for the 
substances in question (whether tax or cap and trade), then we can hope that independent 
agents will find optimal solutions without the need for significant top-level policy.  
Funding for research to find these solutions and then disseminate them will still be useful, 
but that is not as difficult a problem as how to devise the actual control policies in the first 
case.  Note that when an air pollution cap exists, such as the SO2 cap and trade policy, 
implementation of a new climate policy is unlikely to lead to further reductions in SO2 
emissions – there will likely be economic synergies, but as soon as SO2 emissions are 
reduced in one sector due to a CO2 policy, it is likely that emissions will rise in another 
sector due to the nature of cap and trade.  At least until the CO2 policy becomes so tight 
that the SO2 cap is no longer binding.  In the case where one of the policies is measure 
based (such as a hypothetical SO2 policy that required scrubbers), then there would be few 
economic synergies from a new CO2 policy, but environmental synergies might be created.  
One issue is that most of the economic instruments used in air pollution policies apply to 
large stationary sources:  ideally smaller sources would also be dealt with in a way that 
could take advantage of complementarities.  Fortunately, EPA standards for passenger cars 
and trucks are based on emissions per mile driven rather than emissions per gallon, which 
should complement CO2 policies nicely should they ever be applied to the transport sector.   
There are other issues in policy design as well.  How much should black carbon 
reduction be rewarded (as in the Connecticut plan)?  Like methane, there is significant 
uncertainty in emission estimates, but here there are additional uncertainties of impact.  If it 
is included in a broad GHG target, what happens when future research rescales the GWP 
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factor for the substance?  In addition, should the impact of black carbon be discounted for 
international aid purposes because it has a much more regional impact than the well-mixed 
gases?  How do we take advantage of so-called “green gold” solutions if they exist, where 
the win-win-win scenario of economic, health, and climate benefits from reducing energy 
use does not require a reduction in consumption?   
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
In the chapter on methane we showed the potential disadvantages involved in climate 
policies that allowed trading between methane and CO2 using GWP weightings.  There are 
few serious proposals to use GWP weightings for air pollution policy:  rather, there are 
significant benefits to be captured by allowing coordination between air pollution policy 
and climate policy.  However, quantifying these benefits is a difficult problem because of 
the complexities of both the economics and the atmospheric chemistry involved.  In this 
chapter we applied state of the art modeling tools to this problem, as well as political 
analysis to address issues that the models are still not able to resolve. 
We first showed that the direct impacts of air pollution reductions on temperature 
change are fairly small.  Policies that reduce ozone precursors tend to lead to increases in 
methane concentrations that almost exactly cancel out any temperature effects, though 
there is still some climate related value in terms of increased ecosystem uptake due to less 
ozone damage.  Black carbon reductions lead to temperature reductions in our model, but 
black carbon impacts are still uncertain, we do not model organic carbon yet, and in any 
case, SO2 reductions cancel out much of the black carbon effects.   If we include all 
possible effects with a fairly significant reduction in emissions, we see an 8% reduction in 
the total temperature rise expected for the century.   
However, much of the impetus for studying air pollution in a climate context is due to 
interactions between air pollution reductions and climate policy reductions – ancillary 
benefits or complementarities.  In order to model these interactions, we introduced the 
capability to model air pollution constraints within the MIT EPPA model, basing our 
elasticities of substitution on empirical data.  This enables a CGE model to capture end-of-
pipe and other abatement techniques that are normally only accessible to bottom-up 
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models, while continuing to have the capability to model economic shifts at the sectoral 
and demand levels in an equilibrium context.  Using the new modeling system we show 
that an air pollution policy that costs a little more than 1% of net present consumption can 
lead to a decrease of 160 ppm in CO2 in 2100 and almost 25% reduction in temperature rise 
over that same period.  This indicates that there are indeed significant global climate 
advantages to encouraging stronger air pollution policy even in the absence of any direct 
incentives to reduce greenhouse gases.   
This relation works in both directions, and we show that implementation of a 550 
ppm scenario from the CCSP exercise leads to significant reductions in air pollutant 
emissions.  However, this is misleading in that in actuality most climate policies will be 
enacted in regions that already have air quality standards, and therefore the GHG constraint 
will merely lead to a rebalancing of pollutant emissions rather than an absolute reduction.  
This does lead to the question of what the benefits are from implementing GHG reduction 
policies and air pollution emission constraints in a coordinated fashion.  We use a novel 
approach to show that there is a 20% welfare penalty that results if the air pollution and 
climate policies have no flexibility that allows for coordination.  This coordination can 
come from a command and control perspective of choosing measures with dual benefits, or 
from using market based mechanisms that allow individual economic agents to optimize 
their own behavior to meet simultaneous constraints.   
Because of the existence of significant climate benefits that can result from air 
pollution policies we recommend that the OECD nations fund pollution reduction products 
in the developing world even in the absence of provable climate benefits.  Concurrently, 
measures such as CDM should relax their additionality constraints when there are 
significant local air pollution benefits, otherwise there is a danger that the projects with the 
best potential for simultaneous abatement will go unimplemented.  Within OECD nations 
that have both tight air quality standards and climate goals, we recommend that the policies 
are designed in such a way that they allow coordination in order to gain the benefits of 
complementarities.   
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4 Conclusions 
 
Sound climate change policy making requires managing a complex, global integrated 
system composed of anthropogenic emissions, atmospheric chemistry, a number of 
different greenhouse substances, natural systems, uncertainties, technologies, and politics.  
Both the tools used to study the system and the policy recommendations that result from 
the analysis need to take into account this complexity.  It is not obvious a priori how to 
properly balance two key issues:  first, the advantages of a single, global, integrated policy 
which allows for economically beneficial “what, where, and when” flexibilities as well as a 
certain once and for all simplicity, and second, the fact that the complexities of the problem 
are not necessarily well served by a one-size fits all approach, and there are advantages to 
be gained from tailoring policies to individual regions and substances.  In this thesis we 
used an integrated global modeling system to examine this balance between integrated and 
disparate policies as they relate to different climatically important substances.  We showed 
how certain key characteristics of a gas like methane led to the conclusion that it should be 
treated separately from the other major GHGs.  Conversely, we demonstrated the 
advantages of ensuring that coordination is possible between air pollution reductions and 
greenhouse gas reductions, even though air pollution policies will differ significantly on a 
regional level.  We concluded that there are benefits to be gained from 
compartmentalization on the one hand, and from coordination on the other, and we showed 
this through application of novel modeling and other analysis methods.   
In Chapter One we examined stabilization under Article 2 of the UNFCCC, which 
could be considered to be the cornerstone of the climate policy development.  The Kyoto 
Protocol, the currently operative centerpiece of the UNFCCC, uses a GWP based trading 
mechanism to allow exchanges between the six primary greenhouse gases or gas groups.  
While CO2 is the most important of the greenhouse gases, we showed how the emphasis on 
CO2 has led to an under appreciation of other gases that can yield low cost yet significant 
reductions on the century timescale.  We also showed the inherent disconnect between the 
concept of stabilization and the mechanism of gas emission trading.  This analysis led us to 
concentrate on exactly how these other gases should be included in greenhouse policy.   
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The primary non-CO2 gas of interest is methane, because it has the greatest 
contributions to past and probably future forcing, and because methane has significantly 
different properties than carbon dioxide both in terms of emission sources and atmospheric 
characteristics such as lifetime for removal.  We propose that methane should no longer be 
traded with CO2 on a GWP basis for four major reasons.  While any one of these four 
might be a cause for concern in and of itself, perhaps to be solved by an adjustment to the 
GWP number or other similar correction, the sum of all four leads us to conclude that 
continuing to include methane in the standard GHG trading basket is not wise.  The first 
and perhaps the most important reason is the difficulty in estimating anthropogenic 
methane source inventories compared to the relative ease of estimating CO2 emissions from 
fossil sources, leading to possibilities for “creative accounting” in trading, errors in 
emissions estimates, or having national constraints depend on changes in inventory 
methodology.13  We have additionally used modeling to show that methane policies alone 
can easily lead to a reduction of more than 15% of the expected temperature rise in the 21st 
century, and this temperature reduction is greatly decreased by allowing trading with CO2.  
Therefore we believe that methane is significantly undervalued by its GWP, due in part to 
lifetime and ozone effects.  Third, modeling also demonstrates that interaction effects with 
underlying taxes means that the welfare impact of reducing a ton of carbon dioxide at a 
given price will be greater than the welfare impact of reducing a carbon equivalent ton of 
methane at the same price.  Finally, political analysis leads us to believe that methane 
policy can advance faster, and include more nations, without the millstone that is current 
international CO2 policy.  By addressing methane with a separate policy, significant 
temperature abatement can be realized in the near future.   
Again, it must be stressed that the recommendation to address methane using a policy 
separate from a CO2 policy should not be used as an excuse to delay CO2 policy 
implementation.  But the two gases are best suited to different strategies and policy tools.  
CO2 abatement will eventually require significant capital investment and long term 
research and development of zero carbon technologies.  Near term CO2 abatement is also 
well suited to market signals through cap and trade or tax instruments.  Most methane 
                                                 
13 Of course, emissions and sinks of CO2 from land-use change do share this quantification difficulty with 
methane.    
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abatement, on the other hand, can be achieved through low cost measures already available.  
Difficulties in monitoring and verification of methane reduction may mean that methane 
control is best achieved through non-market instruments:  policies and measures, best 
practices, and information transfers.  Non-fossil CO2 should also be addressed separately:  
a coherent land-use change policy is necessary but may also be better managed through 
non-market mechanisms.   
In a contrasting case, we examine air pollution, which is currently controlled almost 
completely separately from greenhouse gas emissions.  Here we show the benefits of 
increased coordination in reductions.  We show that the direct impact of most air pollution 
reduction on climate is small, with the exception of SO2 and BC.  The warming influence 
of SO2 reductions counteracts some of the cooling due to BC carbon reductions.  Despite 
assumptions that may overestimate potential reductions due to high reference emissions, 
and including ozone impacts on ecosystem carbon uptake, we show a potential for only an 
8% reduction in temperature rise over the century from these direct reductions.  There may 
be some climate benefit from greater black carbon reductions, but the main interaction of 
air pollution and climate is the possibility for complementarities between air pollution 
reductions and CO2 reductions.  We have introduced into the EPPA model the capability to 
model air pollution control using elasticities of substitution.  With this tool, we were able to 
explore various aspects of the interactions between air pollution reductions and greenhouse 
gas reductions.  We showed that with an air pollution policy that costs a little more than 1% 
of net present consumption, we not only get cleaner air but a 160 ppm decrease in CO2 and 
a total of almost 25% temperature reduction.  For simultaneous policy implementation, we 
show that there is a 20% welfare penalty to not designing policies that allow coordination 
between reductions of pollutants and greenhouse gases.  This coordination could be as 
simple as implementing cap and trade or taxes on both kinds of emissions and allowing 
autonomous agents to reach their own optimal mix of reductions.  However, current policy, 
especially with regards to the developing world, seems to be focused on project based 
mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism.  And because of the CDM 
additionality clauses, the very projects which best coordinate local benefits and GHG 
reductions are the ones which have the most risk of being rejected, and therefore the 
coordination benefits are likely to be lost.   
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This thesis was not able to address all climate substances, nor account for all details 
of the substances it did address.  However, there are some generalizations that can be made 
with regards to what substance characteristics may be important.  Differences in lifetime 
are a major issue, and our work indicates that GWPs are not a good way to address these 
differences.  Ability to accurately measure emissions is also important.  This applies to 
issues such as carbon sequestration and forest sinks, which are less well understood than 
the direct CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption, and therefore caution should be 
taken when trying to address well quantified and poorly quantified emissions with the same 
policy.  Interactions between policies are also important, whether it be CO2 policies and 
fuel taxes or air pollution policies and greenhouse policies.  The ability to estimate the 
magnitude of potential reductions is necessary in order to determine whether a given 
substance is worth the effort to address by itself, or if including it in a larger mix is 
acceptable because errors will be small.   
This analysis could not have been done without the full tool set of economic analysis, 
both modeling and theoretic, atmospheric modeling capabilities including full chemistry, 
ecosystem, and radiation codes, and analysis of the political realities on the ground.  Truly 
complex problems require a broad spectrum of scientific and political tools in order to 
properly understand and devise appropriate solutions.  Each tool has inherent limitations:  
integrated approaches can overcome some of these constraints.   
While this thesis demonstrates improved methodologies for analyzing policies 
involving multiple substances, it is important to remember that the main thrust of climate 
policy needs to be near term action.  This thesis should not be interpreted as a call to step 
back and reevaluate, but rather to push ahead and implement methane policies and air 
pollution policies immediately while continuing to work on carbon dioxide reductions.  As 
Nicholas Mabey stated14, “The challenge is change, not setting targets or developing 
optimal solutions if said targets/solutions are not actually met”. 
 
 
                                                 
14 6th TPP Symposium, Leadership for 2050: Technology, Policy, and Education, 2006. 
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Appendices 
A. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) 
Model 
 
The EPPA model is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model designed to 
simulate the global economy.  The model was designed with two primary purposes.  The 
first purpose is to project emissions into the future for use in the earth systems component 
of the IGSM.  The second purpose is to analyze the costs and effects of imposing climate 
policies on the economy.  To achieve these purposes requires a global model with multiple 
regions and sectoral detail.  EPPA version 4 (Paltsev et al., 2005b) has 16 separate regions 
(Table A-1) and sectoral splits with special detail in the energy and electricity generation 
because of the importance of fuel choice and generation technology to greenhouse gas 
emissions (Table A-2).  The model is calibrated based on the GTAP dataset in 1997, and 
then simulated forward from 2000 to 2100 in 5 year increments.  The versions of EPPA 
used in this thesis are recursive-dynamic, meaning that they are myopic rather than forward 
looking.  Emissions of the 6 major greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide - CO2, methane - 
CH4, nitrous oxide - N2O, hydrofluorocarbons - HFCs, perfluorocarbons - PFCs, and sulfur 
hexafluoride - SF6) are calculated, along with air pollutants which have direct or indirect 
impacts on radiative forcing (sulfates - SOx, black carbon - BC, organic carbon - OC, 
nitrogen oxides - NOx, carbon monoxide - CO, ammonia - NH3, and non-methane volatile 
organic compounds – NMVOCs).   
Annex B Non-Annex B 
United States (USA) 
European Union (EUR) 
Eastern Europe (EET) 
Japan (JPN) 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) 
Canada (CAN) 
China (CHN) 
India (IND) 
Higher Income East Asia (ASI) 
Middle East (MES) 
Indonesia (IDZ) 
Mexico (MEX) 
Central & South America (LAM) 
Africa (AFR) 
Rest of World (ROW) 
Table A-1:  Countries and Regions in the EPPA Model 
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Non-Energy Sectors Electric Generation Technology 
Agriculture (AGRI)  
Energy Intensive (EINT) 
Transportation (TRAN) 
Other Industry (OTHR) 
Services (SERV) 
Coal 
Pulverized Coal (PC) 
Gas 
Refined Oil 
Hydro 
Energy Sectors Nuclear 
Electricity (ELEC) NGCC 
Coventional Crude Oil (OIL) NGCC-CCS 
Oil from Shale (SOIL) IGCC-CCS 
Liquid Fuel from Biomass (BOIL) Wind & Solar 
Refined Oil (ROIL) Biomass 
Coal (COAL) Primary Input Factors 
Natural Gas (GAS) Capital 
Gas from Coal (SGAS) Labor 
Household Sectors Land 
Own-Supplied Transport Energy Resource Stocks 
Purchased Transport Crude Oil 
Other Goods & Services Shale Oil 
 Natural Gas 
 Coal 
 Hydro 
 Nuclear 
 Wind & Solar 
Table A-2:  Sectoral Breakdown and Resource Factors in the EPPA Model 
NGCC:  Natural Gas and Combined Cycle.  CCS:  Carbon capture and sequestration.  IGCC:  
Integrated Gas Combined Cycle 
The structure of the model involves a representative consumer providing primary 
factors to the production sectors, which then sell goods and services back to the consumer.  
Every production sector has a corresponding production function formulated as a set of 
nested constant elasticity of substitution functions that determine the mix of primary factors 
and intermediate inputs that are necessary to produce the output of the sector.  These 
factors and inputs can potentially be substituted for one another, depending on the given 
elasticities of substitution.  These elasticities are vital for determining the manner in which 
the model can respond to policy constraints, as they control how easy it is to substitute 
labor or capital for energy based inputs.  The model then optimizes the welfare of the 
representative consumers (consumption plus saving) while meeting market clearance 
conditions.   
The evolution of the model between periods involves several factors.  First is that 
savings equal investments, which contribute to capital in the subsequent period offsetting 
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depreciation.  Population trends over time are based on United Nations projections (United 
Nations, 2000; United Nations, 2001).  Labor productivity is assumed to increase over 
time, and an autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI) index is used to represent 
the change in energy use per unit output over time as technology changes.  Natural 
resources have a finite stock, and the cost of extraction increases as that stock is depleted.  
The nuclear sector is also modeled with a limited resource in order to represent political 
limits to expansion of this sector – this assumption has been explored in more depth in the 
Future of Nuclear Power report (Deutch et al., 2003).  Finally, new technologies (such as 
the carbon capture and sequestration – CCS – technologies) are modeled such that they 
become available in a given time period, but there is a limit on the rate at which these 
technologies can penetrate the economy.   
In the reference scenario, the combination of reference parameters used in this thesis 
leads to a total GDP growth over the time period of more than a factor of 10.  This growth 
leads to significant emissions growth of greenhouse gas emissions as shown in Figure 1.4 
in Chapter 1.   
The models used in this thesis had some modifications from the model described in 
Paltsev et al. 2005.  The addition of air pollutant abatement has been described in detail in 
Chapter 3, however there were other minor changes made for the model used in that 
chapter.  First is that the standard version of EPPA4 had a strict cap on SO2 emissions in 
developed nations that was implemented by artificially reducing the SO2 emissions after 
the model solution.  This clearly would conflict with attempts to model SO2 abatement 
response to policy, so the artificial cap was replaced with an exogenous improvement in the 
base emission factors that reproduced the appropriate SO2 emissions path in the reference 
case.  Additionally, the advanced pulverized coal technology had higher NOx emissions 
than the base coal technology, so the emission factors of the pulverized coal technology 
were adjusted to match the intuition that the advanced technology should be at least as 
clean as the older technology.  The new numbers were within literature ranges (Marion et 
al., 2004).  This version of the model also used the baseload and shoulder details developed 
by (McFarland and Herzog, 2006).   
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B. The MIT Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM) 
 
The earth systems component of the MIT IGSM is designed to simulate the global 
atmospheric, land, and ocean system over the next century using emissions inputs from the 
MIT EPPA model.  Two major versions of the IGSM have been used in this thesis:  IGSM1 
(Prinn et al., 1999), a 2D land/2D ocean model with 7.8 degree resolution latitudinally and 
9 vertical atmospheric levels, and IGSM2.3 (Sokolov et al., 2005) which has a finer 4 
degree resolution and 11 vertical levels, a 3D ocean general circulation model, and an 
improved land process component (Schlosser and Kicklighter, 2007) based on the 
Community Land Model (Bonan et al., 2002).  The nature of the problems studied in this 
thesis require a detailed chemistry model.  The IGSM includes 33 chemical species, with 
41 gas-phase and twelve heterogeneous reactions in the background chemistry module.  
Both models include an urban air pollution module based on fitting a 3D California 
Institute of Technology Urban Airshed model (Mayer et al., 2000), though this urban 
module is in the process of being replaced with an improved version.  Natural systems are 
represented by a Terrestrial Ecosystems Model (TEM) (Melillo et al., 1993) and a Natural 
Emissions Model (NEM) (Liu, 1996).  Table B-1 shows which model version has been 
used in which portion of the thesis.   
Chapter Model Used 
One (Stabilization) IGSM1 
IGSM2.3 for CCSP exercise 
Two (Methane) IGSM1 for M2M analysis 
IGSM2.3 otherwise 
Three (Air pollution) IGSM2.3 
Table B-1:  IGSM Model usage in this thesis 
The IGSM is considered to be an Earth Model of Intermediate Complexity (EMIC).  
The two dimensional nature of the model leads to some differences with 3D state-of-the-art 
atmosphere-ocean-land general circulation model (AOGCM):  there may be some sacrifice 
of detail, most obviously in the lack of longitudinal resolution, but the IGSM has 
advantages in computational speed, flexibility of parameterizations allowing for 
exploration of the space of climatic uncertainty, and more complete chemistry and earth 
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systems linkages.  The parameterization flexibility enables ocean heat uptake and the ocean 
carbon sink to be adjusted by modifying Kv (effective diffusion coefficient for 
parameterizing all mixing processes) in the IGSM1 2D ocean or Kz (coefficient for vertical 
diffusion for parameterizing only the small-scale mixing processes) in the 3D ocean.  
Because the 3D ocean has explicit modeling of the biogeochemical cycle the carbon uptake 
in the 3D model is less responsive to Kz changes than in the IGSM1 2D version.  The 
climate sensitivity (CS) can be adjusted by the use of a cloud feedback parameter, and the 
aerosol forcing (Faer) is also adjustable.  The default parameters used in this thesis are 
shown in Table B-2.  The change in Kv is due to improved attribution studies (Forest et al., 
2006), leading to a ocean with slower heat uptake and correspondingly slower sea level 
rise.  The Forest (2006) study also led to a prediction of slightly higher climate sensitivity 
(not used in the CCSP study).  The aerosol forcing parameter required updating due to the 
inclusion of the radiative impact of black carbon in the climate model, and therefore a 
compensating increase in the cooling effectiveness of sulfate aerosol was necessary to 
match historical data in the 1980s.  Work on updating best estimates of these parameters is 
ongoing. 
 Kv (cm2/s) CS (ºC) Faer (W/m2) 
IGSM1 9.2 2.4 -0.61 
 Kz (cm2/s) CS (ºC) Faer (W/m2) 
IGSM2.3 (CCSP) 0.4 2.0 -0.35 
IGSM2.3 0.4 3.0 -0.85 
Table B-2:  Climate parameters chosen for use in this thesis 
 
C. Kyoto gases other than CO2 and CH4 
 
A brief digression to address well-mixed gases other than methane and CO2 is 
appropriate here.  We have chosen to focus on methane because it is the 2nd largest 
contributor to radiative forcing of the greenhouse gases, but the historical contributions of 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) together are on the order of CH4 (Ramaswamy et al., 2001).  We 
analyzed the benefits of reductions of all non-CO2 gases together in Reilly et al. (2006).  
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This study did support our intuition that of these gases methane was clearly the most 
important in terms of cost effectiveness and near term temperature impact.  However, some 
of the findings of the study are still worth noting here for reasons of completeness.  Should 
near term policy move in the direction of addressing gases such as methane individually 
rather than in larger, more comprehensive programs, it would be remiss not to address 
smaller contributors that nonetheless have simple abatement options available.   
Much of the historical forcing of these industrial gases is due to the CFCs, whose 
emissions have largely been phased out because of their ozone depleting effects.  HFCs 
have been rapidly replacing them.  PFC use was growing rapidly because of its use in 
computer chip manufacture, but more recently has slowed. The mix of these substances, 
and the source of them, has changed dramatically in the past decade or so, and could 
change further still in the future (Mayer et al., 2001; Reilly et al., 2003a; Reilly et al., 2000; 
Reilly et al., 2002; Reilly et al., 1999; US EPA, 1999; US EPA, 2001a; US EPA, 2001b; 
US EPA, 2001c).  Forecasts are highly uncertain (Harnisch et al., 2000; Mayer et al., 
2001), in part, because these new chemicals may find new uses. As the automobile fleet 
continues to grow, particularly in tropical developing countries, HFC use in mobile air 
conditioning could grow dramatically.  As the climate effects of these substances have 
become more widely known, some firms are already taking actions to prevent the release of 
the substances, to recycle them, or to switch to those with less powerful effects on climate. 
In some cases, the potential development of new products and new uses for them is being 
shelved, recognizing that the investment in development may not be worth it if soon after 
introduction a climate agreement would mean they would need to be phased out.  All of 
this adds to uncertainty.  A true “no-policy” case, ignoring actions that already appear to be 
built into decisions because of the expectation of climate policy, can lead to very large 
projections of industrial GHG emissions (US EPA, 2001c).  These considerations add 
further to uncertainty and make it difficult to establish a true no-policy reference.  Webster 
et al. (2003) estimated the additional contribution from N2O by 2100 to be 0.50 (0.16 to 
1.0) Wm-2 and the combined additional forcing from PFCs, SF6, and HFC to be 0.34 (0.27 
to 0.54) Wm-2.  Even though emissions are more uncertain for these substances than for 
methane, there is somewhat less uncertainty in their atmospheric concentrations because of 
their very long lifetimes.   
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Similarly, recycling the industrial gases, if it saves their purchase, may be desirable.  
A further consideration is that at this point, very little of the industrial gases (PFCs, SF6, 
and HFCs) are emitted in developing countries.  Therefore agreement here would focus on 
prevention, establishing best practice in developed countries, and assuring that these 
practices are used elsewhere when the products and production moves there.  This may be 
easier to agree on than cutting back on something on which a poor country already 
depends.  As noted above, either because reducing emissions of these substances is actually 
cost-effective or in anticipation of carbon-equivalent penalty for emitting them, many firms 
are reducing them.  Creating a global agreement on these substances would consolidate 
these actions, and in many cases act as a preventative measure against developing practices 
that would lead to their release. 
Currently, because HFC is covered under the Kyoto Protocol, and because destruction 
of HFC is fairly simple to quantify and is arguably always “additional”, the majority of 
CDM credits have been allocated to HFC combustion projects.  However, the problem is 
that there is not a constant rate of production of HFC-23 as a byproduct of HCFC-22 
manufacture.  Therefore, by giving credits for HFC-23 destruction, this creates perverse 
incentives for designing a plant that  creates more HFC-23 byproducts than would be 
maximally efficient – at least, as long as destruction of HFC-23 is credited, and not avoided 
production (Hoffman, 2006).  This characteristic indicates a need to examine HFC-23 
credits more closely, and perhaps to create a separate mechanism for non-Annex B nations 
to gain credits for HFC-23 reduction (perhaps from a baseline cap, rather than per ton of 
destruction).   
N2O has similar emissions characteristics to methane, but lifetime closer to that of 
CO2.  Therefore, if accurate quantification of emissions were possible, there would be few 
reasons not to allow GWP based trading between N2O and CO2, though there still might be 
reasons why some nations might be willing to implement an N2O policy but not a CO2 
policy.  Further analysis would be interesting, but is not included within this thesis, 
especially given that projections indicate that N2O emissions will contribute less than 
methane to warming over the next century.  
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D. Global Warming Potentials 
 
Because GWPs are central to some of the major conclusions of this thesis, we include 
an appendix discussing their basic properties and a few of the alternatives that have been 
proposed over the years.  The Global Warming Potential concept was adopted by the first 
IPCC Assessment Process in 1990.  There was a need for intercomparisons between 
different gases, and the obvious parallel was the Ozone Depletion Potential used within the 
Montreal Protocol (Shine et al., 1990).  A single number was necessary for policymakers to 
be able to evaluate the relative merits of different greenhouse gas mitigation strategies.  
Several of the possible drawbacks to GWPs were noted in the original discussion, including 
the problem resulting from using CO2 and its complicated lifetime as a reference gas.   
The basic definition of a GWP is the time integrated climate forcing resulting from a 
release of 1 kg of a trace gas relative to the forcing resulting over that time period from an 
emission of 1 kg of the reference gas (CO2) as in the following equation:   
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We include a table of the 20 year, 100 year, and 500 year GWP values here (from the 
IPCC Third Assessment Report in 2001), along with the old 100 year values from the IPCC 
Second Assessment Report in 1996.   
 20 year 100 year 500 year IPCC 1996 
(100 year) 
CO2 1 1 1 1 
CH4 62 23 7 21 
N2O 275 296 156 310 
CF4 3900 5700 8900 6500 
SF6 15100 22200 32400 23900 
HFC-134a 3300 1300 400 1300 
Table D-1:  GWPs by gas and integration time period from IPCC TAR (Ramaswamy et al., 2001) and 
IPCC SAR (Schimel et al., 1995) 
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The 1996 IPCC values for GWPs are used in Kyoto for the first commitment period, 
and therefore have been used as the trading metric for EPPA.  However, the Protocol 
indicates that updated GWPs may be used for future commitment periods.   
The table above shows the importance of the time threshold chosen for the 
calculation, where the GWP of methane varies from 62 to 7.  Naturally, the closer the 
lifetime of the gas in question comes to that of CO2, the less difference results from the 
chosen time period.  However, since the carbon cycle has unique properties, it is not 
obvious exactly what lifetime to use for CO2:  the IPCC uses the Bern carbon cycle model 
as a base.  This complexity in CO2 lifetime properties immediately leads to potential 
complications in calculating GWP values.  Also, the radiative forcing per unit CO2 
decreases logarithmically as CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere increase, differing from 
most other gases because the radiative forcing bands of CO2 are more highly saturated.  
Therefore, it is might be expected that a repeat of the GWP calculation in 50 years when 
CO2 concentrations are higher will lead to a higher GWP for all the non-CO2 gases due to 
this forcing relationship.   
Alternate formulations of GWPs have been proposed.  One approach, suggested by 
Shine et al. (2005) was to use a simple energy balance model and look at temperature 
change at a given date resulting from a pulse of gas, rather than integrated forcing.  
Additionally, they also examined the effect on temperature at a given date of a sustained 
reduction of a given gas.  Their 100 year “GTPs” (Global Temperature Change Potential, 
Sustained Reduction) for methane is about 25, not much larger than the same GWP, which 
does not seem to match our experience with methane reductions compared to CO2 
reductions in the IGSM.  However, there is likely a relationship between a calculated GWP 
or GTP and the counterfactual, the size of the reduction pulse, and the effect of methane 
emissions on its own lifetime.  In our scenario we have increasing CO2 concentration in the 
counterfactual which effectively leads to an increase in other GWPs over time as the 
radiative forcing per unit CO2 decreases, we have a fairly large reduction of methane 
between the reference case and the policy case, and we have an elaborate chemistry model, 
all of which could lead to different evaluations than the IPCC or Shine et al. approaches.   
Manne and Richels offer yet another approach (Manne and Richels, 2001b) by 
choosing a temperature change target and using a forward looking model to determine 
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optimal abatement (and price) paths.  With a pure temperature target they get the result that 
methane price is low at the beginning of the period, rising rapidly as the target is 
approached.  This is a natural consequence of the constraint:  methane abatement in the 
early periods does nothing to forcing at the time that the constraint is taking effect (this 
result is also seen in Aaheim et al. (2006)).  If a rate of change constraint is added, then the 
price of methane becomes higher.  A 2 degree temperature target, with a 0.2 degree/decade 
rate of change, leads to a methane price not dissimilar from the standard GWP.  N2O prices, 
however, are higher than their GWP values in all the scenarios that the authors considered.  
Indeed, in their recent paper for EMF-21 (Manne and Richels, 2006), they used a radiative 
forcing ceiling rather than a temperature target, and observed the same behavior where 
methane abatement was delayed until the end of the period.  However, in a radiative 
forcing ceiling scenario, this allows radiative forcing to rise quickly and then stabilize, 
leading to a higher temperature in 2100 than would result if methane were not reduced at 
all.  
Note that GWPs are expressed in CO2 equivalents, and therefore care must be taken 
when converting emissions of a non-CO2 gas to carbon equivalents instead.  The CO2 
equivalents to C equivalents conversion factor is 12/44, and therefore it is important to 
understand when C equivalent, CO2 equivalent, or actual mass of a given gas is being 
reported.  This applies equally well to $/tonC, $/tonCO2, etc. 
 
E. Methane properties 
 
To understand the place of methane policies, we need to understand the relevant 
characteristics of methane:  its sources, sinks, and radiative properties.  These are important 
both for modeling reasons and for policy creation.  The radiative properties of methane are 
important for determining the benefits of reducing its concentrations.  Understanding the 
sources of methane is necessary to determine where to concentrate policies in order to yield 
the best effect, and how to best craft such policies.  Understanding of sinks is important 
both because the manner in which sources are estimated sometimes depends on 
assumptions about the rate of decomposition of methane, but also because we need to 
 159
understand how such sinks may change in the future which may change the relationship 
between emissions and concentration.   
Among the greenhouse gases, methane (CH4) is the most important direct 
anthropogenic source of increased radiative forcing after CO2.  The concentration of 
methane in the atmosphere in 2004 was 1783 ppb according to the WMO (World 
Meteorological Association, 2006), though the abundance of CH4 measured by 
NOAA/GMD was 1775 ppb.  Different measurement scales can lead to different results:  
the NOAA number used to be 1751 ppb (Dlugokencky et al., 2003), but now NOAA uses a 
new scale used for measurement (NOAA04) which is designed to bring NOAA estimates 
into agreement with the AGAGE network (Cunnold et al., 2002; Dlugokencky et al., 2005).  
There is significant variability between regions – the 5 AGAGE monitors registered annual 
average concentrations ranging from 1730 to 1852 ppb in 2004.  In any case, methane 
concentrations are less than 1% that of CO2.  However, each molecule of methane has a 
radiative forcing approximately 21 times that of a molecule of carbon dioxide, or a forcing 
of 60 times that of CO2 by weight.  Methane concentrations have also increased by a factor 
of 2.3 since preindustrial times, compared to an increase of 30% in CO2 concentrations in 
the same time period. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated 
methane’s contribution to increased radiative forcing between 1750 to 2000 to be 0.48 
watts per meter squared (Wm-2), nearly 1/3 the contribution from CO2 (Ramaswamy et al., 
2001).  These calculations do not include the full contribution of CH4.  One product of CH4 
oxidation in the atmosphere is CO2, and so part of the CO2 increase, albeit a small part, is 
the result of oxidation of methane.   CH4 is also a contributor to tropospheric ozone (O3) 
formation, which also is a warming gas.  The IPCC estimated that increases in tropospheric 
O3 between 1750 and 2000 contributed 0.35± 0.15 Wm-2.  CH4 is not the only contributor 
to past increases in O3.  CO, NOx, and VOCs are all involved in the O3 cycle, and clearly 
identifying the contribution of each is difficult both because the chemistry of O3 formation 
in the troposphere is complex and non-linear in precursor emissions and atmospheric 
conditions, and also because the emissions in some of precursors are highly uncertain.  One 
estimate (Lelieveld et al., 1998) is that anthropogenic CH4 emissions contributed to one 
quarter of the tropospheric O3 rise since 1850.  We plan to address this issue further in 
future work on historical emissions as inputs into the IGSM.   
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Naturally, GWP calculations have been made in order to compare methane emissions 
directly to other greenhouse gas emissions for trading purposes.  Methane’s comparatively 
short lifetime of 14.5 years (including adjustment) (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998) or 8.4 years 
(direct lifetime) (Prather et al., 2001) results in it having a 100 year GWP of only 21 (or 24 
in the TAR estimate) despite its factor of 60 increase in radiative forcing by mass.  This 
short lifetime also means that methane concentrations will adjust very quickly to changes in 
emissions, and the comparatively high radiative forcing results in fast reactions of the 
climate system.  Adjustments to methane’s GWP include the fact that its end oxidation 
state is CO2 (regardless of whether it is burned by flaring or in gas turbines, or oxidized in 
the atmosphere), its contribution to O3 concentrations, and the fact that emissions of 
methane lead to an increased lifetime for atmospheric methane by reacting with hydroxyl 
radicals.  These adjustment factors are usually included by multiplying a calculated GWP 
from CH4 forcing alone by a factor of 1.3.   
These hydroxyl radicals are the main determinant of the oxidative capacity of the 
atmosphere.  This means that methane’s lifetime will grow if there are significant 
emissions of hydroxyl radical sinks such as carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, 
or methane itself.  In order to measure OH concentrations (Prinn et al., 1995) used 
chlorinated compounds as tracers.  While there have been variations in OH trend 
estimations (Krol et al., 1998; Krol et al., 2003; Prinn et al., 2001) the most recent 
publications include better estimates of methyl chloroform emissions (Reimann et al., 
2005) and indicate that long term OH trends have been fairly small though interannual 
variability can be larger, with a minimum in 1998 (Prinn et al., 2005b).  Accurate 
determination of OH concentrations is vital for accurately determining the CH4 sink, which 
is then used for determining the total CH4 source using inverse methodologies.  There are 
also small methane sinks due to bacterial oxidation (20 to 51 Tg) and stratospheric 
degradation that may amount to on the order of 10 % of the total sinks (Lelieveld et al., 
1998; Ridgwell et al., 1999).  
Methane is generated from various sources, including incomplete combustion, fossil 
outgassing, and biological anaerobic decomposition.  Estimates for the total source term for 
methane have improved over time:  Seinfeld and Pandis (1998) estimated a range of 410 to 
660 Tg (median 535 Tg), of which they attributed 160 Tg to natural sources (mainly 
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wetlands).  Of the 375 Tg of anthropogenic emissions they attribute 100 to fossil fuels and 
the remainder to biological sources, including enteric fermentation (livestock), rice paddies, 
biomass burning, landfills, and various sewage sources.  Lelieveld et al. (1998) estimated a 
total source of 600 Tg yr-1 (±80 Tg), determined by inverse calculations, with a fossil 
contribution of 110 Tg (± 45 Tg) determined by 14C/12C ratio, for an anthropogenic total 
of 410 Tg. They estimated that the pre-industrial natural methane source was 190 ± 70 
Tg/yr.  Various bottom-up estimates of anthropogenic emissions exist, but generally yield 
lower emission totals.  The US EPA estimates anthropogenic sources at only 287 Tg in 
2000 of which 30 Tg was due to rice (US EPA, 2006) and the EDGAR database lists 321 
Tg emissions of anthropogenic emissions of which 39 Tg is due to rice cultivation and 104 
Tg from fossil fuels (Olivier, 2005; Olivier et al., 2005).   
However, the most recent inverse calculations (Chen and Prinn, 2006) provide 
slightly different numbers:  only 48 ± 3 Tg of fossil fuel emissions, with 112 ± 29  Tg from 
rice, 189 ± 3 from animals and waste, 43 ± 18 from biomass, and 36 Tg from 
industrial/biofuel combustion, for about 430 Tg total anthropogenic emissions.  Natural 
emissions are attributed to wetlands (143 Tg) and termites (23 Tg), for a total of 597 Tg. 
There have been several results in recent years that may require a reevaluation of 
some of these source terms, with some amount of involved controversy.  A recent paper by 
Keppler et al. (2006) claimed that there may be a 62 to 236 Tg source from living plants.  
Some experts in the field are dubious about both the extreme conditions of the original 
experiments and the validity of the extrapolation showing it to be a major worldwide 
source, and many others are waiting for validation of the results from new studies. 
However, the fact that this claim is not dismissed out of hand is another indication of the 
uncertainty involved in methane inventories.  Another paper (Kvenvolden and Rogers, 
2005) has taken issue with the oversight of geological sources of CH4:  they estimate that 
seeps, volcanoes, mid-ocean ridges, and similar non-biogenic nor anthropogenic sources 
account for 45 Tg of CH4 per year.  Geological sources are also addressed in Etiope and 
Klusman (2002) as a source of “missing” old methane, because bottom-up fossil source 
estimates were smaller than top-down 14C/12C ratio fossil estimates.  Finally, there has been 
discussion about whether dams might be potential methane sources.  While it would be 
expected that methane would oxidize in the water column before reaching the surface, 
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perhaps it is possible that methane can escape along with releases of water from the depths 
of the reservoir through the spillway, or through ebullitive emissions (bubbles), and some 
measurements have shown that some dams do have significant emissions (Fearnside, 2004; 
Giles, 2006; Rosa et al., 2004).  Shallow dams for irrigation purposes could be expected to 
contribute more to emissions than would deep dams for power, as any standing vegetation 
that breaches the surface could serve as a “channel” for methane escape from depth.   
Another issue revolves around recent estimates of rice paddy emissions.  Methane in 
rice paddies is generated by decaying plant matter in flooded fields, and the rice plants 
themselves serve as channels for methane to diffuse into the atmosphere.  Emissions vary 
with season, soil types, and various agricultural practices.  An old paper by Sass and Fisher 
(1997) put a limit of 25 to 54 Tg on global methane emissions from rice using bottom-up 
methodology.  The EPA’s inventory methodology follows the general pattern of the Sass 
papers, with total global methane emissions from rice much closer to 20 Tg than to 100.  
Lelieveld listed estimates of annual emissions ranging from 20 to 150 Tg, but suggested 
that the lower end of the range would not be consistent with their model calculations.  The 
inverse methodology of Chen and Prinn (2006) attributed 112 ± 29 Tg of methane 
emissions to rice paddies, far larger than the bottom-up estimates.  Some bottom up 
modelers acknowledge the limitations of their approach:  (Sass et al., 2002) state that 
“reliance on single-field studies for determination of global methane budgets may be 
questionable.”  Given that in the IGSM model system we encountered problems using 
numbers based on the EPA inventories because methane concentrations were dropping 
through the 90s, we have chosen to increase the emissions to match the estimates from 
Chen and Prinn (2006).  This led to much more realistic concentration profiles, though 
there are still issues to be resolved about even present day emissions and chemistry 
estimates in our modeling system.   
However, if the Keppler et al. study bears out, it is possible that the emissions from 
tropical forests may mask the lack of emissions from rice paddies.  Similarly, large 
emissions from dams used to flood rice paddy fields may be another way to reconcile the 
low bottom-up estimates from the EPA and the large inverse modeling estimates from 
Chen and Prinn (2006), as these emissions could potentially have similar geographic and 
temporal patterns.   
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Calculated emissions in 2005 from running the IGSM in a standard reference run 
(IGSM2, EPPA4) were 133 Tg of CH4 from NEM, 40 Tg of CH4 from the preprocessor 
(attributed to termites, oceans, and other processes), and 374 Tg from anthropogenic 
sources, for a total of 547 Tg (emissions were similar in 2000 except for 26 Tg less from 
anthropogenic sources).   
Methane emissions from landfills is quite temperature dependent.  The GAINS model 
uses different emission factors for cool, temperature, and warm climates.  Occasionally, 
there are significant differences even between different inventories.  GAINS and the 
UNFCCC both separately estimated emissions for the EU-25.  For a half dozen countries, 
“GAINS estimates for 1990 deviate by more than 30 percent from the figures reported by 
countries to UNFCCC (2005)”  (GAINS methods report, 2005, pg. 56)  These differences 
were attributed to the waste sector and coal mining emissions, as well as the agricultural 
sector in Germany only.  In the waste sector, the UNFCCC assumes that all waste is 
created equal and therefore has identical methane emission profiles, whereas GAINS 
separated paper and organic waste.  This meant that methane emissions in nations with high 
paper consumption and low recycling and incineration rates were, according to GAINS, 
being underreported to the UNFCCC.  Similarly, in Austria a study showed that the 
standard deviation in methane estimations was up to 25% of the mean emission estimates 
(and even worse for N2O) (Winiwarter and Rypdal, 2001).  If this is true in the EU-25, it 
could be expected that errors of that magnitude or larger may be common in developing 
nation inventory reports.   
While uncertainty in anthropogenic emissions inventories may be most relevant for 
policy purposes, uncertainty in natural emissions is important for climate projections.  
Especially important are possible feedbacks between temperature and natural emissions 
due to possible carbon release from northern latitude land ecosystems or ocean methane 
hydrate destabilization.  Zhuang et al. (2006) estimate a current methane emission source of 
36 Tg, with a doubling of emissions over the 21st century in a scenario where high latitude 
temperatures increase by 7 °C.  This increase is small compared to projected anthropogenic 
emission increases, but there are still mechanistic uncertainties.  Other sources of 
uncertainty include wetlands, which are as hard or harder to measure as rice paddies, and 
possible sources such as ebullition of methane from lakes (Walter et al., 2006) which are 
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difficult to measure due to spatial and temporal non-continuity in much the same way that 
it is difficult to measure possible methane emissions from water trapped behind dams.     
 
F. Complementarity Literature Analysis 
 
Since the “Killer Fog” of London in 1952 more and more attention has been paid to 
the hazards of local air pollution.  In the developing world, India, China, and Mexico have 
the most polluted cities in the world, some of which reach particulate levels of nine times 
the World Health Organization guidelines, and indoor air quality can be even worse.  
50,000 deaths a year in 11 large Chinese cities are attributed to smoke and fine particles 
from coal combustion (or 180,000 annual deaths in urban areas from all air pollution 
sources ) (Hughes, 1997; World Bank, 1997).  The United States, the world’s largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases, has much lower local pollution levels after several decades of 
regulation.  However, heightened environmental awareness continues to lead to calls to 
further reduce pollution, and research such as the Six Cities Study demonstrate the dangers 
of PM2.5 and other pollutants (Daniels et al., 2004; Dockery et al., 1993; Health Effects 
Institute, 2000; Pope et al., 1995).  Given the incentives to reduce local air pollution in the 
developed and developing worlds, and given that the sources of air pollution are often also 
the source of greenhouse gases, it appears that there is a potential complementarity that can 
be exploited to global advantage. 
While the link between climate change mitigation and air pollution reduction seems 
reasonably evident, numerical estimates of these benefits have only become widespread 
recently.  One of the early reviews of these estimates was published in 1996, and stressed 
“the preliminary and tentative nature” of the secondary benefits studies (Ekins, 1996). 
Now, however, policy makers in the climate change field regularly cite non-climate 
benefits as a justification for climate policy.  For example, the IPCC 2nd Assessment 
Report claims that reduced air pollution damages will equal 30 to 100 percent of the costs 
of GHG emission reductions (Pearce et al., 1995).  The 3rd Assessment report went further, 
discussing the difference between “ancillary benefits” – benefits arising from climate-only 
policies – and “co-benefits”, where the policy is designed to be a cost-benefit optimal mix 
of air pollution and GHG reduction (Hourcade et al., 2001).  The Working Group on Public 
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Health and Fossil Fuel Consumption calculated the number of lives saved because of 
secondary air pollution benefits from a climate change reduction policy on the order of 
700,000 annually by 2020 (Davis et al., 1997).  These results lead groups like the WRI to 
call for immediate implementation of GHG reduction policies because “small reductions in 
carbon emissions over the next two decades can yield big benefits to public health 
worldwide” (Repetto and Austin, 1997; World Resources Institute, 1997). The Working 
Group report and other similar studies often make broad assumptions about the relationship 
between PM2.5 and GHG reduction in order to make their predictions of lives saved 
(Cifuentes et al., 2001a; Cifuentes et al., 2001b). Other approaches have involved using 
CGE models in order to calculate marginal abatement curves and therefore predict 
“optimal” and “no-regrets” levels of CO2 reduction, where CO2 abatement costs are 
canceled with ancillary benefits (O'Connor, 2000).  Jorgensen et al. examined the results of 
carbon emission reduction in China, but in their case using a dynamic recursive model to 
look at the health benefits of a carbon tax (Garbaccio et al., 2000).  However, one problem 
many of these studies share is that they do not include sufficient detail to examine all the 
different possible technologies that achieve similar levels of carbon reduction.  The studies 
that look at air pollution benefits derived from GHG reduction also miss some of the major 
problems involved with this complementarity. 
For example, in many developing countries, the largest GHG producers may not be 
the largest pollution emitters.  Power plants may produce the most GHGs, but indoor stoves 
produce pollutants where they have the largest health impacts (as well as being dirtier).  In 
China, for example, health benefits from household stove PM10 reductions were calculated 
to be forty times that of health benefits from an equivalent PM10 reduction in large power 
plants (Wang and Smith, 1999).  The approach of the Wang study was to create a GHG 
reduction target, and examine the ancillary benefits of various technological and policy 
options for meeting that target.  One interesting note in the study was that when replacing 
coal stoves, there was a large GHG emission difference between the alternatives – with 
electric stoves being little improvement over coal stoves, but coal gas and especially 
natural gas being significant improvements.  Another problem regards diesel vehicles.  
Diesel is considered to be a dirty fuel, but is more fuel-efficient than gasoline.  Therefore, 
proposals to clean the air by switching from diesel to gasoline may actually increase GHG 
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emissions. The issue is made more complicated by the possibility that soot from diesel 
emissions actually has a major greenhouse impact in its own right (Jacobson, 2002). 
The flip side of the developing country issue is that in industrialized economies 
pollution control measures are often tight enough already that CO2 reduction measures may 
not have a significant effect on air pollution.  The IPCC predicts that some CO2 measures 
will merely reduce SO2 abatement costs until a certain threshold has been reached.  After 
that threshold, further CO2 reduction measures will then have much larger marginal 
benefits, leading to a significant discontinuity (Hourcade et al., 2001).  This is in large part 
due to the SO2 trading regime in the US.  Of course, decreases in SO2 abatement costs may 
lead to more stringent caps in the future, as are already being considered. 
There has been recognition that addressing multiple pollutants simultaneously is 
often more efficient than addressing the pollutants individually.  This has been noted for 
the separation of air and water policy in the EPA, as well as in climate change where 
models (and common sense) show that targeting multiple gases is more efficient than 
achieving climate control through CO2 reduction alone (Reilly et al., 1999).  Congress and 
the Bush administration have also recognized the value of multipollutant strategies, though 
CO2 may not be included in their mix of SO2, NOx, and Hg. However, the debates highlight 
many of the difficulties involved in any environmental legislation – and additional 
complexity only exacerbates those problems, so there may be political reasons to keep 
pollutants separate (Hogue, 2001).  
Because of the lack of federal action in GHG reduction, there has been a movement 
by state and local agencies such as STAPPA and ALAPCO to create “harmonized 
strategies” of air pollution reduction and GHG reduction (State and Territorial Air 
Pollution Program Administrators and Association of Local Air Pollution Officials, 1999).  
They recommend switching from coal to gas-fired combined cycles plants at a CO2 saving 
of 66 percent, a NOx saving of 99 percent, and an SO2 saving of 100 percent.  They 
estimate the cost of the switch as being under $39 per ton of CO2 saved, not taking into 
account complementarities.  There are recommendations to improve end-use efficiency 
(citing the Five-Labs Study), downsize motors in the commercial sector, and reduce 
emissions in the transportation sector.  The problem is that these organizations have no real 
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mandate to act, and therefore have not implemented the market based GHG reduction plans 
that were suggested in their report.  
There has been a small body of work on taking air pollution reduction as a primary 
goal and examining how to derive a GHG benefit from that reduction, which is closest in 
direct relevance to the work in this thesis.  A CICERO study in Oslo looked at the Chinese 
Shanxi province (Aunan et al., 2004).  Their motivation was that local reductions in air 
pollution often did not imply significant reductions in GHG emissions, as exemplified by 
studies in Mexico City and Santiago, because 1st generation measures for SO2 and 
particulate reductions do not include shifting of fuel types, efficiency measures, or 
renewable use.  Because Shanxi is a major center for coal mining, coke production, power 
plants, and metallurgy, the majority of the analysis was aimed at coal emission reduction 
technology.  The study found that the most cost efficient way to reduce CO2 (co-
generation) was no longer the most cost efficient when local environmental damages were 
introduced into the calculation, leading to a recommendation for briquetting as a means to 
reduce both CO2 and local air pollutants.   
There was also a study using a linear programming model for the Shanghai energy 
system (Gielen and Chen, 2001).  This study examined the difference between a base case 
of economic efficient action, a case where local pollution policies were implemented, and a 
case where an additional $12/ton carbon tax was placed on top of the pollution policies.  
This additional tax resulted in an 11% CO2 reduction (or 22 Mt CO2).  This is on top of 
24% for the local pollution measures, and 10% for inclusion of “no-regrets” measures.  The 
recommendation of the authors was to be careful to use only the final 10% CO2 reduction 
costs in any CDM measures funded by outside nations, as they consider it likely that China 
will be installing local pollution measures on its own. 
Finally, the third study of direct relevance is a World Bank six cities study on 
environmental fossil fuel damages that concluded (given a $20/ton carbon shadow price) 
that optimal policies taking both health and global climate into account were almost 
identical to straight air pollution reduction policies (Lvovsky and Hughes, 1999; Lvovsky 
et al., 2000). They analyzed costs to reach certain PM10 levels focused on PM10 alone, or 
given a strategy focusing on CO2.  They state a value of $80/ton necessary to make CO2 
reduction a priority over local pollution reduction.  Specifically, the authors believe that the 
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priority is local pollution measures, especially focused on household pollution, using 
cleaner fuels and cleaner combustion technology incentives.  Interestingly, of course, the 
European ETS trading price did peak over $80/ton carbon in the early periods of the 
system, and if the trading system returns to such a price the authors could possibly change 
their recommendations to meeting air pollution targets using approaches optimized for CO2 
reductions, with the increment in cost funded by emissions credit purchases.    
 
 
G. Black Carbon 
 
Our modeling simulations show a large global mean surface temperature response to 
black carbon reductions.  In order to stay consistent with past observations, this requires a 
larger sulfate aerosol cooling factor.  There is some doubt as to whether or not a response 
of this magnitude is reflective of reality.  There are some studies which might indicate that 
it is not out of the bounds of consideration:  we have already cited the Bond estimate, but 
additionally the well publicized work by Hansen et al. and Jacobson et al. indicate that 
there are some researchers who believe that the absorptive properties of elemental carbon 
are actually a major contribution to global scale warming patterns.  Jacobson believes that 
black carbon is mainly internally mixed with other aerosols, thereby increasing its 
absorption potential to 0.55 Wm-2 compared with 0.27 Wm-2 for an external mixture 
(Jacobson, 2001).  Hansen goes further to state that including BC indirect effects (through 
ice and snow melt) may “increase its net forcing to 0.5-1 W/m2” (Hansen and Sato, 2001).  
Under the Jacobson hypothesis, unless diesel vehicles become significantly cleaner, then 
switching from gasoline to diesel in order to reduce CO2 emissions would actually warm 
the climate in the 13 to 50 year timescale. 
These estimates are highly controversial for various reasons.  First, the black carbon 
forcing numbers are controversial in themselves.  Second, black carbon is often emitted 
along with organic carbon, which is much more reflective, and therefore the two types of 
particle may cancel each other out to a large extent.  The Jacobson study did eliminate both 
organic and black carbon when running comparisons with CO2 and CH4 reductions 
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(Jacobson, 2002).  However, the MIT IGSM does not yet include organic carbon in the 
climate/chemistry component of the model.   
In addition, emissions estimates for black carbon are highly uncertain.  Cooke et al. 
(Cooke et al., 1999) attempt to construct an equivalent 1x1 degree emission data set for 
black and organic carbon but acknowledge that there is “at least a factor of 2 uncertainty” 
due to problems with emissions data.  In addition, despite the 1x1 degree resolution, in fact 
the emissions are only calculated at the national level, and then a simple mapping to 
population density is made from there.  We can see some of the uncertainties involved in 
calculating activity and emissions factors when we note that for biomass burning, the 
EDGAR database tentatively, and somewhat arbitrarily, assumes that 50% of the biomass 
is burned.  Finally, there is significant uncertainty involved in even the characterization of 
what constitutes black carbon versus organic carbon versus non-carbonic impurities.   
The temperature change resulting from black carbon may be unrealistically large 
(Wang, C, personal communication), and further investigations into the model structure 
leading to this large black carbon impact are ongoing.  Because the sulfate aerosol forcing 
constant is set such that all forcing from all aerosol in the 1980s approximates best 
estimates for that decade, any changes in black carbon forcing are likely to be partially 
compensated by opposing changes in sulfate aerosol forcing (in the case where all 
pollutants are controlled).  This does mean that both sulfate and black carbon impacts may 
be currently overestimated.  However, there are some researchers (Tami Bond) who believe 
that black carbon has a significant impact on global mean surface temperature, and 
therefore the black carbon results from the current model version are not outside the realm 
of believability.   
 
H. Fictionistan 
 
In the analysis of effiency losses due to lack of coordination between air pollution and 
climate policies we showed that there was a danger of taking a “naive” approach.  This 
approach would involve adding the cost of an air pollution policy to the cost of a climate 
policy and comparing that sum to the cost of the two policies implemented simultaneously 
(and therefore, presumably efficiently, in the context of a general equilibrium model, 
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though as we have showed that there is not always a perfect correspondence between 
minimizing prices of pollutants and minimizing consumption loss).  In order to solve this 
problem, we devised an iterative method involving setting constraints at a level equal to 
that of the ancillary impact on the non-constrained gas.  The cost of the original GHG 
control run minus the cost of achieving the ancillary control would allow us to add the cost 
of GHG control to the cost of air pollution control more accurately than the original 
“naive” approach.  In order to demonstrate the value of this iterative methodology, we 
created a fictional nation ‘Fictionistan’ which has available a set of nine reduction 
measures which control CO2, BC, or both, each at a given cost (Table H-6).  We then 
attempt to choose a set of measures to achieve at the lowest possible cost a CO2 reduction 
of 50 units, a BC reduction of 50 units, or both reductions simultaneously.  The results are 
shown in Table H-1. 
Constraint Options CO2 red. BC red. Cost 
CO2 TBNW 53 15 61 
BC TMYQS 20 56 77 
CO2+BC TOMWNY 53 50 90 
Table H-1:  Optimal set of options for achieving constraints to CO2, black carbon, or both 
simultaneously. 
We note that there are ancillary BC reductions from the CO2 constraint, and ancillary 
CO2 reductions from the BC constraint.  The “naive” approach would compare the sum of 
the two constraint costs (61 + 77 = 138) and compare that to the cost of the combined 
policy (90), and show that the welfare penalty for not allowing coordination between 
policies is 53%.  There are two obvious reasons why this “naive” approach is wrong.  The 
first is that option “T” is used in both the CO2 constraint case and the BC constraint case, 
and therefore its cost is being double counted.  If we just take the option set TBNWMYSQ 
then the cost of the combined policy is 131, not 138.  The other problem is that this 
combined option set actually far exceeds the actual constraint levels.  As can be seen in 
Table H-2, the combined set has 66 units of CO2 reductions rather than 50, and 64 units of 
BC reductions.  If we take the minimal set required to meet the constraint by removing the 
least cost effective CO2 reduction (option W) and the least cost effective BC reduction 
(option S), the cost of meeting the constraint drops to 105.  This is the number that should 
be compared to the combined policy cost of 90, or only a 17% welfare penalty for lack of 
coordination.  This difference mainly comes because option O is the second most efficient 
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option for reducing both pollutants simultaneously, but not efficient for reducing either 
pollutant individually.  Also, option W was left out of the minimal set, as the most 
expensive per unit reduced of the CO2 options, but is actually more efficient than Option N 
if pollution reduction is also a goal.   
Constraint Options CO2 red. BC red. Cost 
CO2+BC – all TBNWMYQS 66 64 131 
CO2+BC – minimal TBNMYQ 53 53 105 
Table H-2:  A comparison of the combination of all of the options necessary to meet the CO2 constraint 
and BC constraint individually to the minimum set of those options that is required to meet the two 
constraints.    
The above analysis is fairly straightforward:  however, it is impossible to determine 
the “minimal set” doing a CGE analysis.  We can, however, set constraints to try to meet 
the ancillary benefits level, thereby having a CO2 constraint at 20 and a BC constraint at 
15, as seen in the Table H-3. 
Constraint Options CO2 red. BC red. Cost 
CutOff:  CO2 20 TB 27 7 29 
CutOff:  BC 15 TM 10 16 18 
Table H-3:  Meeting constraints equal to the ancillary benefits of the original policy 
These two scenarios have their own ancillary benefits, and so another iteration was 
performed (Table H-4). 
Constraint Options CO2 red. BC red. Cost 
CutOff:  BC 7 T 7 7 7 
CutOff:  "CO2 10" (10/27*TB) 10 2.6 10.7 
Table H-4:  Second iteration of setting constraints equal to ancillary benefits 
So, we can now look at the cost of the original policies (CO2 constraint of 50 or a BC 
constraint of 50), and the first and second iterations of corrections in Table H-5.   
Constraint Combination Cost 
CO2 50 61 
CO2 50 - BC15 43 
CO2 50 - BC15 + "CO2 10" 53.7 
BC 50 77 
BC 50 - CO2 20 48 
BC 50 - CO2 20 + BC 7 55 
Table H-5:  Cost of original two policies and the cost of those policies after one and two iterations of the 
adjustment scheme described in this chapter 
At zero iterations, the sum of the cost of the two individual policies is 138, which we 
showed is a tremendous overestimate of the “true cost” of 105.  At one iteration, the sum is 
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91, which is rather an underestimate of the true cost.  After two iterations, the sum is 108.7, 
which is now approaching the right number.  Unfortunately, the resolution of this exercise 
does not allow us to prove that the convergence will lead to the exact right number.  Given 
that this exercise is a simple linear programming model and not a full CGE model, even 
such perfect convergence would not be proof.  However, it should serve as a logical 
demonstration of the methodology and why this method was necessary.   
Option CO2 red BC red Cost Cost/CO2 Cost/BC Cost/SUM 
B 20 0 22 1.10 NA 1.10 
M 3 9 11 3.67 1.22 0.92 
N 14 4 17 1.21 4.25 0.94 
O 13 14 23 1.77 1.64 0.85 
Q 5 21 31 6.20 1.48 1.19 
S 1 7 11 11.00 1.57 1.38 
T 7 7 7 1.00 1.00 0.50 
W 12 4 15 1.25 3.75 0.94 
Y 4 12 17 4.25 1.42 1.06 
Table H-6:  Full Set of Reduction Options available in Fictionistan 
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Glossary 
 
AGAGE – Advanced Global Atmospheric Gases Experiment 
AGGG – Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases 
Annex B – As defined in the Kyoto Protocol, nations that agreed to emission constraints 
AR4 – Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
BAU – Business As Usual 
BC – Black Carbon 
CCSP – Climate Change Science Program 
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism, a method by which Annex B nations in Kyoto can 
gain CERs by implementing emission reducing projects in non-Annex B nations 
CER – Certified Emission Reduction 
CFC – Chlorofluorocarbons 
CH4 – Methane 
CGE – Computable General Equilibrium 
CLM – Community Land Model 
CO2 – Carbon Dioxide 
CO2eq– Carbon Dioxide equivalents (using GWP weightings) 
CS – used in this thesis to refer specifically to equilibrium Climate Sensitivity – change in 
global mean temperature at equilibrium resulting from a doubling of CO2 
EINT – Energy intensive industries 
EMF – Energy Modeling Forum 
EMIC – Earth Model of Intermediate Complexity 
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency 
EPPA – Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis  (CGE economic modeling tool 
developed by the MIT Joint Program:  Appendix A) 
ETS – Emission Trading System (EU carbon trading) 
EU – European Union 
Faer – aerosol forcing parameter 
GAINS – Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies 
GCM – Global Climate Model 
GHG – Greenhouse Gas 
GTAP – Global Trade Analysis Project 
GtC – Gigatons of Carbon 
GtCeq – Gigatons of Carbon equivalent (using GWP weightings) 
GWP – Global Warming Potential  
HFC – Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC-134a is the representative species used in the IGSM) 
H2O – water 
ICLEI – International Council for Local Environment Initiatives 
IGSM – Integrated Global Systems Model (modeling tool developed by the Joint Program:  
Appendix B) 
INE – Instituto Nacional de Ecologia (Mexican environmental agency) 
IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI – Joint Implementation 
Kv – effective diffusion coefficient (a parameter to capture mixing by all processes, used in 
2D model) 
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Kz –  coefficient for vertical diffusion (small scale mixing parameter, used in 3D ocean 
model) 
LDC -  Least Developed Country 
LEV – Low Emission Vehicle 
LULUCF – Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry 
M2M – Methane to Markets 
MAC – Marginal Abatement Cost 
MERGE -  Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects 
MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MMT – Million Metric Tons 
N2O – Nitrous Oxide 
NEM – Natural Emissions Model 
NGCC – Natural Gas Combined Cycle 
NGCC_S/B – Shoulder or Base load 
NMVOC – Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compounds 
NOAA – National Oceanographic & Atmospheric Administration 
NO – Nitrogen Oxide 
NO2 – Nitrogen dioxide 
NOx – Nitrogen Oxides (usually NO + NO2)  
Non-Annex B – nations not included in Annex B 
OC – Organic Carbon 
OECD -  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OH – hydroxyl radical 
PC – Pulverized Coal 
PC_S/B – Shoulder or Base load 
pdf -  probability distribution function   
PFC – Perfluorocarbon (CF4 is the representative species used in the IGSM) 
PNNL -  Pacific Northwest National Labs 
PPP – Purchasing Power Parity 
SAR – Second Assessment Report of the IPCC 
SF6  – Sulfur hexaflouride 
SO2 – Sulfur dioxide 
SOx – Sulfur Oxides 
SRES – Special Report on Emission Scenarios 
TAR – Third Assessment Report of the IPCC 
TCR - Transient Climate Response - temperature change at the time of doubling CO2 in a 
1%/year increase scenario 
TEM – Terrestrial Ecosystem Model 
Ton – Throughout the thesis, ton refers to metric tonne 
ULEV – Ultra Low Emission Vehicle 
UN – United Nations 
UNEP – UN Environment Program 
UNFCC – UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
US – United States 
VOC – Volatile Organic Hydrocarbons 
W – Watt, equals joule/second 
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WMO – World Meteorological Association 
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